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ARTICLE
THE APPLICATION OF FINANCE THEORY TO
INCREASED RISK HARMS IN TOXIC
TORT LITIGATION
Robert J. Rhee*
In toxic tort litigation, a plaintiff has no cause of action for
increased risk of harm unless that risk is proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence to lead to a future physical injury. This rule of
law is based on an antiquated concept of uncertainty, and it evinces
the law's detachment both from other intellectual disciplines and
from the everyday workings of the world. This article argues that
freedom from increased risk should be a legally cognizable interest,
the violation of which gives rise to an independent cause of action.
When analyzed under finance theory, increased risk harms a per-
son by increasing costs, reducing economic asset value and impos-
ing a negative value option. The damage resulting from increased
risk can be quantified by applying securities and derivatives pricing
techniques used in the financial markets. This article further
argues that the rules of liability and damages proposed here create
the singular circumstance in law where the application of a statute
of limitations would be a suboptimal solution for defendants. The
statute of limitations imposes a barrier to informational efficiency
for both parties. Accordingly, it should be eliminated in increased
risk tort cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional tort law is built on three great pillars of protected
interests-body, property and money.' For each interest in this
troika, the injury is tangible, results in harm in fact and damages
can be readily valued. As the modern world speeds toward greater
technological development and knowledge, the challenge of the
law is to keep pace and to meet the demands of society.2 Similar to
the way technology and information drove the development of the
I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 7 cmt. b, 924 (1965). Of course, there are
other interests, such as invasion of privacy and defamation, but this troika represents the
primary interests protected under tort law. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2 The twentieth century has seen tort law become increasingly enmeshed in public pol-
icy. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 3, at 15.
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law of privacy,3 modern society is learning of new harms that merit
consideration of a remedy even though the interests involved defy
easy categorization under the prevailing legal scheme.4 Not so long
ago, agents of harm took the form of things readily apparent, and
causation and injury were routinely determined without serious
dispute.' The old dangers still exist today, but the world has
become more complicated, with the continued discovery of unseen
or undetected agents of harm like toxins.6 Moreover, progress in
medicine and epidemiology have helped link these agents to result-
ing bodily harms.7 Coinciding with these discoveries have been
advances in mathematics and social sciences, such as statistics and
financial economics, which have led to a better understanding of
risk and risk management.8 Nevertheless, courts have been slow to
protect interests beyond the traditional injury troika because the
current legal doctrines seem so inadequate to deal with new situa-
tions.9 This reluctance dislocates the law from the needs and
3 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195-
96 (1890) (arguing that the advent of new technology and cultural phenomena, like photog-
raphy and mass media, necessitates a right to privacy under tort law).
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (stating that the history of tort law
has shown "a continuous tendency to recognize as worthy of legal protection interests
which previously were not protected at all").
5 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 405 (D. Utah 1984) ("In most cases,
the factual connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury is not genuinely
in dispute. Often, the cause-and-effect relationship is obvious; A's vehicle strikes B, injur-
ing him; a bottle of A's product explodes, injuring B; water impounded on A's property
flows onto B's land, causing immediate damage."), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1987).
6 Most increased risk cases arise in medical malpractice or toxic tort litigation. See, e.g.,
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (toxic tort case); Petriello v.
Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990) (medical malpractice case). Toxic tort involves harm
to a person or property resulting from exposure to toxins. Recently, courts have seen an
increase in cases involving increased risk harms without any physical manifestation. See
Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1506-07 (1998).
7 Chief among these sciences is the study of epidemiology. See infra note 140; see gener-
ally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); Christopher Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (1991).
8 See infra Section II (discussing modern advances in the way financial economics treats
risk).
9 See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987) (noting that "common-
law tort doctrines are ill-suited to the resolution of such injury claims"); Melanie Leslie,
Liability for Increased Risk of Harm: A Lawyer's Response to Professor Shafer, 22 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2001) (noting that traditional tort doctrine is "ill-equipped to
deal with the uncertainties inherent in toxic tort cases"); see also Margaret Berger, Elimi-
nating General Causation: Notes Towards A New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2134 (1997) (noting that the causation element in toxic tort litigation
"knocks out the link between culpability and liability"); Andrew R. Klein, A Model for
Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173, 1177 n.23 (1999) ("Such
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expectations of society, and the law runs counter to the knowledge
culled from other intellectual fields10 This conflict is manifested in
cases of increased risk where a victim is exposed to an identifiable
risk of harm but the physical injury is latent. Such cases involve
two abstractions-risk 1 and time12-which pose a dilemma for a
legal system that values certainty and predictability. 13
Suppose a company negligently dumped carcinogens that
leached into the local drinking water and the evidence shows that
the plaintiff was exposed to a 25% to 30% increased risk of death
at some point in the distant future. 4 Most people would recognize
that the defendant's negligence put the plaintiff in a worse situa-
tion than she would be in without the culpable conduct.15 The
exposure increased her risk profile dramatically. Despite this com-
'paradigms' might be viewed as revolving around physical, emotional, or economic harm.
In enhanced risk cases, however, the plaintiff's injury simply cannot be so easily
compartmentalized.").
10 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 926 (1984) (reluctance of courts to
depart from traditional legal doctrine "may be a subtle admission of institutional incompe-
tence" to deal with scientific and other technical knowledge). Cf. DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LABORATORY OF JUSTICE (2004) (discussing how courts have struggled to integrate scien-
tific knowledge and discoveries into the legal framework).
11 Risk is defined as "the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage, or destruction ...
someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard or adverse chance ... the degree
of probability of such loss." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNA-
BRIDGED 1961 (1976). Obviously, without the law's hand, risk as a concept does not split
into alternative universes of the "probable" and the "possible." The common usage and
understanding is that risk exists across a spectrum.
12 Long latency periods are problematic because tort law requires that injury and causa-
tion be confirmed in the present unless that injury can be shown to probably occur in the
future.
13 This need for certainty and predictability is seen in the doctrine of stare decisis, where
past precedents serve as instruments of future predictability and certainty in the law. See
Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) ("[Stare decisis] not only plays an
important role in orderly adjudication; it also serves the broader societal interests in even-
handed, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules."); Oona Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law Sys-
tem, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 651 (2001) ("[T]he use of precedent contributes to greater
predictability and certainty in the law."); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Prece-
dent, 38 VAND. L. REv. 495, 496 (1985) ("The reason most often given for the practice of
precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial decisions."). But see Nancy Levit,
Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 137-38 (1992) (noting that the law has increas-
ingly recognized uncertainty on both doctrinal and theoretical levels).
14 These facts are from Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988), which is discussed at infra page 140-41 and accompanying notes.
15 See, e.g., Metro-North Commuters R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 443 (1997)
(holding that a plaintiff who had been exposed to asbestos "has suffered wrong at the
hands of a negligent employer" but the wrong is not cognizable until there is a physical
manifestation).
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monsensical truth, courts have struggled to define the harm and
causally connect the possibility of a future bodily injury to the
defendant's conduct.16 Tort law is built on the concept that there
can be no cause of action without an injury that is causally con-
nected to a defendant's wrongdoing. 17 Increased risk cases present
a conflict between an intuitive (almost visceral) understanding of
the plaintiff's misfortune and the traditional framework of accident
law. Addressing these concerns, most courts have applied the
traditional rule, often called the "all-or-nothing" rule, which states
that if a plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
the increased risk will manifest into a physical injury, she can
recover the present value of the damages for the future injury as if
she currently suffers from it; otherwise she recovers nothing.
18
Increased risk cases present unique challenges. Unlike most
ordinary accidents where the proof is in the eye or the ear, physical
injury and its causality are not past events requiring judicial recon-
struction, but rather future events requiring judicial prediction. 9
One can only assess the probability of future injury and draw infer-
ences from this assessment. In dealing with this abstraction, courts
have clung to an antiquated concept of uncertainty that ignores the
common expectation and the realities of modern society and mar-
kets. The problem stems from a fundamental misapprehension of
the interest and harm at stake.2° The interest, courts have
assumed, is the freedom from personal injuries.2 a Under this
rubric, the struggle has been to recognize an unmanifested bodily
injury and to link that risk of harm to the defendant's conduct
16 See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1188; Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219
(D. Mass. 1986).
17 The concepts of duty, breach, general and legal causation, and injury are standard fare
in tort law. See Joseph King, "Reduction of Likelihood" Reformation and Other Retrofit-
ting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 491, 497-99 (1998). But under
some circumstances, traditional notions of causation are abolished, as is the case in the loss
of chance cases and the market share theory of liability. See infra Section III.B (discussing
loss of chance) and Section V.E (discussing market share liability).
18 See infra Section III.A (discussing the traditional rule).
19 See, e.g., Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) (recov-
ery only if plaintiff "can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to"
injury), modified on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986).
20 Harm is a detriment in fact and is different from an injury, which is the invasion of a
legally protected interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) cmt. a (1965); see also
infra Section V.A (discussing harm and injury).
21 See, e.g., Pietrzak v. Eggen, 295 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. 1980) ("[T]he plaintiff is
entitled to an instruction on future damages if he or she has shown that such damage is
more likely to occur than not to occur."); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 264
(N.J. 1989) ("[P]laintiff must prove that the prospective disease is at least reasonably prob-
able to occur.").
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under a causation analysis. The glue connecting these elements is
the preponderance of the evidence standard, which separates the
"probable" (deemed a legal certainty) from the "possible"
(deemed mere speculation).22
The law treats risk not as a spectrum of information on adverse
chance but as a formalistic dichotomy that supposedly proves
injury-in-fact and causation. Yet the traditional analysis does not
prove causation and injury as perceived by the law, which in fact
have not occurred; instead it creates the legal fiction of injury and
so causation as well. 3 Many scholars have criticized the traditional
rule, and their arguments have primarily focused on various policy
considerations: the unfairness and arbitrariness of the rule,24 the
under-deterrence of harmful conduct and related social utility con-
cerns, the under-compensation of plaintiffs, 6 the violation of a
victim's autonomy 2 and the "moral responsibility" of defendants.2 8
Based on these considerations, various solutions to the increased
22 See infra text accompanying notes 137-148 (discussing evidentiary hurdles imposed by
the traditional tort doctrines).
23 See infra Section IV.A.
24 See, e.g., 2 J. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 13.02 (2001) ("The pri-
mary motivation of the courts for permitting damages for such an injury is fairness.");
Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules of Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 893 (1982) (advocating fairness of proportional recovery
because "there is neither over- nor under-deterrence"); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1370, 1376 (1981) (arguing that the traditional rule is
"arbitrary").
25 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 263-68 (1987) (proposing the social utility function of tort law); Neil Orloff
& Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Stan-
dard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1169 (1983) ("While some plaintiffs are under-compensated
and others are over-compensated, they received, as a group, exactly the amount to which
they are entitled."); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tor-
tious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 783-89 (1985) ("In the utilitarian model the essential
function of a tort system is efficient risk management in order to reduce the net social costs
of accidents, that is, the excess of accident-related costs over activity-related benefits.").
26 See, e.g., 2 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 9:16 (Gerald W.
Boston ed., 3d ed. 1997) ("Compensation should be given for the fact of increased suscepti-
bility to the illness."); Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 881 (proportionality rule preserves the
"value of entitlements"); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risk, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 466-69 (1990) (proportionality rule meets need to
compensate victims across broader class).
27 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a
Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781, 789 (1988)
(proposing the elimination of traditional doctrines because "violation of a person's bodily
autonomy ... is also an injury that the law should recognize and compensate").
28 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9, at 2131-34 (arguing that companies have moral respon-
sibility to remedy injuries caused).
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risk problem have been proposed. 29 This article builds on some of
these arguments, particularly with respect to the logical and legal
inconsistencies of the traditional approach.3" But the primary pur-
pose of this article is not to criticize the traditional rule on policy
grounds; that has been ably done by others. 31 Rather, its purpose
is to show that based on an application of finance theory, increased
risk is itself both a harm and an injury.32 Here too the suggestion
has been made,33 but thus far there has not been an adequate
29 See id. at 2152 (arguing for the elimination of the causation element); E. Donald Elli-
ott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 801 (1985) (proposing
legislative remedial solutions); King, supra note 24, at 1382 (proposing a proportional
scheme of recovery); Klein, supra note 9, at 1210 (adopting rule of recovery but only if the
relative risk is at least doubled); Robinson, supra note 25, at 787 (advocating damages
calculated as "equal to the present value of future losses multiplied by the estimated
probability of their occurrence"); Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 908-10 (proposing propor-
tional recovery scheme under a "public law" approach in which class actions deal with
mass exposures); Glenn Shafer, Causality and Responsibility, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1811,
1832-34 (2001) (proposing class actions to proportionally distribute remedies). But see
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1650-
60 (2002) (arguing that probabilistic injuries are unrealized harms and thus not cognizable
injuries); Jonathan C. Mosher, A Pound of Cause for a Penny of Proof: The Failed Econ-
omy of an Eroded Causation Standard in Toxic Tort Cases, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531
(2003) (arguing against the erosion of traditional causation standards in toxic tort litiga-
tion); Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscien-
tific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987) (advocating
adherence to traditional concept of causation).
The topic of increased risk has also been a favorite topic for student scholars. See, e.g.,
Gregory L. Ash, Comment, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an Increased
Risk Cause of Action, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087 (1990); David Ashton, Comment, Decreas-
ing the Risks Inherent in Claims for Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1081, 1103-05 (1989); Kira Elert, Note, Dillon v. Evanston Hospital: Illinois Adopts the
New Increased Risk Doctrine Governing Recovery for Future Injury, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
685, 691 (2003); Keith Lapeze, Comment, Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisi-
ana, 58 LA. L. REV. 249, 254 n.35 (1997); Barton Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as
an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563, 568 (1984); Tamsen 0. Love, Note, Deterring
Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances: The Case for Legislative Recognition of
Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 VAND. L. REV. 789 (1996); Deirdre A. McDonnell,
Comment, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an Alternative to
the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL. Ari. L. REV.
623, 647-48 (1997); Diane Schmauder, Note, An Analysis of New Jersey's Increased Risk
Doctrine, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 893, 926-31 (1994).
30 See infra Section III.A (discussing the policy concerns surrounding the traditional rule
and the proportionality approach). This article agrees that a proportionality approach, in
general, is a superior method in increased risk torts. But it proposes that the damage calcu-
lation method under the proportionality rule is also flawed and could lead to significant
overcompensation of the victims. See infra Section VI.A.
31 See supra notes 24-29.
32 See infra Section V.A (discussing the harms suffered by exposed victims).
33 See Elert, supra note 29, at 696 ("[A] court should focus upon whether a defendant
caused an increased risk itself."); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for
Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143, 160 (1990) ("In other words, is the risk of
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explanation outside of an ex post justification that legal recognition
of risk as an injury is necessary to legitimize the broad array of
policy considerations.
Increased risk does not fit squarely into the traditional paradigm
of injury,34 and so has been characterized as a "noncognizable" or
unrealized injury of an inchoate nature.35 Such characterizations
are made from a physical point of reference, and arguments based
on that perspective lead to but one conclusion. Rather than being
explanatory, these characterizations merely beg the question and
underscore the struggle to articulate this new interest within the
conventional language of tort interests.36 The interest here
involves a hybrid tort, sharing traits of a negligence action for bod-
ily injuries and an informational tort like invasion of privacy or def-
amation. In one sense, it is a contingent claim for personal injury;
in another sense, it is a claim for economic damages to the victim's
future earning stream, which is a capital asset akin to a property
interest; and yet it is also information concerning adverse uncer-
tainty that is the true harm. Although an accident precipitates the
cause of action, the essential nature and character of the injury
defies convenient or conventional classification. An interdiscipli-
nary analysis can link these seemingly disparate characterizations
into a better understanding of the interest and injury at stake.37
The recognition of a new legal interest involves several consider-
ations. This article addresses the following questions. Is increased
harm itself a harm? The answer may be yes, but less obviously than in case of physical
injury."); Schroeder, supra note 26, at 442 (arguing that increased risk is harm that should
be recoverable under corrective justice theory).
34 See Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 903 (Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) ("The old rules of causation simply don't work-because toxics are not auto-
mobiles or the other instruments of sudden destruction so familiar to the law."); Love,
supra note 29, at 805 ("Courts typically try to force these causes of action into the tradi-
tional tort paradigm, with the result that plaintiffs are faced with difficult and often insur-
mountable barriers to recovery.").
35 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 165 ("The threat of future harm, not
yet realized, is not enough."); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1634 ( "[Heightened
risk] is, at most, a noncognizable harm-a harm but not an injury .... ).
36 See Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It is obvious
that proof of damages in such cases would be highly speculative, likely resulting in wind-
falls for those who never take ill and insufficient compensation for those who do. Requir-
ing manifest injury as a necessary element of an asbestos related tort action avoids these
problems and best serves the underlying purpose of tort law: the compensation of victims
who have suffered.").
37 Daniel Farber, Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 727, 737 (1990) (observing that
legal scholarship in this matter has tended to separate rules of liability, evidence and dam-
age, and this compartmentalization has created intellectual inertia that has hindered
analysis).
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risk a harm? If so, what is the nature of that harm? Is there a
societal expectation of compensation? Are there policy reasons
militating for or against such an interest? How should damages be
calculated? How should such an independent cause of action be
administered procedurally? Unless these questions are answered,
the debate will continue to revolve around policy grounds, the per-
suasiveness of which, however eloquent, is limited when the alter-
native is to throw out hallowed principles of tort law such as
causation and injury.
Section II discusses the way financial economics and modern
markets treat risk, and how risk affects the pricing of securities, the
valuation of firms, and the decisions of firms, governments and
individuals. The purpose of this section is to put the forthcoming
legal discussion of risk in the broader context of social expecta-
tions, the ordinary workings of the world order outside of the law,
and an interdisciplinary understanding.
Section III discusses the doctrines of increased risk and loss of
chance. For such a controversial field, courts have been consistent
in fashioning substantive rules dealing with risk and latent injuries.
This section also discusses the administrative problems of applying
a statute of limitations and res judicata to latent injuries.
Section IV discusses the various criticisms levied against the
traditional approach. It shows that a proportionality scheme, in
principle, is more consistent with the goals of tort law and provides
a more accurate allocation of remedy and deterrence.
Section V discusses the nature of the harm caused by increased
risk from the perspective of finance theory. This discussion will
build on the financial concepts discussed in Section II. Increased
risk changes the essential nature and character of the victim. In
this light, a victim can be analogized to a financial instrument, and
securities pricing techniques can be used to measure the harm.
Section VI proposes two alternative methods to calculate dam-
ages: economic asset valuation and option pricing theory. Under
both the traditional and proportionality schemes, a potential for
significant overcompensation exists because both methods are
static calculations. Finance theory presupposes the dynamic nature
of risk and time, which cannot be ignored in the valuation of
uncertainty.
Section VII discusses statutes of limitations. A statute of limita-
tions always favors the defendant. But when the rules of law pro-
posed by this article are applied, it creates the singular
circumstance where the imposition of a statute of limitations is
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
suboptimal for defendants. Accordingly, this article proposes the
elimination of statutes of limitations for increased risk cases on
efficiency grounds.
II. RISK IN NONLEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Value of Risk
The problems posed by risk are not unique to the law. Uncer-
tainty is as ubiquitous as the air we breathe.3 8 While the law has
searched for order and predictability in the complexities of human
interactions, the intellectual understanding of risk has been greatly
advanced by fields outside of the law such as statistics, epidemiol-
ogy, insurance and financial economics.39 These disciplines seek to
understand and manage uncertainty in the context of their respec-
tive fields. Financial economics is the study of risk in the context of
investments and finance, and this article uses its principles to
bridge the gap between the social costs of uncertainty and the
framework of tort law.
If the first order principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence is
the notion of fundamental fairness,4" then its equivalent in financial
economics is that risk has value. If this were not the case, financial
markets would not exist-nor would insurance, banking, credit
cards, mortgages, consumer warranties or lotteries. The modern
world assigns value to risk; it assesses, trades, buys and sells risk-
not in the speculative manner of a prodigal gambler-but in the
rational choices of individuals, firms and governments. This under-
standing was not always the case, however. As Bernstein astutely
observed:
The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between
modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion
that the future is more than a whim of the gods and that
men and women are not passive before nature. Until
human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the
future was a mirror of the past or the murky domain of ora-
38 The law has long recognized the problem of "negligence in the air." Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
39 Statistics is the branch of mathematics that deals with probabilities and relationships
among numbers. Epidemiology is the science of disease distribution and causes among
human populations, and uses statistical inferences to show relationships between illnesses
and cause. See infra note 140; see generally Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of
Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429,
431-33 (1983).
40 See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 955 (1984) (noting that "notions of fundamental
fairness ... are at the heart of Anglo-American law").
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cles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge
of anticipated events.
41
Like many of the technological and informational breakthroughs
of the twentieth century, financial economics has had a revolution-
ary impact on industry and society.42 Only recently could financial
risk be calculated in a quantitatively rational manner rather than
be assessed with intuition or a certain gambling spirit.43 While
there have been many noteworthy contributions to finance theory
in the past fifty years, this article focuses on three theories that
illustrate the concept of the value of risk: the Efficient Portfolio
Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Black-Scholes
Option Pricing Model. These theories were chosen because their
underlying principles are relevant to this article's discussion of
increased risk torts, the nature of litigation risk, and some of the
key ideas on damage calculation.44
41 PETER BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 1 (1996).
The subject of risk has occupied the thoughts of the great economic thinkers. For instance,
Adam Smith characterized the "universal" tendency for humans to speculate as an "over-
weening conceit." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. X, at 124 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994). Yet
John Maynard Keynes observed that a certain risk-taking spirit is a prime catalyst for
capitalism:
Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters,
leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise
will fade and die;-though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable
than hopes of profit had before .... [I]t is our innate urge to activity which
makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alterna-
tives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for
our motive on whim or sentiment or chance.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 162-63 (1964).
42 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 57-72. The serious study of risk began during the
Renaissance. Id. at 3. One of the first major breakthroughs was the discovery of
probability theory in 1654 by Chevalier de Mdr6, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat. Id. at
57-72. The law of probability and statistics then became the cornerstone of the study of
modern finance, as well as a wide range of natural and social sciences.
43 Some of the most important breakthroughs in financial economics occurred in only
the past fifty years. The revolution in financial thought arguably began in 1952 when Harry
Markowitz showed the quantitative relationship between risk and reward. See infra note
45 and accompanying text; see also Christopher Farrell, Three Wise Men of Finance, Busl-
NESS WEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at 20 (noting the pioneering works of Markowitz, William
Sharpe and Merton Miller, and their theories on efficient portfolios, option pricing and
capital asset pricing, as having profound impacts on modern finance).
44 See infra text accompanying notes 228-230 (discussing the Efficient Portfolio Theory
in the context of litigation risks); infra Section V.C & Section VI.C (discussing the Capital
Asset Pricing Model in the context of comparing the underlying economic asset value of a
firm to a person and discussing damage valuation); infra Section V.D & Section VI.B (dis-
cussing the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model in the context of damage valuation under
an option pricing theory).
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Until recently, no one could quantify the concept of market risk
or the effect of individual stock selections on a portfolio's risk-
reward profile. That changed when Harry Markowitz proposed the
Efficient Portfolio Theory in 1952. He showed that it is mathemati-
cally superior to diversify one's investments in an efficient portfolio
rather than to concentrate all investments in a single basket.45
Markowitz noted that any given investment is subject to two forms
of risk: market and unique risk.46 Market risk is the risk that can-
not be reduced by diversification: the general, systemic risk that
can adversely affect all stocks (e.g., risk of market downturn, inter-
est rate movements, political-economic developments, etc.). 47
Unique risk is the risk associated with an investment in a particular
company (e.g., quality of management, competitive positioning,
financial resources, and the like). 48 A well-diversified portfolio can
mitigate the unique risk and approximate the remaining market
risk.49
In an uncertain world of limited resources, risk and reward are
conjoined twins. The level of risk assumed is a discretionary mat-
ter depending on the individual investor's preference. Markowitz's
insight was not that risk was bad per se, but that unnecessary risk
was not good (a concept that should be readily apparent in
increased risk cases as well)." He proved that portfolios can be
structured so that for each level of risk appetite there is an efficient
portfolio that maximizes expected returns.-" Thus he proved that
unnecessary risk can be reduced by the stock selection in a portfo-
lio.52 Today, diversification of risk is the keystone concept of cor-
porate finance and investment management, and the Efficient
45 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952) ("[A] rule of behavior
which does not imply the superiority of diversification must be rejected both as a hypothe-
sis and as a maxim.").
46 RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 137
(4th ed. 1991).
47 See Markowitz, supra note 45, at 79 ("Diversification cannot eliminate all variance.").
Market risk is sometimes called systemic or undiversifiable risk. BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 46, at 137.
48 Unique risk is sometimes called unsystemic, diversifiable, specific or residual risk.
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 137.
49 Markowitz, supra note 45, at 79.
50 Markowitz observed that most investors consider "yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad
thing; gambling, to be avoided." Id. at 91.
51 Id. ("There is a rate at which the investor can gain expected return by taking on
variance, or reduce variance by giving up expected return.").
52 Id. at 80-90.
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Portfolio Theory was the theoretical precursor to the growth of the
modern mutual fund industry.5 3
Prior to the mid-1960s, the market did not have a generally
accepted theory to value a firm because there was no method
to quantify the risk associated with the firm.54 Without the ability
to quantify the risk, valuation was largely a qualitative assess-
ment. William Sharpe, John Lintner and Jack Treynor solved this
problem with the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). 56
Under CAPM, all equity investments are compared to the
expected return of the general market,5 and a linear regression is
53 The theory is so ingrained today that even novice investors are familiar with the con-
cept of diversification. Interestingly, diversification was not a new idea when Markowitz
first championed his theory. The concept has been noted in curious places. For example,
Antonio-the merchant in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice-explained his invest-
ment strategy this way: "My ventures are not in one bottom trusted, nor to one place; nor
is my whole estate upon the fortune of this present year; Therefore, my merchandise makes
me not sad." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, sc. 1, cited in
BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 93.
54 "Throughout most of the history of stock markets ... it never occurred to anyone to
define risk with a number. Stocks were risky and some were riskier than others, and peo-
ple let it go at that. Risk was in the gut, not in the numbers." BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at
247.
55 This approach is seen in Graham & Dodd's classic treatise on security valuation,
which set forth the following theory of stock valuation: "The value of a common stock
depends entirely upon what it will earn in the future." BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID
DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: THE CLASSIC 1940 SECOND EDITION 351 (1962). Yet when
Graham and Dodd stated this "complete revolution in the philosophy of common-stock
investment" in 1940, they were unable to quantify the risk, and so could not calculate
value. Id. at 352, 362. This "lack of well-defined and authoritative views" of valuation
prompted them to counsel that stocks should be valued largely on qualitative assessments
that are "reasonable," one parameter being past performance, and that achieve sufficient
diversification. Id. at 362-71.
56 See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); William F.
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19
J. FIN. 425 (1964). Treynor's article has not been published. BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 46, at 161 & n.9.
57 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 162. Data on the market risk premium, defined
as the market return minus the risk free rate, is readily available. Between 1926 and 1993,
the arithmetic average of the market risk premium was 6.9% and the geometric average
return was 5.0%. THOMAS E. COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAG-
ING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 260-61 (2d ed. 1995). Arithmetic return average is the
average of the year over year return for any given time period. Geometric return average
is the compound internal rate of return from the beginning to the ending time period. Id.
Based on these data, Copeland et al. recommend that the market risk premium be five to
six percent. Id. at 260. General practices in the financial markets are consistent with these
rates. See G. BENNETr STEWART, III, THE QUEST FOR VALUE: A GUIDE FOR SENIOR
MANAGERS 438 (1991) ("Is there any fundamental reason why market risk premium
should be 6%? Not that I can figure. The question is a little like asking why did God make
pi the number 3.14159 ... Don't ask. Just memorize it, and then head out to recess.").
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calculated. 58 In mathematical terms, the linear regression calcu-
lates the slope of the stock's returns against expected market
return, the slope value being the beta.59 The beta then is the com-
parative measure of the expected stock return versus the market
return.60  For instance, if the expected market return is 10%, a
stock with a 2.0 beta means that the expected return of that stock is
20%. A firm's risk premium is defined as the measure of the over-
all risk associated with that stock, i.e., the expected return neces-
sary to induce a rational investor to invest in that particular stock
given its unique risks.61 CAPM measures the risk premium relative
to the market return and the risk-free investment rate, both of
which are easily calculable.62  Based on this understanding of a
stock's relative risk, CAPM postulates that the risk premium for
any given asset is Ra = 1l (Rn, - Rf) + Rf, where Rf is the risk-free
rate,63 Rn is the market return, and 3 is the stock's beta.64 With a
theory to measure a stock's unique risk profile, investors were
58 Linear regression is a statistical technique that takes a set of data points and finds the
line that best fits the data. See STEWART, supra note 57, at 440-41 (discussing beta
regression).
59 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 183-89. The regression and the slope are
expressed in the formula: Ra = a + (P x R.) + e, where R, is the return for a specific asset,
R. is the market return, a and P are the intercept and slope of the regression of Ra and R.,
and e is the error term.
60 Id. at 162. Betas are unique to each company and may change over time. Also, each
business sector has a risk profile as seen by average betas throughout different industries.
See STEWART, supra note 57, at 451-52 (discussing betas for various industries).
61 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 183-84.
62 Id. at 180.
63 In the investment world, only U.S. Treasury securities are considered completely risk-
free. Id. at 159, 161. Even when there is no risk, an investor still expects to earn a return
because of the time value of money. Yields on Treasury bills, notes and bonds are com-
monly used as the prevailing risk-free rates in many financial calculations including the
Black-Scholes formula, the CAPM, and the weighted average cost of capital calculation for
cost of capital. All other investments are associated with a certain risk for which there
must be commensurate expectation of reward.
64 CAPM can be understood as calculating the opportunity cost of equity. An investor
has a spectrum of investment choices. She can invest in a risk-free investment (i.e., U.S.
Treasury instruments) or alternative investments with a range of risk. The greater the risk,
the greater the expected return on the investment for the risk taken. The investor can also
invest in a portfolio or index that closely approximates the market return. The term (R,, -
Rf) is the measure of expected market return in excess of the risk-free rate. This net return
is the market risk premium. See supra note 57. An equity investment is then compared
against the market risk premium as weighted by the beta. This measure captures the
expected return requirements for the risks taken on the particular stock, net of the risk-
free rate which is then added back to calculate the overall expected return for that invest-
ment. Thus, CAPM answers the simple question: How much return is needed to entice an
investor to invest in that particular stock vis-A-vis a risk-free investment or a market
portfolio?
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given the tools needed to value an asset using a risk-based, quanti-
tative method rather than qualitative or accounting assessments, as
was the case before CAPM.65
Until recently, option pricing also suffered from a lack of a disci-
plined valuation methodology. An option is one of the most basic
forms of a derivative security.66 It gives the holder the right but
not the obligation to buy or sell an underlying asset, typically a
stock, for a fixed price within a specified time period.67 Despite the
simplicity of an option contract, its valuation was elusive. In 1973,
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes solved this problem. 68 Although
mathematically complex, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula
revolves around the concept that option value is dynamic and mul-
tivariate. The formula captures the interplay of six variables on
option value: the current stock price, the strike price, time to
maturity, the volatility of the stock, dividend yield, and the risk-
free rate. All else being equal, each factor was understood to
affect option value,69 but no one could calculate the effect on value
for the infinite permutations of the six variables until the publica-
65 The CAPM has been criticized on the basis that beta does not accurately measure
asset returns. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of
Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 428 (1992) ("In short, our tests do not support the
most basic prediction of the [CAPM] that average stock returns are positively related to
market beta."). Despite these concerns, "CAPM combines so many strands of theoretical
innovation that it remains the keystone of investment theory, theories of market behavior
and the allocation of capital in both private and public enterprises." Michael Peitz, Is This
the Night of the Living Beta?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1992, at 42 (quoting Peter
Bernstein). Cf. PETER BOSSAERTS, THE PARADOX OF ASSET PRICING X (Princeton Univ.
Press 2002) ("To put this differently, asset pricing is paradoxical. On the one hand, the
theory is so persuasive that it is widely believed to be correct, to the point that business and
both the executive and jurisdictional [sic] parts of government appeal to it. Yet there is
little evidence that the theory explains the past, let alone that it predicts the future."). In
investment banking and corporate finance practices, CAPM and the Discounted Cash
Flow analysis are the primary analytic tools to conduct a theoretical valuation.
66 JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (3d ed. 1997).
67 See infra Section II.D (discussing options).
68 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81
J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); see also JoHN C. Cox & MARK RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS
1204-12 (1985) (presenting Black-Scholes formula and the underlying mathematical con-
cepts); Peter H. Huang, Teaching Corporate Law from an Option Perspective, 34 GA. L.
REV. 571 (2000) (discussing options without the mathematical details). Huang provides a
number of graphs and charts that explain the characteristics of various options and option
trading strategies. Id. at 582-91.
69 For call options, increasing the following variables while keeping all other variables
the same has the following increasing (T) or decreasing (,.) effects on option value: stock
price (T), strike price (.1), time to maturity (T), volatility (T), risk-free rate (T), and divi-
dends (,.). HULL, supra note 66, at 157. For put options, the effects are: stock price (.1),
strike price ("), time to maturity (T), volatility (T), risk-free rate (,[), and dividends (T). Id.
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tion of the Black-Scholes formula.70 Similar to the way the Effi-
cient Portfolio Theory cultured the mutual fund industry, the
Black-Scholes theory sparked the explosive growth of the modern
derivatives market.7 '
B. Credit Valuation
The measure of a firm's value depends on its bundle of risks and
potential returns, which together constitute uncertainty and value.
Risk affects all aspects of the firm's operations and valuation,
including the issuance of debt and equity securities.72 A firm incurs
a cost for issuing any security instrument, and such costs are deter-
mined by a combination of the firm's unique risk profile and the
general market risk. The higher a firm's risk, the higher is the
expected return on the instrument, and either the cash flow yield
must be higher and/or the valuation must be lower to provide the
investor with a higher return.73
As ancient societies grew-to understand risk, they began to trade
it and markets were created. One of the simplest forms of risk
trade is the market for credit. Credit long predated industry, bank-
70 The Black-Scholes formula can now be programmed into a handheld calculator and
there are a number of websites that calculate option value. For example, how much is an
option in a share of IBM worth on December 9, 2003 if the stock price closed at $90.63, the
option strike price is $110, and the option expires two years on December 9, 2005? If we
assume a dividend yield of 0.7%, a risk-free rate of 4.5%, and volatility of 20%, then as of
December 9, 2003, the option was worth $5.94. See http://www.numa.com/derivs/ref/calcu-
lat/option/calc-opa.htm (providing a Black-Scholes option calculator on the Internet) (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004). The theoretical option value changes daily because the time to
maturity changes as well as the other factors. While the calculation can be mechanical,
option valuation is far from rote. The valuation depends on calculations and assumptions
of future volatility and risk-free rates. Like anything else, trading in options involves in
large part a disciplined understanding of the fundamentals of a very technical subfield of
finance, a healthy portion of intuition and a little bit of luck.
71 See MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 3 (1997) (describing the
tremendous growth of the derivatives market in the 1990s); Niall Ferguson, Who's Buried
by Higher Rates?, FORTUNE, June 21, 2004, at 70 (noting that since December 2000, "the
gross market value of over-the-counter derivative contracts has grown from $3 trillion to
nearly $8 trillion" according to the Bank for International Settlements); see also Kimberly
Krawiec, More than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding
Derivatives, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (1997) (discussing the legal and financial risks of
derivatives).
72 There are also hybrid instruments such as preferred stocks, convertible bonds and
convertible preferred stocks, which have characteristics of both depbt and equity.
73 In consideration, the issuer can give the investor money (e.g., interest payments), con-
cessions in valuation (e.g., issuing shares at lower prices), or a combination of monetary
payments and valuation concessions (e.g., convertible bonds or preferred shares).
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ing, coinage, and probably primitive forms of money. 4 Like
equity, credit has two risks: the unique creditworthiness of the bor-
rower, and the prevailing market cost of credit.75 The higher the
risk of default or the cost of funds, the greater is the cost of debt.
Keynes described the risk-reward concept embedded in the theory
of interest rates:
For if a venture is a risky one, the borrower will require a
wider margin between his expectation of yield and the rate
of interest at which he will think it worth his while to bor-
row; whilst the same reason will lead the lender to require a
wider margin between what he charges and the pure rate of
interest in order to induce him to lend (except where the
borrower is so strong and wealthy that he is in a position to
offer exceptional margin of security).76
This concept applies equally to sovereign bonds of nations and con-
sumer credit cards.
The cost of debt is intuitively understood. It is the interest
expense on borrowing.77 Because interest expense is paid in cash
or recognized as an accrued liability, it is an out-of-pocket eco-
nomic cost, something the law has no trouble recognizing as a tan-
gible cost.78 The interest rate depends on credit quality, which
assesses the riskiness of the borrower.79
74 SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 3 (3d ed. 1991).
Homer and Sylla note that Hammurabi, circa 1800 B.C., regulated interest rates (33.33%
for loan on grain and 20% for loans on silver) and explicitly provided for collaterization by
debt slavery subject to a three year limit. Id.
75 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 663.
76 KEYNES, supra note 41, at 145.
77 Less intuitive are zero coupon bonds, which are priced at a discount to face value.
The cost of debt is the discount, which reflects the credit risk of the issuer/borrower, and
the interest cost is calculated by the yield to maturity. Credit instruments are compared
based on yield to maturity rather than the nominal interest rate. Yield to maturity repre-
sents the internal rate of return for the bond. The yield represents the true interest charge
based on the purchase price or the fair market value of the credit instrument, and allows a
true comparison of various credit instruments. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at
562 (discussing yield to maturity and term structure of interest rates).
78 Accordingly, the law protects an individual's freedom from wrongfully imposed inter-
est expenses. See Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2004).
79 The debts of firms and sovereign nations are evaluated by professional rating agen-
cies. Two of the most prominent agencies are Moody's Investor Service and Standard &
Poor's. For individuals, creditworthiness is evaluated by credit reporting agencies such as
Trans Union, Experian, and Equifax.
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C. Equity Valuation
Equity is the ownership interest in a business venture. The con-
cept of equity incorporates the raison d'tre of a community: col-
lective self-advancement and economic benefit through
cooperative enterprise. 80 Although no one knows for certain when
the first equity investment was made, we can speculate that it took
place when primitive humans learned that hunting in a partnership
was more fruitful than a solo effort. Equity interest became more
commoditized with the invention of the corporate form, which is
the dominant economic institution of the modern era and the form
most conducive to public trading.81 As with the cost of credit, the
cost of equity reflects the underlying risk.8" But unlike credit costs,
equity costs are not as accessible because the cost is not in the form
of an immediate monetary payment like interest expense, but
rather is embedded in the firm's valuation. Nevertheless, the cost
of equity is no less tangible or consequential.
Equity valuation depends on how value is perceived. A share of
stock in a firm can be viewed in two ways. Under the accounting
view, a share derives its value from the assets of the firm, or at least
80 See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND
IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 18-19 (7th ed. 1999).
81 In Western society, the concept of the corporation was well-established at the begin-
ning of the Middle Ages, when it was applied to ecclesiastical bodies, civic entities like
boroughs, and craft and trade guilds, which collectively formed the dominant economic
institutions of the era. D.L. Mazumdar, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 187, 187 (1965). Gradually, the legal concepts associated with the corpo-
rate form took root: independent personage, indefinite survival, capacity to own property,
and the right to sue and be sued. Id. at 187-88. By the middle of the 16th century, the
corporate form was used to set up national mercantile organizations of the type of the
Chartered Companies of the 16th, 17th and 18th century, the most famous being the East
India Company. Id. at 188. By the second half of the 19th century, the corporation
became the dominant form of industrial enterprise in all Western countries. Id. at 189.
82 Stocks are generally riskier than bonds for several reasons. Bonds are contracts in
which the issuer promises to repay the loan and that promise is ultimately secured by the
assets of the issuer. On the other hand, stocks are subordinate to bonds in a liquidation,
and generally there is no commitment or requirement to pay dividends. Some bonds, pri-
marily high yield or "junk" bonds, are so risky that their yields approximate returns on
equity. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 663-64.
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a subordinate claim on those assets.83 Equity then is balance sheet
driven (defined as assets minus liabilities), a tangible concept.8
Under the finance perspective, equity is viewed as a participa-
tion in the firm's risk. It is not a residual asset but rather a contin-
gent claim on the future earnings of the firm as discounted by
risk. Market value depends on an evaluation of the firm's risks as
compared to the potential rewards.86 The greater the anticipated
earnings, the greater is the valuation; as a corollary, the greater the
perceived risk to earnings, the less is the valuation. Value is not a
function of the value of assets and liabilities, 88 but depends on the
interrelationship between the stream of anticipated earnings and
its associated risks.89 We can see this concept at work by examin-
83 GERALD WHITE ET AL., THE ANALYSIS AND USE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 13
(1994) ("Equity is therefore the residual interest in the net assets of an entity that remains
after deducting its liabilities."). The components of stockholder equity are the paid in capi-
tal, which is the money contributed by shareholders to purchase a newly-issued share, and
the retained earnings, which are the accumulation of net earnings after dividends are paid.
Id. at 19-20.
84 This is readily understood by the accounting equation: Assets = Liabilities + Equity.
Id. at 13. The equity in a financial statement is typically called the book value. In a liqui-
dation, the "breakup" value of the firm depends on the fair market value of assets and
liabilities vis-A-vis the book value. Upon liquidation, a company's assets are first distrib-
uted to creditors, and whatever is left is apportioned pro rata between equity holders. In
many liquidations, there are no more assets left over, and the equity holders are simply out
of luck. See Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in
Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2557 (2003) ("In liquidation, how-
ever, it is uncommon for equity to be paid anything even in the best of circumstances
...."). Regardless of whether assets and liabilities are considered under book or fair
market value, equity is seen as a balance sheet item under the accounting view.
85 See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 26 ("[E]quity holders ... are the residual
claimants on the cash flows of a company.").
86 Id. at 27. Risk drives the cost of capital for each firm, also known as the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC).
87 A firm with a higher volatility of earnings will be valued less than one with a lower
volatility, all else being equal. Volatility of earnings shows that the expected cash flows are
subject to higher risk. Higher risk is not a good thing and must be compensated by higher
returns to the investor, which is accomplished by lower valuations. Thus, certain compa-
nies or industries have traditionally suffered from lower valuation multiples than others
due to the perceived comparative risk.
88 See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 76 (noting that "the DCF model is concep-
tually superior to the accounting model"). This is a general statement, and there are some
notable exceptions. Some businesses that earn profits primarily from yields on assets are
driven by the net asset value. Banks, insurers, and some real estate companies fall into this
category. Also, valuations for the purposes of mergers and acquisitions sometimes employ
"breakup" valuation techniques. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into these
matters.
89 In practice, book value will seldom reflect the fair market value of the equity. This
accounts for the difference between market and book values. For example, as of Septem-
ber 30, 2003, IBM reported in its 10-Q that shareholders' equity was $27.3 billion. As of
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ing how the CAPM is used to value stock in the Discounted Cash
Flow ("DCF") method of valuation.
The DCF method is the primary theoretical basis for calculating
a firm's equity value in the financial markets today. 90 Although the
DCF is technically more detailed, it is conceptually similar to its
distant legal cousin, the pecuniary loss method used for wrongful
death cases.91 In principle, both the DCF and the pecuniary loss
methods involve projecting a series of finite cash flows and then
discounting them to calculate a present value. Under the DCF, the
present value of a firm is calculated for a finite series of projected
free cash flows, representing the residual cash available to stock-
holders after payment for continuing operations, capital invest-
ments, debt expense and taxes. 92
Present value incorporates the concept of time value of money.
Money has time value in that a dollar today is worth more than a
dollar tomorrow.93 There are two reasons for this. First, inflation
decays nominal future value.94 Second, the future cash flow is sub-
December 20, 2003, its market capitalization was approximately $160.2 billion, 5.8 times
more than the book equity.
90 See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 71 ("[T]he value of a business is the future
expected cash flow discounted at a rate that reflects the riskiness of the cash flow."). There
are other variations of the DCF. See STEWART, supra note 57, at 2-4 (proposing that a firm
should be valued on the economic value added (EVA) which is the sum of operating prof-
its less the cost of capital).
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1965) ("The measure of a lump-sum
award for future pecuniary losses arising from a tort is the present worth of the full amount
of the loss of what would have been received at the later time."); id. § 925 cmt. b.1
("[D]amages are determined by the present worth of the contributions and aid that the
deceased probably would have made to the survivors had he lived."); see also DAN DOBBS,
THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 8.3(1), at 671 (2d ed. 1993). Under this method, an economist
would estimate the average remaining length of life based on actuarial data and then pro-
ject the anticipated earnings, which is then discounted back to present value. See, e.g.,
Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1988) (still valid on issue of pecuniary
loss, but overruled on the issue of discounting non-pecuniary losses); In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981); PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 1, § 127, at 949-50.
92 Free cash flow is defined as the after-tax operating earnings of the company, plus
noncash charges, less investment in operating working capital, property, plant and equip-
ment, and other assets. COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 135.
93 See Oliveri, 849 F.2d at 746 ("Because a dollar received in the future will almost
surely have less purchasing power than a dollar has today, we have required estimates of
lost future earnings to reflect the effect of inflation.").
94 Inflation is a relatively modern concept. From 1800 to 1940, the cost of living
increased on average 0.2% per year, and decreased on 69 different occasions. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 41, at 184. But from 1940 to 1959, the cost of living increased on average 4.0%
per year and increased every year except one. Id. Today, inflation is a given, and any
financial projection should incorporate projected inflation. See COPELAND ET AL., supra
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ject to risk of nonpayment and the opportunity cost of capital.95 To
calculate present value, a discount rate must be selected, and the
formula for the present value calculation is: Present Value (PV) =
Future Value (FV) x Discount Factor (DF). Where R is the dis-
count rate and N is the year in which the future payment is
expected to be received, the discount factor is calculated as: DF = 1
- (1 + R)N. Thus, the discount rate (a measure of risk) and the
number of years (a measure of time) independently affect the dis-
count factor.96
In a DCF calculation, a series of expected free cash flows, Fi, is
projected. The discount rate R is calculated as the weighted aver-
age cost of capital, R,, which is the blended cost of capital given the
firm's unique capital structure.97 The cost of credit is the average
yield to maturity calculated by the total interest expense charged to
the firm, and the cost of equity is the risk premium calculated by
the CAPM.98 With the cost of capital calculated, the value of a
firm under the DCF is then:
(N-) 1 FN 1 99
i1 (1 + ReJi  (R,-g) (1 +t Rc)(N- l )
note 57, at 211-13; SIMON BENNINGA & ODEI SARIG, CORPORATE FINANCE: A VALUA-
TION APPROACH 20-23 (1997).
95 Opportunity cost of capital in this context means that the dollar today can be invested
to earn a return, while a dollar in the future would not have this opportunity. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 13.
96 For instance, assume a future payment of $100 two years from now. If the discount
rate is 10%, then the discount factor is 1 (1 + 10%)2 = 0.8264, and the present value
calculation is $100 (FV) x 0.8264 (DF) = $82.64 (PV). If the discount rate is 20%, then the
discount factor is 1 (1 + 20%)2 = 0.6944, and the present value calculation is $69.44. A
10% difference in the discount rate results in a present value difference of $13.20.
97 The weighted average cost of capital can include any combination of debt, equity and
preferred stock securities. It calculates the cost of capital based on the following equation:
R = [Cd x (1 - T) x D + V] + [C x P V] + [C, + E + V], where T = marginal tax rate, Cd =
pretax expected yield to maturity of nonconvertible debt, C,,= after-tax cost of capital of
preferred stock, C, = cost of equity determined by CAPM, D = total market value of debt,
P = total market value of preferred stock, E = total market value of equity, and V = total
market value of the firm (D + P + E). COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 240.
98 Id. at 251-71.
99 The last term,
FN 1
(Rc-g) (1 +Rc) (N- 1) '
is called the present value of the terminal value, where g represents a stabilized growth rate
of the firm. See COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 277. We assume that most firms
operate in perpetuity. The terminal value represents the value attributable to the continu-
ing operations in perpetuity after the specific period of projections up to the Nth year. The
concept is illustrated by asking the question: How much would you pay now for the right to
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Although the variance between market and theoretical values can
be volatile as short term intervening factors influence the markets
in unpredictable ways,100 DCF valuations tend to correlate highly
to market valuations in the long run.10 1
The DCF calculation is complex and tedious, if done properly,'0
2
but it incorporates a simple concept: value depends on how much
cash flow is expected and the risks associated with that cash flow.
The financial syllogism is simple. For companies that are higher
risk, investors demand a higher expected return either in capital
appreciation or earnings, and so the cost of equity is higher. This
results in a greater discounting of the expected future cash flow,
meaning that an investor's money will result in greater relative
purchasing power of the ownership of that company. 103 Although
the cost of equity is a less accessible concept than the cost of debt,
it is just as real and consequential. 0 4
receive $1 per year for an infinite period? If there were no risk of not getting paid (equity
risk) and no risk of the dollar losing value over time (inflation), then the answer is an
infinite amount. The calculation is: $1 + 0 = -o. But because we know that there are risks
to that dollar, the value is less than an infinite sum. If we calculate the discount rate at
10%, then the present value of this infinite stream of dollars is $10. The calculation is: $1 +
10% = $10. For the terminal value, the term (R, - g) is the perpetuity discount rate calcu-
lating the terminal value.
100 As a result, reliance on the DCF for short-term investments is a perilous venture
because any number of market factors can affect stocks in short intervals of time.
101 COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 83.
102 The complexities surrounding a DCF valuation involve projecting future earnings.
The projection must be based on rigorous due diligence of past and present operations and
future forecasting. Moreover, the future earnings must then be tested by various assump-
tions (typically, optimistic, pessimistic and baseline views). After this forecasting process, a
working model of the financial statements must be produced, from which the free cash
flows are derived.
103 This decrease in valuation has profound ramifications. Capital is the lifeblood of a
company, and lower valuations mean that a firm must give up more of its ownership, rela-
tively speaking, to raise new equity capital. This concept has fundamental implications
throughout all aspects of corporate finance activities, including initial and secondary public
offerings, mergers and acquisitions, venture capital fundraising and financial restructurings.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these matters in detail.
104 The concept of the cost of equity is at the center of a current accounting reform
movement that seeks to expense the cost of employee stock option benefits. Traditionally,
the granting of stock options has not been expensed in the income statement as an item for
salary and compensation. When equity costs are considered, this practice had the effect of
artificially inflating a firm's earnings. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Pro-
posed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards: Share-Based Payment, Amendment
of FASB Statements 123 and 95 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/draft/
ed.intropg-share-based-payment.shtml (proposing the expensing of employee stock
option plans); see also Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, About Those Big Enron
Bonuses. . ., WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at C1 (describing stock option plans at Enron and
criticism of them); Opening Statement of Ranking Democratic Member Paul E. Kanjorski:
Hearing on the Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options Before the House Sub-
2004] Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms 133
D. Option Valuation
The best example of the inherent value of risk is seen in deriva-
tives. A derivative, such as a call or put option, is a security whose
value "derives" from some other asset, typically a stock. Its funda-
mental nature is a contingent claim where value is assigned to the
contingency. 10 5 It is a contractual bet placed in the financial mar-
ket. The derivatives market is the purest form of a financial trade
in risk because a derivative is quite simply the securitization of
uncertainty.10 6  In the market, derivatives are used as a double
edged sword: they can be used to minimize risk exposure through
hedging or maximize it through leveraged speculation. 10 7
committee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 108th
Cong. 1 (Jun. 3, 2003), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
060303ka.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) ("Employee stock options are a type of compensa-
tion, just like a salary or a bonus. Because compensation is an expense and because
expenses influence earnings, employee stock options should be counted against earnings
and subtracted from income. My opinion is shared by many others, including such
respected financial experts as Warren Buffett, Alan Greenspan, and Joseph Stiglitz.").
105 The contingency is typically the price of a traded security or market index. HULL,
supra note 66, at 1.
106 "The product in derivative transactions is uncertainty itself." BERNSTEIN, supra note
41, at 314.
107 Hedging is a term used to describe the mitigation of risk through the use of deriva-
tives or other risk management techniques. HULL, supra note 66, at 11. See also Niall
Ferguson, Who's Buried by Higher Rates?, FORTUNE, June 21, 2004, at 70 (finding that
more than 80 percent of the world's top 500 companies use derivatives to hedge against
interest rate risk according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association). Con-
sider the simple case of a U.S. company that does significant business in Korea. The com-
pany is exposed to the risks of fluctuation of the value of the Korean won against the U.S.
dollar. Currency fluctuations may result in volatile earnings, which are reported in dollars.
Volatility of earnings is not a good thing for public companies because such companies are
considered more risky. If the company is concerned that the Korean won will lose value
against the U.S. dollar, it can hedge this risk by entering into a futures contract to fix a
specific exchange rate. Or the company can buy put options on the Korean won so that as
the won decreases in value the option will have a payoff that would match the currency
translation loss. Thus the foreign currency risks can be managed by hedging, resulting in
smoother earnings.
Derivatives can also be used for leveraged speculation. See HULL, supra note 66, at 11-
12. Unlike an investment in the underlying assets investments in derivatives require little
upfront capital investment. Accordingly, a speculator can assume significant risk exposure,
or, in financial parlance, "leverage" a position. As the trading position changes with time,
margin calls may require a portion of the current loss to be paid by the investor from time
to time as the derivatives are marked-to-market. Id. at 20-24. Marked-to-market refers to
the process of continually updating market value as the derivative changes value with time.
Id. Generally, however, complete settlement takes place upon exercise of the option or
expiration of the maturity date (i.e., a buy now, pay later scheme). Therefore, derivatives
allow an investor to assume enormous risk without the concomitant capital investment
required for investment in the underlying asset like a stock purchase. The 1990s saw some
spectacular losses as a result of improper hedging strategies and raw speculation, including
the bankruptcy of Orange County, California (losses of over $2 billion) and Barings PLC
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A financial option is not a modern concept. Aristotle described
financial options as devices involving "a principle of universal
application" and recounted how they were used to monopolize the
ancient olive oil market. 10 8 The simplest option is one that gives
the right to buy or sell a single share of common stock.'0 9 A call
option is a contract whereby for a premium the buyer/holder has
the right to buy a share of a common stock from the seller/writer at
an agreed strike price during a fixed time period."10 A put option
gives the buyer the right to sell the underlying asset."' For either
kind of option, we denote P for premium, S for stock price and X
for strike price. The strike price is the defined contingency upon
which the counterparties are placing their financial bets.
For a call option, if the stock price is greater than the premium
plus the strike price (S > P + X), then the call option is "in the
money" and the profit for the buyer is (S - X - P).112 If the strike
price plus the premium equals the stock price (S = P + X), the
option is "at the money" and the parties break even. If the stock
price is less than the strike price plus the premium (S < P + X), the
option is "out of the money" and the buyer's maximum loss is
capped at P. So the seller and buyer are betting the stock will fall
(losses of over $1 billion). See Krawiec, supra note 71, at 2-3 & n.5 (discussing the enor-
mous losses of various investors and firms); JOHN GA'PPER & NICHOLAS DENTON, ALL
THAT GLITTERS: THE FALL OF BARINGS (1996) (recounting the demise of Baring Brothers
due to speculative derivatives trading).
108 In Politics, Aristotle explained how the philosopher Thales purchased option con-
tracts to monopolize the olive press market:
There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which
involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on
account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty,
which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the
story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would
be great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he
gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which
he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-
time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them
out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk.1, ch.ll, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOLE 1142
(Richard McKeon ed., 2001) (n.d.). Aristotle recounted this story to point out that philos-
ophers too could easily engage in commercial enterprise but that philosophy was a wor-
thier pursuit.
109 Black & Scholes, supra note 68, at 637. There are two varieties of options: American
options can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date, whereas European options
can be exercised only on the expiration date. HULL, supra note 66, at 5. Most options
traded on exchanges are American. Id.
110 Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 68, at 1.
"It Id. at 3.
112 See id. at 1-3 (describing the payoff matrix for call options).
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and rise, respectively. 1 3  These concepts are best visualized
through graphs. Figure 1 is a profit and loss schematic for the
buyer of a call option with a strike price of $5 and a premium of $2.
FIGURE 1
Call Option
4
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The Y-axis represents the profits or loss, and the X-axis is the
range of stock prices. The kinked line represents the profit and
loss as a function of stock price.
A put option is the mirror opposite of a call option. For a put
option, if the stock price is less than the strike price minus the pre-
mium (S < X - P), the put option is "in the money" and the buyer's
profit is (X - S - p).114 The seller's maximum theoretical loss is (X
- P) if the'stock price becomes nil, and the maximum gain is P. If
the stock price equals the strike price minus the premium (S = X -
P), the option is "at the money." If the stock price is greater than
the strike price plus premium (S > X - P), the option is "out of the
money." So the seller and buyer are betting the stock will rise and
fall, respectively. Figure 2 is a profit and loss schematic of a buyer
of a put option with a strike price of $5 and a premium of $2.
Lest one consider options and other derivatives to be the sole
domain of financial engineers and sophisticated investors, an
113 While the above are the most basic derivatives, financial engineers can take various
combinations of calls, puts, swaps, futures and forwards to synthetically create any risk
profile an investor wishes. See id. at 8-23 (describing some of the common option trading
strategies including vertical straddles, vertical combinations, butterfly spreads and bullish
and bearish vertical spreads); HULL, supra note 66, at 179-191 (same).
114 See Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 68, at 3-5 (describing the payoff matrix for put
options).
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FIGURE 2
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option is created anytime there is a possibility of two or more alter-
natives. All options, financial or otherwise, have value, which is to
say that the underlying uncertainty has value. The pricing of
options is set in various ways. The value of the option can be arbi-
trarily assigned as in the case of a lottery ticket, qualitatively
assessed as in the case of a personal choice, or quantitatively calcu-
lated as in the case of an exchange-traded financial option. Never-
theless, the idea that options have value extends across a range of
social endeavors. 115
Perhaps the simplest option is a lotto ticket. A lottery ticket rep-
resents a contingent claim on a jackpot, and until the drawing the
chance has some value. The price of a lottery ticket is arbitrary, for
it is always the same and always more than the expected value of
winning. 1 6 Just because a lottery ticket has not manifested into a
winner does not mean that it was worthless when purchased.117
The chance (or risk) has some value. It is not surprising then that,
115 See Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's Fees in
Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1943, 1951 (1998) (characterizing mar-
riage, suicide and legal reform as options).
116 "The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery; or one in
which the whole gain compensated the whole loss; because the undertaker could make
nothing by it." SMrm, supra note 41, at 124.
117 See infra text accompanying notes 289-292 (discussing the property nature of a lot-
tery ticket).
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in arguing increased risk creates negative value, some scholars
have analogized increased risk cases to lottery-like situations.' 18
Another common example of an option is an ordinary insurance
contract. 119 Insurance is a contract whereby the insured pays a pre-
mium in consideration for the insurer's assumption of certain speci-
fied risk of loss. Insurance is a contingent claim on a future loss-
the very essence of a derivative. The profit and loss characteristics
of an insurance policy behave in exactly the same fashion as a put
option.120 An insured seeks to protect against (or speculate on) the
occurrence of a loss, similar to the way the holder of a put option is
betting that the underlying asset will decrease in value.
Consider finally the nature of a lawsuit. A lawsuit is also an
investment in a contingent claim and shares the essential character-
istics of a financial option:' 2' it has counterparties, 22 a premium
charged for the option in the form of litigation costs, a contingency
118 See King, supra note 24, at 1378 ("A defendant's tort not only destroys a 'raffle
ticket,' in so doing it destroys any chance of ever knowing how that ticket would have fared
in the drawing."); Legum, supra note 29, at 568 ("It is as if courts are finding that 40% of
all tickets in a lottery are absolutely worthless while 60% of the tickets are worth the entire
prize."). But see Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]ort law
should not operate by the same principles that govern lotteries and insurance policies.").
While the analogy is fair, a lottery ticket has positive value whereas an increased risk situa-
tion has negative value. A more accurate analogy is a game of Russian Roulette.
119 Insurance has a long history. Ancient Egyptian, Hindu and Chinese societies used
annuities. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CoRP. L. 723, 725 (2000). The Code of Hammurabi,
which was enacted about 1800 B.C., devoted 282 clauses to "bottomry," which was a loan
taken out by a shipowner to finance voyages and which was nonpayable if the ship was lost.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 92. Life insurance appeared in Europe between the 12th and
16th centuries. Broome & Markham, supra, at 725. In the 13th century, the Lombards
introduced insurance to England. Id. The seeds of modem property and casualty insur-
ance were sown in 1688 when Lloyd's of London was formed at Edward Lloyd's Coffee
House for merchants to pool the risk of shipping in a syndicate. Id. at 725-26. See also
BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 89-92 (sketching the historical beginnings of Lloyd's of
London); John Fabian Witt, Towards a New History of American Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 692
(2001) (providing a history of the relationship between tort law and insurance).
120 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 314 ("Options bear a strong family resemblance to
insurance policies and are often bought and sold for the same reasons. Indeed, if insurance
policies were converted into marketable securities, they would be priced in the market-
place exactly as options are priced.").
121 See Huang, supra note 115, at 1955 ("[A] lawsuit actually involves a series of call
options."). There has been much recent scholarly interest in applying option theory to
analyze the economic value of lawsuits. Id. at 1953 n.48.
122 The option analogy is complicated by the role of the attorney. Although a plaintiff
owns the litigation option in theory, the attorney has a great deal of influence and power
over the case in practice. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee
Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 293, 296-97
(1984) ("Scholars who study the legal profession have been reporting for some time that
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defined as a judgment of liability, and a maturity date defined as
the entry of final judgment. The profit and loss characteristics of
any given lawsuit for legal remedies behave similarly to a call
option. The potential payout increases as the chances of winning
increase, similar to the relationship between the current price and
strike price of an option. 123
E. The Common Understanding
The foregoing discussion was not intended to be a thorough reci-
1241ttation of the subject of risk or financial economics. It was writ
ten to place some ordinary concepts-investments in debt, equity
and options-in the simple context of risk and value. Even the
ancient world understood that risk has value and created primitive
markets for risk trade. These markets continue today, although
they have taken a more sophisticated form with the advent of
quantitative methods.125 In short, modern society understands, as
did the ancients, that risk has value and that increased risk necessa-
rily inflicts harm by creating negative value.
Nor is the notion of risk so esoteric, speculative or difficult a
concept that it is beyond the ken of the average person who bor-
rows money on credit cards, invests in stocks or bonds, buys lottery
tickets, takes out insurance to protect his house or sues her
employer for sexual harassment. The concepts of risk and reward
drive most everyday decisions of individuals.2 6  As Markowitz
observed, everyone understands that unnecessary (or imposed)
risk is a "bad thing. ' 127 Most people are risk averse, particularly
when it comes to potentially large losses, as evinced by the exis-
tence of the insurance industry.128 There is no larger loss than
lawyers regularly depart from the professional model of client control and make critical
decisions on their own in ... civil representations.").
123 Under this analogy, a settlement is an exercise of the option prior to maturity where
the value has been privately negotiated between the counterparties. See Huang, supra
note 115, at 1961-66 (analyzing the settlement value of lawsuits under option theory).
124 A comprehensive discussion of the subject of risk can only be done in treatise or
encyclopedic format. For an excellent, nontechnical discussion on the subject of risk, read-
ers are referred to BERNSTEIN, supra note 41.
125 See id. at 3 ("The modern conception of risk is rooted in the Hindu-Arabic number-
ing system that reached the West seven to eight hundred years ago.").
126 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11 (1994) ("Individu-
als are rational in the sense they consistently prefer outcomes with higher payoffs to those
with lower payoffs.").
127 Markowitz, supra note 45, at 91.
128 See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Risk-
averse persons-and most people are assumed to be risk-averse in their serious financial
affairs-will pay a premium, often a very large one, to avoid risk. That is the rationale of
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one's life or health, which explains the enormous size of the life
and health insurance market, 12 9 and a substantial risk to life or
health is understood as harmful. Society expects that freedom
from risk should be protected, and so the law mandates speed lim-
its, workplace safety regulations, product safety standards, inter-
state transportation regulations, child endangerment laws and
myriad other laws aimed at public safety. Tort law exists, in part at
least, to deter costly and risky conduct.
Most persons, whether trained in finance or not, understand that
in the hypothetical posed in Section I of this article, the defendant
who negligently exposed the plaintiff to toxins has placed him in a
worse situation by increasing her risk, and that this increased risk
constitutes a present harm regardless of the specific level of that
risk.13° In the legal context, however, risk is not considered in such
a simple light.
III. RISK IN THE LEGAL CoNTEXT
A. The Traditional "All-or-Nothing" Rule
The traditional rule, sometimes referred to as the all-or-nothing
rule, is simply stated: if a plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that she would suffer a future injury, then she is compen-
sated for the full present value of the future injury now; otherwise
she recovers nothing.131 The future predicted by a preponderance
of the evidence is a "reasonable certainty" as to the present, the
logic goes. 132 Most jurisdictions continue to use the all-or-nothing
rule in increased risk cases. 133
insurance."); Stephen Penner, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule: The
Trustee's Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 MicH. J. INr'L L. 601, 626
(1995) ("This result is important because risk aversion is essentially universal. Most people
are at least slightly risk averse.").
129 In 2003, the global premium volume for all insurance was a staggering $2.94 trillion,
constituting 8.06 percent of the world GDP and $469.6 of premium per capita. World
Insurance in 2003: Insurance Industry on the Road to Recovery, Sigma No.3/2004, at 33
(Swiss Re Publication, June 1, 2004) ($1.67 trillion for life and $1.27 trillion for nonlife).
130 See supra pages 114-15.
131 See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
132 Various jurisdictions use different formulations: "in all likelihood," "reasonably cer-
tain," "reasonably probable," "medically probable," "probable," "reasonable medical cer-
tainty," and "more probable than not." Ashton, supra note 29, at 1103-05. All of these
concepts refer to the same "but for" causation analysis required by the traditional rule. See
Lapeze, supra note 29, at 254.
133 Elert, supra note 29, at 691 (citing John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malprac-
tice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R. 4th 10, §§ 2, 4 (1987)).
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The traditional rule is illustrated in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp.134 Velsicol Chemical dumped 300,000 fifty-five gallon drums
of toxins over a ten year period. These toxins infiltrated the local
drinking water supply, and plaintiffs sued for increased risk of dis-
ease. The district court found that plaintiffs had a 25% to 30%
increased risk of disease and awarded damages. But Tennessee law
requires proof of a reasonable medical certainty that the antici-
pated harm will manifest by showing "probability-i.e., more than
a fifty percent chance. 1 35 Thus, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
increased risk theory of liability because the risk was "a mere pos-
sibility or speculation.' '1
36
The traditional rule is an extension of the well-accepted tort
principle that an injured plaintiff may recover damages for an
actual present injury as well as any related injury that is reasonably
probable to occur.1 37  Causation is the critical analysis,'138 and a
plaintiff must prove both general and specific causation. 39 In toxic
tort litigation, general causation is shown by producing scientific
evidence from which a probabilistic inference can be made that the
exposure was capable of causing the harm. Epidemiological evi-
dence is commonly used to link the exposure and the harm.14 Spe-
134 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
135 Id. at 1204-05 (citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Young, 362 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1962)); see
also Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1969).
136 Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205; see also Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d
1129, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[M]ere possibility does not meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard .... [T]he plaintiff need demonstrate only that the event is more likely
to occur than not.").
137 See Pullen v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 469 (Mass. 1911); see also Leslie,
supra note 9, at 1845.
138 See King, supra note 17, at 499 ("A victim's claim is viewed exclusively in terms of
causation.").
139 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-15 (Tex. 1997)
(discussing general and specific causation) (citing Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evi-
dence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993)).
140 See Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fact: Alter-
native Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L.Q.
311, 330 ("Epidemiological evidence shows a statistical relationship between the risk cre-
ated by the defendant's conduct and the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff, but it does
not show a causal relationship between the two."); Leslie, supra note 9, at 1837 ("The
strongest and most reliable evidence of general causation is a well-designed epidemiologi-
cal study that shows an increased risk (against a background population) of harm from
exposure to the drug or chemical."). See generally Dore, supra note 39; Khristine L. Hall &
Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENvm_.
L. REV. 441 (1983); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Stan-
dards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). Epidemiological
studies are expensive and many plaintiffs cannot afford them. Leslie, supra note 9, at 1841
(citing Berger, supra note 9, at 2128, and Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the
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cific causation is established by evidence that the toxic agent
actually caused the injury.141 In practice, causation is generally
reduced to the "but for" standard.142 Anything less than a showing
of traditional causation is said to result in speculative damages. 43
In increased risk cases, courts have struggled to find certainty in
an area of the law where any evidence on probabilities will have a
certain "best guess" quality at the margins. 44 Courts dogmatically
have adhered to the 51% preponderance concept, stating it in such
precise mathematical terms, as if expert testimonies between
"equal chance" and "more likely than not" have any meaningful
distinction in these cases beyond the artful. For example, testi-
mony of a "fifty-fifty chance" has been held to be insufficient
because an even chance is said to be a possibility and not a
probability. 4 5 Courts have consistently stuck to this formalism,"4
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 774-75 (1997)). Additionally,
they take a significant amount of time to conduct properly, and so plaintiffs may not have
access to them even if they can afford the studies. Id. If epidemiological evidence is
unavailable, other types of evidence can be used. See Berger, supra note 9, at 2123 (stating
that plaintiffs generally rely on four kinds of evidence: structure-activity analysis, in vitro
analysis, in vivo analysis, and epidemiological analysis).
Courts have taken various approaches to epidemiological evidence. Some courts have
allowed epidemiological evidence where the relative risk, defined as "the ratio of the dis-
ease rate in those with the [causal] factor to the rate in those without," is greater thanone.
See, e.g., Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1085, 1087 (N.J. 1992) (study of rela-
tive risk of 1.55 was "one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in
determining whether the expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her
conclusion"). Other courts have required a relative risk of greater than two. See, e.g.,
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a
plaintiff who relies solely on epidemiological evidence to survive summary judgment must
establish a relative risk greater than 2.). Still others have rejected other scientific evidence
if epidemiological evidence was missing. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d
269, 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting majority's rejection of clinical
evidence where not supported by epidemiological data).
141 Berger, supra note 9, at 2122. Causation is difficult to prove because there often is
no direct proof, and the evidence is inferential and often based on an incomplete under-
standing of the underlying biological and chemical processes. Id. at 2120-21.
142 See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715 (adopting the preponderance standard); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
143 See, e.g., Crawford v. Seufert, 388 P.2d 456, 459 (Or. 1964) ("If the probabilities are
in balance, the matter is left to speculation. Speculation filtered through a jury is still
speculation.").
144 See Berger, supra note 9, at 2129 ("[T]he scientific evidence relied on to prove causa-
tion is subject to numerous kinds of uncertainty.").
145 Davis v. P. Gambardella & Son Cheese Corp., 161 A.2d 583, 587 (Conn. 1960), over-
ruled by Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990).
146 See Healy v. White, 378 A.2d 540, 544 (Conn. 1977), overruled by Petriello, 576 A.2d
474. Other courts have held similarly. See, e.g., Devine v. S. Pac. Co., 295 P.2d 201, 272
(Or. 1956) (distinguishing between evidence establishing mere "possibility" and
"probability"); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138, 141 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that
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which creates an illusory legal certainty in cases that inherently
concern the uncertain.
The evidentiary hurdle is daunting for a plaintiff. 147 Most cases
involve a significant increase in the risk of harm though not to
levels that exceed the evidentiary burdens.148 We recognize that
even a 10% increase in risk of death is a great harm. Would any
rational person exchange a 10% risk of death for $10,000? Yet
many lawsuits are brought for damages for less than $10,000 or for
other relatively trivial interests. Although the adherence to tradi-
tional concepts of causation and evidentiary burdens is purportedly
neutral in principle, its practical import is that virtually all claims
for increased risk are precluded because most harmful exposures to
toxins, however noxious, simply do not cross the legal Rubicon that
is the preponderance rule.
Criticism of the traditional rule has been legion. While most of
the criticism has focused on the weighty policy concerns, 149 com-
mentators have also noted two practical problems associated with
administrating the rule.
First, statutes of limitations are a problem because if a plaintiff
cannot meet the preponderance burden she must wait until the
injury manifests. 50 The plaintiff is then caught in a Catch-22 situa-
tion: she must wait for the injury to occur, but the process of wait-
fifty-fifty chance of future injury failed to meet reasonable certainty standard); Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971) ("Probability is most
often defined as that which is more likely than not."), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); Fennell v. Southern Maryland
Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 214 (Md. 1990) (distinguishing between forty-nine and fifty-
one percent chance); see also Schmauder, supra note 29, at 897 n.19 (citing other cases
adhering to 51-49 distinction).
147 Most cases simply do not present the extreme increases in risk required by the tradi-
tional rule. See McDonnell, supra note 29, at 632 ("Most toxic tort plaintiffs are precluded
[because] ... the probability of the plaintiff actually developing the disease usually is less
than fifty percent."); Klein, supra note 9, at 1179 ("[The traditional rule] represents a
nearly insurmountable barrier for enhanced risk plaintiffs."); Love, supra note 29, at 809
(noting that increased risk cases face the highest barrier to recovery); see also Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Mass. 1986).
148 See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-05; Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 458, 466 (5th
Cir. 1985); Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232; Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 308
(N.J. 1987). See also McDonnell, supra note 29, at 633 (noting only two reported cases
where plaintiffs successfully recovered for increased risk: Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir. 1986) (asbestos case), and Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (same)).
149 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
150 Lapeze, supra note 29, at 257; Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tor-
tious Toxics, 26 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 67, 74 (2001).
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ing may result in the preclusion of the claim. 151 Addressing this
problem, some jurisdictions have adopted the so-called discovery
rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows
or should have known of the injury.15 But the discovery rule is not
a complete tonic.153 For one thing, it is inapplicable if there is a
current injury accompanying the increased risk.' 54  Moreover,
many injury situations are not clear cut as to the existence of an
injury and the extent of that injury. Finally, there is the issue of
whether discovery occurs on the date of the exposure, the date the
plaintiff knew of the defendant's wrongful conduct, the date of any
microscopic or cellular change, or the date of manifestations of the
disease. 55 A statute of limitations should be unambiguous because
it deals with preclusion of claims, but in this field the lack of clarity
poses a significant trap for the unwary plaintiff. 56 The application
of a statute of limitations and the discovery rule has the potential
151 Klein, supra note 9, at 1181; McDonnell, supra note 29, at 624, 629-30.
152 Historically, the discovery rule has been used in cases involving fraud, mistake and
breach of fiduciary duty. Developments in the law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1221-22 (1950). The discovery rule has since been extended to other types of
cases. See Annotations, When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Malprac-
tice Action Against Physician, Surgeon, Dentist, or Similar Practitioner, 80 A.L.R.2d 368,
387 (1961), 79-80 A.L.R.2d 472, 511 (Supp. 2000). In passing the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Congress tolled all state
statutes of limitations for exposure to a hazardous substance or pollutant released into the
environment from a facility until "the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)"
of the injury. 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2004).
153 See Klein, supra note 9, at 1183 (arguing that the discovery rule and splitting causes
of action "raise more problems than they solve").
154 See, e.g., Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); Hagerty v.
L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Elert, supra note 29, at 703
("If the plaintiff has already suffered a recoverable injury ... ,the [discovery rule] will be
inconsequential because first, the plaintiff is most likely aware at the time of the original
injury of other possible future consequences, and second, if the plaintiff attempts to
recover for the original injury, the claim for future injuries will be barred under the theory
of res judicata."); Lapeze, supra note 29, at 258.
155 See Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 176-77 (N.H-. 1977) (discussing the
issues pertaining to the application of the discovery rule); see also Klein, supra note 9, at
1183 ("Is it the date of exposure? The date of 'sub-cellular injury'? The date when the
plaintiff discovers the defendant's legal responsibility? Or do we wait until manifestation
of disease before starting the clock?"); Lapeze, supra note 29, at 258 ("In practice, the
main problem with the discovery rule is determining when the plaintiff knew or should
have known when an injury occurs to 'trigger' prescription.").
156 See, e.g., Albertson, 749 F.2d at 231 (holding that plaintiff who lost consciousness and
experienced severe headaches after exposure to a toxin was time barred when he filed suit
several years later because the statute of limitations started to accrue after he lost
consciousness).
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for creating satellite litigation within the lawsuit, as is often the
case whenever the statute of limitations is at issue.157
Second, the doctrines of res judicata and merger present signifi-
cant practical problems. A plaintiff could have a current injury
from the accident, the manifestation of which may be trivial or rel-
atively minor, and a substantial chance of a future injury, which is
anticipated to be far more severe. 158 He is then aware of the injury
and so should file a lawsuit, even if the jurisdiction has a discovery
rule. But if the plaintiff cannot prove the future injury under the
traditional rule, and the risk subsequently manifests into a physical
injury, under res judicata and merger doctrines he cannot file
another lawsuit.' 59 This presents a plaintiff with a devil's choice:
sue now and waive future claims, or sue later and waive present
claims.'6 ° Further complicating the matter is the interplay of any
applicable statute of limitations on a later action. Recognizing this
fundamental unfairness, some jurisdictions have allowed a plaintiff
to split her cause of action into an action for an injury or manifesta-
tion incurred in the present and a future action for latent inju-
157 See infra Section VII.B (discussing the efficiency of eliminating the statute of limita-
tions in the context of increased risk cases).
158 See, e.g., Albertson, 749 F.2d at 223.
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (stating that the rule of
merger bars plaintiff from bringing a subsequent claim arising out of same transaction
upon final judgment of remedy in an action); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (8th ed.
2004) (defining res judicata "barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on
the same claim ... raised in the first suit"). Res judicata has long been observed in tort
claims to preclude successive lawsuits, though more and better information has come out.
See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 368 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Petriello v. Kalman,
576 A.2d 474, 483 (Conn. 1990)); Howell v. Goodrich, 69 Ill. 556, 559-60 (1873) ("[T]here
can not be successive suits brought from time to time, as damages may in the future be
suffered, but the recovery is once for all, and may embrace prospective as well as accrued
damages."); DOBBS, supra note 91, § 3.1, at 208 ("The damages remedy is not conditional,
and it is not payable periodically as loss accrues unless a statute so provides. So the dam-
ages award is traditionally made once, in a lump sum to compensate for all the relevant
injuries, past and future."); McDonnell, supra note 29, at 628 ("Cases involving both a
present injury and an increasing likelihood of a future disease or injury present a problem
for the plaintiff because the rules of res judicata usually limit an injured party to one
recovery.").
160 See Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The
victim of exposure to toxic substances which cause present harm and which may at some
future time cause cancer or other serious disease is further victimized by the single cause of
action rule."); Klein, supra note 9, at 1181-82 (explaining Catch-22 situation posed by the
traditional rule); Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from
Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVT. L. 285 (1994) ("[T]he
potential plaintiff is faced with a choice between an inadequate recovery if he sues immedi-
ately, and no recovery if he waits.").
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ries. 61 . Other jurisdictions have indirectly addressed the problem
by recognizing other causes of action as avenues for partial rem-
edy, the two principal actions being for fear of future disease 162 and
recovery of future medical monitoring costs.' 63 These are indepen-
dent causes of action arising out of the transaction that precipitated
the increased risk, but are not actions to remedy the harm resulting
from the increased risk itself."6
The traditional rule presents significant practical problems impli-
cating procedural fairness, predictability and the uniform adminis-
tration of justice. Despite a clear consensus among courts that
freedom from increased risk is not an independent interest worthy
of legal protection, the procedural administration of the traditional
rule has been anything but uniform or predictable. Courts have
recognized the inherent unfairness of the legal regime, at least in
some of its procedural and evidentiary applications, and have
employed various measures to alleviate some of its harshness. But
this approach has been aptly described as "patchwork.' 1 65
161 See Elert, supra note 29, at 703-04; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26 (advocating a splitting of the cause of action in an increased risk situation).
162 These are essentially claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress that have
been specially recognized outside the ordinary rules applicable to this field. See, e.g., Pot-
ter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (fear of disease); Herbert
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (AIDS phobia);
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251-52 (N.Y. 1958) (cancerphobia). See generally
Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Future Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 965 (2002); Glen Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia: Reasonableness Rede-
fined, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1995).
163 See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312-13 (N.J. 1987) (recovery for
future medical surveillance to detect signs of cancer on theory that the medical expenses
could be construed as presently identifiable injury); Paoli R.R. Yard PCB v. Monsanto Co.,
916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Nonetheless, in an effort to accommodate a society with
an increasing awareness of the danger and potential injury caused by the widespread use of
toxic substances, courts have begun to recognize claims like medical monitoring, which can
allow plaintiffs some relief even absent present manifestations of physical injury."); Potter,
863 P.2d at 824 ("It bears emphasizing that allowing compensation for medical monitoring
costs 'does not require courts to speculate about the probability of future injury. It merely
requires courts to ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of medical super-
vision is appropriate."' (quoting Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852)). See generally Andrew R. Klein,
Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1998); Kara L. McCall, Comment,
Medical Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 969
(1999).
164 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail these derivative actions. I
note that while fear of disease and future medical monitoring may be compensable harms,
they simply do not address the fundamental injury from which these harms arise-
increased risk of bodily injury. Nevertheless, these causes are palatable to the law because
the interests (mental distress and economic harm) fall squarely into the conventional
scheme.
165 Klein, supra note 9, at 1182.
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B. The Loss of Chance Doctrine
The judicial treatment of risk is also seen in the loss of chance
doctrine. Whereas increased risk deals with a presumably healthy
plaintiff incurring increased risk of a future harm, and arises prima-
rily in the context of a toxic tort exposure situation, loss of chance
deals with a plaintiff with a preexisting illness who loses the chance
to recover from the illness due to a defendant's medical malprac-
tice.166 Although the two doctrines are mirror images in terms of
risk,167 they developed differently. 168
Courts have perceived the nature of the risk differently in the
two doctrines.1 69 In a loss of chance case, the plaintiff must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that he lost a chance for a
favorable outcome, and this loss of chance is attributable to the
defendant.17 0  A plaintiff need not prove that she would have
enjoyed a greater than 50% chance of survival or recovery absent
166 See generally Julie A. Braun & Maria Elyse Rabar, Recent Developments in Medicine
and Law, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 463 (2001). One noteworthy distinction between the two is
that loss of chance typically involves risk of death, where increased risk can deal with any
risk of bodily harm. Elert, supra note 29, at 715.
167 "Tortious exposure to risk is in fact really the obverse of these 'losses of chance'
cases, and the problems of causal determination and valuation are virtually identical."
Robinson, supra note 25, at 792-93. See also Love, supra note 29, at 818-19 (noting similar-
ities between the two doctrines).
168 Unlike the traditional rule for increased risk, the loss of chance doctrine is a newer
concept. The traditional rule of increased risk has long been established. See Amann v.
Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (Ill. 1909) ("To justify a recovery for future
damages the law requires proof of a reasonable certainty that they will be endured in the
future."). The loss of chance doctrine is generally attributable to Hicks v. United States,
368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). Jason Perkins, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State Hospitals:
Legal Recovery for Terminally Ill and Injured Patients Without the Loss Chance Doctrine,
32 U. TOL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2001). In Hicks, the decedent died from intestinal blockage,
which plaintiff alleged was misdiagnosed by the Navy doctor. The Fourth Circuit reversed
a dismissal of the complaint, reasoning that "[i]f there was any substantial possibility of
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable." 368 F.2d at 632. The sub-
stantial possibility standard was a deviation from the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. But King notes that this language was dictum since expert testimony established that
the decedent "would have survived." King, supra note 24, at 1369 n.53. About half the
jurisdictions recognize a loss of chance cause of action. These jurisdictions include Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Elert, supra
note 29, at 710-11.
169 See United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75-76 (Del. 1995) (discussing the differ-
ences between increased risk and loss of chance doctrine).
170 See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (S.D. 2000) (attributing this
two-part analysis to King, supra note 24, at 1370).
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the negligence. 171 The risk is taken at face value as a measure of
the injury rather than evidence of injury, so damages are calculated
by multiplying the lost opportunity by the present value of the total
damages should the plaintiff fail to recover.172 For example, if a
plaintiff's chance of recovery from cancer was reduced by 10% due
to a negligent misdiagnosis and death from cancer is valued at
$100, then the recoverable damage would be $10.173 Under tradi-
tional causation analysis, the plaintiff should recover nothing since
it is more likely than not that she would die of cancer regardless of
the malpractice. This deviation from the way the law deals with
risk has been attributed to a policy of promoting proper standards
of medical care by not allowing health care providers to escape
liability for negligence. 174 To serve this end, courts have distin-
guished the physical injury from the loss of chance.175
171 See, e.g., Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1213 (Ill. 1997) (holding that
loss of chance doctrine applies where pre-malpractice probability of recovery is less than
fifty percent); Estate of Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (same).
The theoretical basis for this proportional recovery scheme is generally attributable to
King, supra note 24, at 1370.
172 See, e.g., Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991) (applying pro-
portional damages based on lost chance attributable to negligence).
173 If malpractice decreased a loss of chance of recovery from 28% to 20%, a net 8%
loss of chance of recovering from a preexisting illness, and the plaintiff subsequently dies
(i.e., the plaintiff is one of the unfortunate 80% of the people who do not survive), then the
cause in fact attributable to the death is 90% the preexisting illness and 10% the loss of
chance attributable to the malpractice. Although traditional causation under the prepon-
derance test cannot be satisfied, the plaintiff can still recover for the percent loss of chance.
This is not to suggest that traditional causation can never be shown where the chance of
death is less than 50%. The inquiry is not the absolute chance of death, but the causality of
that death. For instance, assume a person had a 90% chance of recovery, but a doctor's
negligence reduced this chance to 75%. If the patient dies, the inquiry is not whether the
doctor's negligence made the chance of death more likely than not, but whether the death
was more likely than not caused by the negligence. Without the negligence, the chance of
death was 10%. With the negligence, it is 25%. Death in fact occurred, and the law must
determine what caused the death. We conclude that 60% is attributable to the negligence
and 40% is attributed to other causes. Thus traditional causation is satisfied.
174 See, e.g., Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1213 ("Disallowing tort recovery in medical malprac-
tice actions on the theory that a patient was already too ill to survive or recover may
operate as a disincentive on the part of health care providers to administer quality medical
care to critically ill or injured patients."); Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983) ("To decide otherwise would be a blanket
release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a fifty percent
chance of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence.").
175 Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring) ("If the injury is determined to
be the death of Mr. Herskovits, then under the established principles of proximate cause
plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case.... If, on the other hand, we view the injury
to be the reduction of Mr. Herskovits' chance of survival, our analysis might well be
different.").
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C. The Minority "Proportionality" Rule
Due to the evident harshness of the all-or-nothing rule, some
courts have haphazardly relaxed the evidentiary and causation hur-
dles in the interest of doing substantial justice.17 6 By contrast, a
small minority of cases have allowed recovery for increased risk
though the risk is less than a preponderance (for convenience, the
minority rule is referred to as the "proportionality" rule).
Although various courts have at one time or another allowed these
claims,177 only a few state supreme courts have explicitly rejected
the traditional rule in favor of the proportionality rule.
Connecticut was one of the first jurisdictions affirmatively to
reject the traditional rule in a limited context. In Petriello v. Kal-
man, the plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure to remove a dead
fetus. During surgery the defendant perforated the uterus and
drew portions of the plaintiff's small intestine. 178  As a result,
defendant had to excise one foot of small intestine. At trial, one
expert testified that there was a "very remote" chance of future
intestinal obstruction, while another calculated the risk at 8% to
16%. 179 The court held that the plaintiff should recover propor-
tionally the possibility of her future injury to "the extent of her
present injuries. '18° A close reading of the opinion shows a tension
between the holding and the reasons supporting it. Read strictly,
the opinion suggests that a plaintiff can seek proportional damage
for the future consequences of a present physical injury.'81 In
176 See Love, supra note 29, at 817-18 (discussing cases); infra Section V.E (discussing
the market share theory of liability).
177 The following jurisdictions have at one point or another allowed such claims: Califor-
nia, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Virginia. See Elert, supra note 29, at 713-14 n.160 (citing
cases from these jurisdictions); Legum, supra note 29, at 569-70 (listing other cases).
178 576 A.2d 474, 476-77 (Conn. 1990).
179 Id. at 481.
180 Id. at 483. "[I]n a tort action, a plaintiff who has established a breach of duty that
was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk of
future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to
occur." Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
181 This conclusion is supported by the distinction drawn between an injury and its
future consequences:
This system is inconsistent with the goal of compensating tort victims fairly for
all the consequences of the injuries they have sustained, while avoiding, so far
as possible, windfall awards for consequences that never happened .... Simi-
lar evidence, based upon medical statistics of the average incidence of a par-
ticular future consequence from an injury, such as that produced by the
plaintiff in this case, may be said to establish with the same degree of certi-
tude the likelihood of the occurrence of the future harm to which a tort victim
is exposed as a result of a present injury.
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other words, the increased risk was a parasitic aggravation of dam-
ages for a present injury, 18 2 reminiscent of the early and now obso-
lete treatment of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 18 3
Yet the court's reasoning was more expansive. The proportionality
rule is fairer because it prevents over- and under-compensation,
and a plaintiff "should not be burdened with proving that the
occurrence of a future event is more likely than not, when it is a
present risk, rather than a future event for which she claims dam-
ages."' 8" This passage reveals the true interests at stake.185 Under
the Petriello rationale, it remains to be seen whether a pure
increased risk without a present physical injury is an independent
tort or whether such an interest must be anchored to a present
physical injury. 18 6
In Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, Illinois followed Connecticut's
lead.'87 The plaintiff averred that the defendant doctor negligently
left a piece of catheter, which later lodged in her heart.'88 The
increased risk of future medical complications included infection,
perforation, arrhythmia, embolization and further migration of the
fragment into the heart. 89 Evidence at trial showed a 0% to 20%
Id. at 483, 484 (emphasis added).
182 Other courts have connected present injuries and the future consequences of those
injuries. See, e.g., Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1993) (allowing recovery
for "future effects flowed directly from the initial injuries ... [if] proven with reasonable
medical certainty"). The reasoning in these decisions is consistent with the traditional rule
that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all reasonable consequences of an injury.
See, e.g., Pullen v. Boston Elevated R.R. Co., 94 N.E. 469 (Mass. 1911).
183 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54, at 363 ("With a cause of action estab-
lished by the physical harm, 'parasitic' damages are awarded, and it is considered that there
is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not feigned."). Even in the law of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, which is one of the most controversial and fractured in
torts, the notion of a "parasitic" injury has long since been dispensed with. See, e.g., Dillon
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1968) (adopting the bystander rule); Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R. Co., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897) (adopting the physical impact rule), overruled by
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W.
497 (Wis. 1935) (adopting the zone of danger test), overruled by Bowen v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
184 Petriello, 576 A.2d at 483 (emphasis added).
185 Id. at 484. As a result of this decision, Connecticut promulgated new jury instruc-
tions: "The plaintiff is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely
to occur as measured by multiplying the total compensation to which the plaintiff would be
entitled if the harm in question were certain to occur by the proven probability that the
harm in question will in fact occur." Connecticut Civil Jury Instruction No. 2-40(c).
186 See Klein, supra note 9, at 1179 (noting that the traditional rule requires some form
of a present physical injury).
187 771 N.E.2d 357 (Il1. 2002).
188 Id. at 361.
189 Id. at 366.
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risk for infection, less than a 5% risk for arrhythmia, and a negligi-
ble risk for other conditions. 190 The Illinois Supreme Court over-
ruled earlier decisions that had established the traditional rule. 191
The court dismissed the notion that awarding damages would be
speculative, reasoning that scientific advances have enabled the
medical community to determine the probability of future injuries
more accurately. 192 It held that a "plaintiff can obtain compensa-
tion for a future injury that is not reasonably certain to occur, but
the compensation would reflect the low probability of
occurrence."
193
Both the Petriello and Dillon courts found support for the pro-
portionality rule in fundamental fairness. 194 Two of the basic goals
of tort law are to correct the wrong done to the plaintiff by putting
him back in nearly the same position as before the accident and to
deter future accidents by imposing civil sanctions. 95 Both courts
recognized that a proportionality rule achieves these goals better
than the traditional rule. But both decisions arose in the context of
claims for medical malpractice also involving some present physical
injuries. As discussed, courts have viewed medical malpractice
cases differently from toxic tort cases. 196 The recognition of pro-
portional increased risk claims in these cases may be an extension
of the special policies underlying the loss of chance doctrine. Also,
both cases involved present physical injuries, and it could be
argued that the courts viewed the award of remedies for increased
risk as a logical extension of damages awards for the present physi-
cal injuries. However, despite the expansive reasoning of Petriello
and Dillon, they are easily distinguishable from most toxic torts,
which involve latent risk of harm rather than a discernable present
physical injury. At present, no jurisdiction has unequivocally
adopted the proportionality rule outside of the medical malpractice
190 Id.
191 Id. at 370 (overruling Amann v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673 (Ill.
1909), and Stevens v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 137 N.E. 859 (Ill. 1922)).
192 Id.
193 Id. The court then endorsed the Connecticut jury instruction, supra note 185, as a
correct statement of the law. Id. at 372.
194 Id. at 370 ("Fairness requires that this court speak to this issue definitively.");
Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 483 (Conn. 1990) ("[The traditional rule] is inconsistent
with the goal of compensating tort victims fairly for all the consequences of the injuries
they have sustained .... ").
195 See DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting);
Mauro v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 269-70 (N.J. 1989) (Handler, J., dissenting).
196 See infra Section III.B.
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context and without some manifestation of a present physical
injury.
IV. CRITICISM AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Legal Fiction of Injury and Causation
A striking feature of the all-or-nothing rule is the use of a legal
fiction under the guise of applying traditional principles of tort law.
The rule redefines the concept of risk by creating a bright line divi-
sion between "possibility" and "probability," and based on this
division assumes the nonexistence or existence of an injury. It
assumes that a future harm proven to a "reasonable certainty" is a
present actuality, and therefore the injury is a physical harm. 19v On
the one hand, this approach purports to apply the established con-
cept that a claim should seek recovery of damages for an actual
injury and any related injury reasonably probable to occur. 198 On
the other hand, the irrationality of this approach is patent, for any
future injury is an unknown contingency.1 99
Once the law takes the plunge into predicting the future and
assigning a value to that contingency, the concept of injury is really
just a probability function.2 °° Thus, there is no reason why dam-
ages for such an injury should not be assessed in accordance with
the degree of that probability function, similar to the way the legal
system would mete out differing amounts of damages for a broken
finger, a ruptured kidney and death. The inquiry should not focus
on the "reasonable certainty" of a future occurrence, which is
always a speculative endeavor,201 but on the severity of the injury
197 See, e.g., Amann v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (Ill. 1909), over-
ruled by Dillon, 771 N.E.2d 357.
198 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
199 In most personal injury cases, the injury can be established with factual certainty
through empirical testing. This is the key distinction between negligence actions for physi-
cal and mental injuries, and the reason why claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress have been so controversial and have not been analyzed under traditional tort rules.
See generally Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. - (2004).
200 See Robinson, supra note 25, at 787 (endorsing proportional recovery); King, supra
note 24, at 1382 (same). But see Wright, supra note 29, at 578 (stating that the substitution
of mathematical functions for the causation requirement under the proportionality rule
does not constitute "scientific progress").
201 Here the term speculative is used loosely in the sense that the future will never be
known for certain. Strictly speaking, to speculate means to act "on the basis of insufficient
evidence." WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 1133 (1985). This is the
common usage in the financial markets, which distinguish between speculation and invest-
ment. Uncertainty should not be a basis to preclude all claims. Even the traditional rule
does not go this far. If the risk or uncertainty can be quantified, the matter is not specula-
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based on a quantitative assessment of the risk. In other words, it is
a matter of valuation of damages and not of assignment of
liability.20 2
Under the traditional rule, if two plaintiffs are similarly exposed
and both recover damages, a possibility exists that one plaintiff will
eventually suffer the physical injury while the other never will.
This anomaly can result because a statistical concept of injury is a
proxy for the certainty of a physical injury. If physical injury is the
true injury for which a remedy is provided, it would be far better to
toll the statute of limitations until injury manifests. This would
impose significant litigation costs on the plaintiff in the form of lost
or stale evidence and the potential disappearance of the defendant
through corporate dissolution, merger or liquidation.2 °3 These
costs, atypical in most ordinary cases, would increase the plaintiff's
litigation risk.2 4 Nevertheless, if a certainty of physical injury is
the concern, requiring a manifestation would be truer to tort prin-
ciples and would be far more just to the defendant, who would be
held liable only upon a showing of actual physical injury.20 5 The
injury for which the traditional rule provides remedy is a legal fic-
tion; and it matters not whether the future injury is characterized
as a "reasonable certainty. ' 20 6
The traditional rule is justified primarily on causation grounds.
In toxic tort litigation, the key issue is causation. 2 7  A plaintiff
tion in the irrational sense. In this regard, the difference between the traditional rule and
the approach suggested here is only a matter of degree.
202 King first raised this insight. See King, supra note 24, at 1354-55 (distinguishing issue
of liability from damage valuation in proposing the proportionality rule).
203 See Ash, supra note 29, at 1094-95 (noting problems for delayed lawsuits); Lapeze,
supra note 29, at 251 (noting the problem of bankruptcy, liquidation or death); Love, supra
note 29, at 802-03 ("[B]y the time a disease manifests itself, a particular company may have
reorganized, gone out of business, or declared bankruptcy.").
204 See infra pages 161-63 (discussing litigation risks).
205 Cf Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Requiring
manifest injury as a necessary element of an asbestos-related tort action avoids these
problems [of speculative damages] and best serves the underlying purpose of tort law.").
206 See, e.g., Amann v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (I11. 909) ("rea-
sonable certainty" standard); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
("reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard); Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758,
763 (Minn. 1993) ("reasonable medical certainty" standard). Shakespeare most elegantly
unveiled the nature of semantic formalism: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET,
act 2, sc. 2.
207 See JACK WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFEC'r
OF CLASS ACrIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 148 (1995)
("The only real liability issue becomes causation: was this manufacturer's product a sub-
stantial cause of this plaintiff's medical problems-however we define them?"); Rosen-
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must show that the injury resulted from a defendant's wrongdo-
ing.20 8 Where the injury has not yet manifested, the causation anal-
ysis goes as follows: The factfinder must determine whether a
defendant's negligence would cause a future injury; future injury
could be caused by the increased risk or by an independent factor;
so if a defendant's conduct increased the risk by at least 51%, a
plaintiff would show by a preponderance that the defendant's con-
duct would legally cause the future injury.20 9 This analysis turns a
statistical likelihood into a proxy for the factual certainty of
injury.2 10
The traditional rule merges injury and causation into a single
analysis. Until there is a real injury, whatever it may be as defined
by the law, there should not be a cause of action based on that
injury, much less a causation analysis. The rule's logic turns tort
principles on their heads.211 Injury and causation are independent
inquiries-causation should not prove injury, and vice versa.
Stripped of its legal fagade, the traditional rule does no more than
create a legal fiction of injury where the increased risk was so great
that a sense of moral justice cannot ignore the probabilistic truth.
berg, supra note 10, at 855 ("The tort system's capacity to deal effectively with mass
exposure cases has been stymied in large part by the burden of proof of causation."); Ayers
v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987) ("By far the most difficult problem for
plaintiffs to overcome in toxic tort litigation is the burden of proving causation." (citing
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARY. L. REV. 1458, 1617-30
(1986))).
208 The traditional standard for general causation is a showing that "but for" the defen-
dant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have incurred the injury. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 41, at 265-66. See also Lapeze, supra note 29, at 252-54 (most jurisdictions
use "but for" causation test for increased risk cases). The Restatement advocates a "sub-
stantial factor" test. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-33 (1965). This standard
incorporates the "but for" standard as an "essential precondition," except in situations
where there are two or more operative forces. King, supra note 24, at 1356. In cases where
the defendant was responsible for only one of these forces, and the other could have been
sufficient to cause the injury, the defendant's conduct would be a "substantial factor" in
bringing about the harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2). Cf Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
209 See, e.g., Budden v. Goldstein, 128 A.2d 730, 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957)
(noting that the traditional rule is "a just balance of the warring interests" of providing
remedies upon a showing of "reasonable probability" and doing "reasonably efficient jus-
tice if conjecture and speculation are to be used as a measure of damages"), overruled by
Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1958).
210 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that
the test for recovery is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency).
211 See Robinson, supra note 25, at 780-81 ("In the more complex environment of toxic
torts, however, the search for deterministic causes-whether cast in the form of the 'sub-
stantial factor' or the 'but for' tests of legal causation-is both artificial and misleading.").
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B. Proportionality and Corrective Justice
Because a defendant is immune from liability so long as the
increased risk does not surpass the preponderance threshold, the
formulaic distinctions of the traditional rule have been described as
"artificial and misleading. '212 The all-or-nothing concept has been
severely criticized by many commentators. The thrust of the criti-
cism focuses on the lack of aggregate apportionment between rem-
edy and liability, and so the rule is deemed unfair and arbitrary.2 13
By denying any compensation unless a plaintiff proves that a future
consequence is more likely than not to occur, courts have created a
system that potentially compensates for future consequences that
never occur, and conversely denies compensation for consequences
that may later ensue. This system is inconsistent with the goal of
compensating tort victims fairly for all the consequences of the
injuries they have sustained, while avoiding windfall awards so far
as possible.214
These arguments are straightforward and intuitive. Regardless
of whether tort law is based on corrective justice or deterrence the-
215ories, meting out compensation commensurate with culpability
and injury will in turn deter defendants from socially harmful
conduct.216
At its core, the proportionality principle is based on a concept of
statistical justice, a matching of culpability with expected damages
212 Id. See also supra note 25 (citing scholars who criticize the traditional rule as arbi-
trary and unfair).
213 See Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It is obvious
that proof of damages in such cases would be highly speculative, likely resulting in wind-
falls for those who never take ill and insufficient compensation for those who do.").
214 Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 482-83 (Conn. 1990) (footnotes and citations omit-
ted). See also supra text accompanying notes 178-185 (discussing Petriello).
215 Corrective justice theory posits that the primary goal of tort law is to compensate
victims and provide corrective justice where a defendant is proven to have caused the
plaintiff's harm. See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-
Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 113 (1990); Ernest J. Weinrib, Towards a Moral
Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1982). Deterrence theory posits that the
primary goal of tort law is social utility and deterrence of inefficient behavior. See gener-
ally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 25; Richard Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice
in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEG. STUDIES 187 (1981). Some commentators have
proposed a "mixed theory" that bridges the two concepts. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801 (1997).
216 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 4, at 25.
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in the aggregate. 17 But critics of the proportionality rule have
argued that liability without causation would award damages for
injuries that are unlikely to be suffered.218 Their point is that the
plaintiff must single out the specific defendant who caused injury.
Each case is an individual search for truth, the argument goes, and
what matters is whether the specific plaintiff in this case proved the
cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence against this
defendant, as opposed to the overall effect of the law's application
on a larger class to which the plaintiff belongs.219 This argument
focuses on the individual transactional nexus between plaintiff and
defendant and whether the defendant in fact inflicted the injury on
the plaintiff. While I do not disagree with the underlying goal of
this proposition,22 ° it is at least an incomplete thought and on that
basis inaccurate.
To start, the correctness of individual cases does not matter in
the eyes of the law. This is not to suggest that the law does not care
about correct results. Certainly courts and juries care greatly about
the right outcome and strive to achieve it. But it does not shake
the foundation of our legal system to say that errors, defined as
deviations from the omniscient truth, occur frequently by the very
nature of the adversarial system.221 The judicial process is an insti-
tutionalized procedure under which an injured party has the oppor-
tunity to obtain the "correct" result and such results are achieved
in sufficiently large numbers. The overall accuracy of the system,
or aggregate correlation of judgments to the correct results, con-
firms our confidence in its fairness and ultimately legitimizes the
217 "From the standpoint of corrective justice, the proportionality rule is unquestionably
more effective than the preponderance rule in achieving the tort system's goal of preserv-
ing the value of entitlements." Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 881.
218 See Klein, supra note 9, at 1187-94 (noting that corrective justice theorists have been
hostile to the proportionality rule because it imposes liability without proof of causation);
Wright, supra note 29, at 578 ("The disappearance of the causation requirement from the
[proportionality rule] and its replacement with mathematical functions ... is neither scien-
tific progress nor a cause for celebration.").
219 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KErNrT L. REV. 407, 429
(1987) ("[C]ausation particularizes by singling out this plaintiff from the class of persons
whom the defendant has endangered.").
220 This article agrees that a transactional nexus is required between plaintiff and defen-
dant. See infra Section V.E. This necessarily means that the injury must be causally con-
nected to the defendant's culpability and not some market share theory of liability. But
the question is: What is the injury?
221 "It is no longer controversial, I think, to argue that there is no moral or practical
reason to insist that victims be denied recovery or that some wrongdoers escape liability
simply because we are unable to match wrongdoers with their victims." Saul Levmore,
Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 698
(1990).
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system. If this was not the common perception, our justice system
could not exist for no rational society would perpetuate a process
that consistently achieves the wrong results.
In our adversarial system, one way to consider a lawsuit is a
zero-sum game in which one party's gain is another's loss. 2 22 We
can distinguish two kinds of games: games of pure chance, where a
player has no input into the overall odds of winning (e.g., dice or
roulette), and games of skill, where acumen or knowledge can
influence the result even though the game still has significant ele-
ments of chance (e.g., poker or backgammon).,2 3 The former can
be classified as a pure gamble, a speculation in the true sense of
that word,22 " whereas the latter combines random risk with a
rational, risk-based decision-making process. 2 25 Transactions in the
legal and financial markets are typically games of skill because
many factors within the control of the parties can affect the end
result.
Higher ideals aside, a lawsuit is also a financial investment by the
plaintiff and her attorney.2 6 The plaintiff provides the business
222 See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Crit-
ical Survey 56-87 (1958) (discussing two party zero-sum games).
223 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 14 ("Games of chance must be distinguished from
games in which skill makes a difference .... With one group of games the outcome is
determined by fate; with the other group, choice comes into play.").
224 See supra note 201.
m Cf Roy Kreitner, Essay, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped
Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1096 (2000) (discussing how
contract law has accepted the notion of risk). Contracts in the financial markets, such as
derivatives, come close to being pure gambles on uncertainty. On the one hand, each party
uses information, knowledge and skill to seek an advantage or arbitrage. On the other
hand, predicting the movement of any price has been a perilous venture since the dawn of
commercial trade. Consider for example derivatives, which are pure bets on the price
movement of the underlying asset. When massive amounts are invested in them through
leverage, wrong bets can have spectacular consequences, as was the case with Long-Term
Capital Management ("LTCM"). See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). LTCM was
an arbitrage fund with $100 billion in assets and $4.7 billion in equity (meaning that most
of the firm's assets were borrowed), and in 1998 it had entered into thousands of deriva-
tives contracts with a combined exposure of over $1 trillion. Id. at xix-xx. In the wake of
the August 17, 1998, debt moratorium by the Russian government, LTCM suffered a pre-
cipitous fall that threatened not only the vast sums invested in the fund but also the sys-
temic stability of the global derivatives market. Id. at 144. Ironically, two of LTCM's
partners were Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, both Nobel Prize winners for their pio-
neering work on derivative pricing techniques. Despite these occasionally spectacular hic-
cups, derivatives have enormous value in risk management and can hedge risk if used
properly. See supra note 107.
226 This is the approach taken by most plaintiffs and their attorneys. Contingent fee
arrangements prevalent in personal injury cases are essentially equity partnerships where
the plaintiff provides the business opportunity and the attorney provides the intellectual
2004] Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms 157
opportunity, and the attorney provides not only the intellectual
capital and labor but often the financial capital in the form of con-
tingent attorney's fees and costs. Most plaintiff lawyers are entre-
preneurs, and they conduct their business with an eye toward
economic self-interest. 27 The decision to undertake a case is like
any other sound investment decision, including an assessment of
the business partner (plaintiff), the competitive environment
(opposing attorney and party), the business environment (legal
forum and judicial climate), and a risk-reward analysis including
the opportunity cost of capital (other cases foregone). The value of
this financial investment depends on the underlying risk. Compo-
nents of the litigation risk can be unpacked as Markowitz did for
investment risk.228 Borrowing from the Efficient Portfolio Theory,
we can isolate two kinds of litigation risk: general and unique risk.
General risk encompasses the systemic process risk associated
with the legal forum, which can be seen as a market. This market
risk constitutes the uncertainty associated with the decisions of the
jury and the judge, who are influenced by their life experiences,
opinions, predispositions, and the prevailing community standards.
General risk is unrelated to the case, and is systemic to all lawsuits
brought before deliberative bodies. It not only includes the risk of
unpredictable human interactions, but also unpredictable discre-
tionary decisions where there are two or more decision paths,
neither of which could be classified as wrong or irrational in the
sense of reversible error. Under this view, reversible error can be
understood to occur when a deliberative body arbitrarily increases
the general risk of a litigant beyond the range of rational mul-
tivariate decision-making. A lawsuit with only general risk is akin
to a game of pure chance. The matter is left purely to the delibera-
tive bodies without input or influence, and it is no surprise that
many practicing trial lawyers consider the unpredictability and ran-
domness of a trial as akin to a pure gamble.229
and financial capital. See generally Rhee, supra note 199; Marc A. Franklin et al., Acci-
dents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961) (discussing economics of attorney-plaintiff relationship).
227 Charles A. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits
of Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 293, 295-96 (1984). See also
Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 890 ("The primary goal of plaintiff attorneys is to maximize
not the expected judgment, but rather their own expected return-their fees.").
228 Markowitz, supra note 45; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
229 Scott Shane, Md. to Join Tobacco Settlement, BALT. SUN, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al
("[Maryland] did not want to gamble on taking the case to trial" in approving $206 billion
settlement which would net Maryland $4.2 billion (quoting Maryland Attorney General J.
Joseph Curran, Jr.)); John Steinman, Couple to be Sentenced in Foster Child's Death, L.A.
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Unique risk is the risk associated with the specific case. This risk
is itself comprised of two general categories: the totality of the fac-
tual and evidentiary circumstances and the substantive and proce-
dural laws specifically applicable to the case. Unique risk
encompasses factors such as the strength of the facts, the client's
likeability and the sympathy she will or will not elicit from the
factfinder, the quantity and quality of witnesses, the skill of the
lawyers and the financial resources of the parties. The substantive
law is also a key determinant. The law can skew the risk for one
party or another, and often the risk is allocated based on various
policy and efficiency grounds. 230  All of these factors combine to
create the unique risk profile for any given case. Because some of
the randomness or unpredictability of the lawsuit is eliminated by
these factors, unique risk converts a lawsuit from a game of chance
to a game of skill.
In only the minority of cases is the total risk, defined as the com-
bination of general and unique risks, said to be evenly distributed.
All things considered, one party generally has the edge. This is the
nature of competition. For the purpose of this discussion, however,
we can imagine a jurisdiction in which judges are perfectly neutral
administrators of the law and juries rationally apply the law to the
facts.23' Accordingly, general risk is mitigated to its natural state,
the risk inherent in the randomness of rational multivariate deci-
sion-making. 32 In this perfectly efficient legal system, the simplest
Tisms, Oct. 9, 1997, at B5 ("[T]aking the case to trial is a gamble .... (quoting attorney
H. Russell Halpern)).
230 The clearest example of such skewing is criminal law, which greatly skews the risk in
favor of the defendant. This does not mean that errors are less tolerated in criminal cases.
In fact, the opposite is true-more errors are tolerated in favor of the defendant. Accord-
ingly, the law imposes standards by which the defendant's unique litigation risk is greatly
mitigated. See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) ("The evidence upon
which a jury is justified in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a
conviction of guilt, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt."); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 684-687, (1984) (providing constitutional guarantee of reasonably effective
counsel); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88, (1963) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to disclose all exculpatory evi-
dence against the defendant).
231 It has been said that the reasonably prudent person is "a fictitious person, who never
has existed on land or sea." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 174-75. Likewise,
this hypothetical jurisdiction of perfectly impartial and objective deliberative bodies has
probably never existed.
232 Parenthetically, it is this remaining risk that makes the law an entirely human affair,
for we cannot conceive of a day in which logical decision trees programmed into a com-
puter would mete out justice in place of judges or juries. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, Public
Law Working Paper No. 18, Nov. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
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of tort cases is brought: a suit seeking compensation for property
damage to a car resulting from a two car accident on a lonely
stretch of country road. Plaintiff says the traffic light was green,
defendant says it was red, and there are no other witnesses. Plain-
tiff and defendant are equally situated in terms of reputation, per-
sonal appeal, financial resources, attorney skill and other
circumstances that could affect the case. In other words, unique
risk is equally distributed to plaintiff and defendant. What is the
truth?
Absent an omniscient factfinder, the dispositive "fact" (the color
of the traffic light) is like Schr6dinger's cat.233 It is neither true nor
false; it exists as a probability function. 34 As a result, in most cases
we will not find absolute truth, only legal certainty.235 This particu-
lar case could then be resolved based on a twitch of the eye, a shift-
abstractid=289789 (arguing that artificial intelligence cannot now engage in sophisticated
legal reasoning but leaving open the possibility that such reasoning can be achieved in the
future).
233 Erwin Schr6dinger was an early twentieth century atomic physicist who researched
quantum mechanics. Unlike classical physics, quantum mechanics postulated that we can-
not measure the exact position of subatomic particles, and that they exist only as
probability functions along different space and time configurations. To demonstrate this,
Schrodinger proposed a thought experiment. Erwin Schr6dinger, The Present Situation in
Quantum Mechanics, reprinted in Quantum Theory and Measurement 152 (John Archibald
Wheeler & Wojciech Hubert Zurek eds., John D. Trimmer trans., 1983). A cat sits in a
sealed box facing a gun. The gun is connected to a Geiger counter, which is connected to a
block of radioactive uranium. If a uranium atom's nucleus decays, the Geiger counter will
activate and trigger the gun. Schr0dinger asked whether the cat was alive or dead before
opening the box. Most of us would say that the cat exists in an alternative, mutually exclu-
sive dead or alive state. Under quantum theory, however, the cat is neither dead nor alive,
but exists as a probability function. Various scientists and philosophers have pondered the
meaning of this thought experiment within and outside of the discipline of quantum phys-
ics. See generally MICHIo KAKU, HYPERSPACE 260-61 (1995) (presenting a general discus-
sion of Schrodinger and his thought experiment); BRIAN GREENE, THE FABRIC OF THE
COSMOS: SPACE, TIME, AND THE TEXTURE OF REALITY 211 (2004); HELGE KRAGH, QUAN-
TUM GENERATIONS: A HISTORY OF PHYSICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 217 (1999).
234 Much of legal fact finding is based on incomplete information and uncertainty. See
Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in Infer-
ences, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2001) (proposing a "theory of uncertainty" to deal with
the uncertainties in fact finding).
235 There are many cases where truth appears to be absolute. The Rodney King video-
tape is a good example. We saw what happened on the video, but then the trial turned on
the interpretation of the recorded event. The "truth" under law became entangled in a
credibility dispute, an element of unique litigation risk. The jury verdict was as unpredict-
able as the resulting riots in Los Angeles. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald,
The Rodney King Videotape: Why the Case Was Not Black and White, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1637, 1644 (1993) (arguing that videotaped events need "context" and are subject to widely
varying interpretations); David Sternbach, Note, Hanging Pictures: Photographic Theory
and the Framing of Images of Execution, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1141 (1995) ("Photo-
graphic images offer appearances, but they do not offer meanings.").
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ing in the seat, a misunderstanding of a phrase or a carefully timed
smile. Even in this most simple traffic accident example, there is a
significant chance that the judicial system will produce the wrong
answer. The plaintiff and defendant would have an approximately
even chance of winning, but with little correlation between the
omniscient truth and individual judgment. Culpable plaintiffs
could be awarded a remedy, while victimized plaintiffs could be
denied. Where general risk is mitigated to its natural state and
unique risk is equally distributed, the case takes on the characteris-
tic of a game of chance. Given one hundred such cases, the law
could err in as many as half the cases. The maxim "justice is blind"
means not only that individuals will be treated fairly, but also that
the law is blind to individualized error rates. Fairness (or justice)
does not equate to individualized correctness. In short, the law
guarantees a fair process but not necessarily correct results.236
This shows the fallacy of the argument put forth by the correc-
tive justice theorists. While causation in most ordinary torts is
obvious and so seldom an issue, causation as the concept has been
used in increased risk cases is problematic. When it is applied as a
predictive device, the accuracy of that prediction becomes an issue.
Each close case could err as much as 50% in a perfectly efficient
legal system-a terrible result if viewed in isolation. Yet we are
not troubled by a high error rate in the truth-seeking process in
close cases. On a practical level, we are resigned to a certain truth-
seeking process for we cannot calculate the risks in the first place
unless a process is employed to evaluate that risk. Paradoxically,
that process would constitute a component of the risk it seeks to
assess. 237 Because the legal process is risky, we expect some unpre-
dictability and are only troubled if the result was achieved through
236 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968 (1984) ("Indeed, there is always some
chance of error in the legal system, and at the time defendants must choose their behavior
it will usually be hard to predict the kinds of evidence that will be available when they are
brought to trial, the persuasiveness of the witnesses and advocates who will participate in
that trial, or the temperament of the judge or jury at the time of their decision.").
237 There is another analogy to a principle in quantum physics. The Heisenberg Uncer-
tainty Principle states the paradox that the position and speed of a subatomic particle can-
not be ascertained in its natural state because the act of observing it affects the qualities
observed. See WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND: ENCOUNTERS AND CONVER-
SATIONS 76-81 (Ruth H. Anshen ed., Arnold J. Pomerans trans., 1971); KRAGH, supra note
233, at 207-09; WILLIAM H. CROPPER, GREAT PHYSICISTS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LEAD-
ING PHYSICISTS FROM GALILEO TO HAWKING 284-85 (2001). Likewise, we can never assess
the litigation risks without actually undertaking the lawsuit, but the legal process itself
constitutes a part of that risk.
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extraordinary process error. In the extreme case where general
and unique risks are perfectly distributed,238 the game becomes one
of pure chance-a speculative gamble. Nevertheless, the legal pro-
cess would not be troubled by this implied randomness because the
litigation risk is equally assumed by the parties.239
We continue the car accident hypothetical and assume an expert
study shows that the terrain on the defendant's side of the road
could potentially induce an inattentive driver to become disori-
ented. Based on this data, an expert concludes that 55% of all past
accidents were due to defendants' inattention and opines that the
defendant in this case was probably negligent.24 ° What result? In
one hundred such cases, we expect that a factfinder would find for
the plaintiff in fifty-five cases based on the combined litigation risk.
Even when the facts favor one party, as they do here, the other
party would win a substantial minority of cases based on the unpre-
dictability and randomness associated with rational multivariate
decisionmaking. Certainly unexpected results at trial, achieved
without reversible error, are not surprising. But in an efficient sys-
tem the aggregate results should statistically reflect the underlying
risks. Under these facts, we are still not guaranteed correctness.24'
Now suppose a review of one hundred such accidents in the
jurisdiction shows that defendants actually won eighty-nine cases in
which the expected result is only forty-five wins. If general risk has
been mitigated to multivariate rationality, and if unique risk has
238 Many cases go to trial precisely because the risks are so evenly distributed, and other
cases settle because the parties have rationally opted to split the difference in a settlement
rather than risk trial.
239 The litigants are keenly aware of the prospect for speculation, which explains why
most lawsuits never make it to trial. Trials are expensive and the risks are great, sometimes
unknown even to experienced trial attorneys, thus 'explaining why most cases never reach
trial. In 2002, out of 258,876 cases filed in the United States District Courts, only 4,569 (or
1.8 percent) went to trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Court, Symposium on The Vanishing Trial Spon-
sored by the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association at 2 (December 12-14,
2003) (to appear in 1 J. Empirical L. Studies __ (Nov. 2004)). In 1962, the comparative
figures were 50,320 and 5,802 (11.5 percent). Id. The decrease in number and percentage
of trials shows a "striking philosophical, ideologically driven view that is hostile to trials."
Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get To Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2003, at Al (quoting Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). Accident cases have produced similar data. See Franklin et
al., supra note 226, at 10 (2,500 cases reached verdicts in New York City compared to
193,000 claims; i.e., less than 2 percent).
240 We assume that such evidence passes scrutiny under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
241 Cf. D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Per-
suasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1987).
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been determined to be 55/45 in favor of plaintiffs, the results are
anomalous. Perhaps this odd data would not alarm some given
that we are dealing with money and not liberties or lives. It could
be ignored as a statistical fluke. However, the data would pique
interest, at least, for it hints at a systemic error rate that cannot be
accounted for by general or unique risk. While the results of each
case can be explained by the randomness or unpredictability of the
justice system, collectively the errors suggest a systemic problem.
The point of this discussion is to underscore the obvious facts
that even past events are uncertain in the present, and future con-
sequences can never be predicted with certainty. Uncertainty is a
part of the human condition. Most knowledge and legal evidence
are probabilistic in nature.242 Probability can be assessed and dis-
cussed in qualitative terms such as credibility and weight of the
evidence, or in terms of statistics. The concept is the same. Under
this view, the standards of proof simply set forth error tolerance
rates relating to the litigation risk.243 We do not complain that
errors in the omniscient sense occur or even that the individual
error rates are high in some cases. But systemic errors concern us
for they are the byproduct of an inefficient process that arbitrarily
increases general or unique risks, or both. This increased risk
unfairly influences the individual outcome, and thus the result
(whether correct or incorrect in the omniscient sense) is said to be
achieved through extraordinary process error.
These truths must be incorporated into the legal rubric that does
justice to a broader understanding of risk and value. Society
expects not correct individualized results-the primary concern of
corrective justice theorists in this field-but a fair process that
achieves overall corrective justice for plaintiffs and deterrence for
defendants. Implicit in this social bargain are two things: (1) the
process will not impose an extraordinary increase in general or
unique risk in each individual case, (2) resulting in fairness
achieved through probabilistic results that reflect a certain statisti-
cal justice for the collective whole. If these twin goals are
242 Almost all evidence is probabilistic. DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 230 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting). See also Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 484 (Conn.
1990) (medical statistics can establish with a degree of certainty the likelihood of a future
injury and the risks); King, supra note 24, at 1385 ("[A]I1 factual evidence is ultimately
statistical and probabilistic in the epistemological sense.").
243 There are three major standards of proof: preponderance of the evidence, clear and
convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)
(discussing the three standards). These standards set out the various error tolerance levels,
which are set based on the underlying interests at stake.
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achieved, it does not matter that the legal system has produced an
individual error, for the law is a human endeavor.244 Thus, our jus-
tice system has a distinct utilitarian quality based on a notion of
statistical justice.2 45
C. Statistical Justice and "Loading the Dice"
Under this notion, it violates the implicit bargain to impose arbi-
trariness into the process. This means that the legal process should
not "load the dice." Cases should not be determined by the race of
the parties, the illicit prejudices of deliberative bodies, irrational
decision-making, perjury of witnesses, or misdeeds of attorneys.
Obviously, these things inject extraordinary risk into the legal pro-
cess. The resulting decision falls outside the bounds of multivariate
rationality and unfairly alters the natural state of the general or
unique risk profile for that particular case, creating the possibility
of reversible error on appeal.
Thus far, the discussion has centered on process-oriented risk
and error. The substantive rules of law can also affect unique risk
by "loading the dice" in a party's favor. In the above hypothetical,
assume that the anomalous discrepancy between expected and
actual results (forty-five versus eighty-nine cases) is due to the fol-
lowing rule of law: all traffic accident cases where the verdict is
rendered on Monday through Thursday will result in a directed
verdict for the defendant; otherwise the judgment will be consis-
tent with the jury's verdict. This peculiarity in the substantive law
244 I limit this discussion to civil cases. Criminal cases pose a far more difficult weighing
of acceptable errors. For some, the death penalty is troubling not because death is categor-
ically an abhorrent punishment, but because we must recognize that errors in the legal
process occur as a necessary product of human deliberation and so there is the possibility,
however infrequent or remote, of executing an innocent person. See Callins v. Collins, 114
S.Ct. 1127, 1129-30 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("On their
face, these goals of individual fairness, reasonable consistency, and absence of error appear
to be attainable: Courts are in the very business of erecting procedural devices from which
fair, equitable, and reliable outcomes are presumed to flow. Yet, in the death penalty area,
this Court, in my view, has engaged in a futile effort to balance these constitutional
demands .... From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death.").
245 Nevertheless, courts have generally adhered to a mechanistic and deterministic con-
ception of causation, which "reflects an intellectual uneasiness about probabilistic concepts
themselves." Robinson, supra note 25, at 780. Some commentators, however, have voiced
concerns that reliance on statistics may diminish justice. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Statisti-
cal-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530 (1989);
Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329 (1971). Others have suggested that statistics can assist in the truth seeking
process of the law. See, e.g., David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the
Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979).
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perfectly explains the 89% favorable verdict rate for defendants.2" 6
Of course, we cannot countenance these errors.247
The law scrutinizes the overall results achieved and seeks sub-
stantive rules that will make the legal system more efficient in the
overall sense. This is the very essence of the common law-a pro-
cess of continued reconstitution of the law looking to past experi-
ence to solve present problems and anticipating future issues to do
substantial justice on the grander scale.248 The process of evaluat-
ing the overall results also takes place in the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government as the statutory laws are continuously
reviewed.2 49 A rule of law in the field of torts should induce results
consistent with an overall statistical justice of error minimization.
This underlying concept is not as apparent in the context of an
ordinary accident because physical injury and causation are con-
firmed routinely,250 and the substantive law does not directly affect
the process that hopes to achieve the "correct" result. Ordinary
accidents produce ordinary results on the whole, and these results
do not test the legal system. The unique risks inherent in the rule
of law are evenly distributed, favoring neither defendant nor plain-
tiff. Each case is said to be determined on its "merits" based on
246 Statistically, if we assume that the one hundred cases are spread evenly throughout
the week, the eighty brought Monday through Thursday will automatically be decided for
the defendant. On Fridays, eleven cases will be decided for the plaintiff and nine for the
defendant (a 55/45 split as predicted by the expert report). This results in an 89% success
rate for the defendant.
247 This Monday-Friday rule is a fanciful example. But irrationality in substantive rules
of law presents itself throughout legal history. Few can argue that the decisions in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), or Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), were
rational, though they were argued as such at the time. As time changes, so does the law, as
society may come to consider irrational what was once considered reasonable. See Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (noting that "historical premises" were miscon-
strued in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and "our laws and traditions in the past
half century are of most relevance here"). Tort law too has seen irrationality at work. For
instance, contributory negligence disproportionately allocates the risks of an accident to
the plaintiff, and a large majority of jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine for the more
equitable doctrine of comparative negligence. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 65,
at 453, § 67, at 468-69.
248 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
249 This is apparent in recent reviews of death penalty cases. See Emanuel Margolis,
New Life for Connecticut's Death Penalty: Revisited, 74 CONN. B.J. 216, 233-34 (June 2000)
(discussing the indefinite moratorium on death penalties in Illinois announced on January
31, 2000); JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995, at 4-5, 30 (2000) (Columbia Law School study of 4,578 death penalty sentences
from 1973 to 1995 showing an overturning rate of 41% due to "serious errors" and an
"overall error rate" of 68%).
250 See supra note 5.
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proof that this defendant injured this plaintiff, which is the primary
concern of corrective justice. Each case too has the same suscepti-
bility to error, but across a large pool of cases these errors would
average out to produce a fair correlation of overall liability to rem-
edy. Under these circumstances, the preponderance of the evi-
dence rule has been shown to be more accurate than the
proportionality rule.25'
Levmore explains the efficiency of the preponderance rule in
most ordinary accidents this way. Suppose there is a 75% chance
that A injured the victim and a 25% chance that B caused the
injury, which is valued at $100.252 Under the preponderance rule,
A is assessed liability of $100 while B escapes liability. In three out
of four situations, this achieves the correct result and the error is
nil. In one out of four situations, the law erred by assessing $100
liability to A and failing to assess the same against B, a total error
of $200. The expected average error then is $50. Under the pro-
portionality rule, A and B are assessed $75 and $25, respectively.
In three of four situations, A is the culpable one but underpays by
$25 and B is erroneously assessed $25, a total error in the three
cases of $150. In one out of four situations, A is wrongly assessed
$75 while B underpays by $75, a total error of $150. The expected
average error then is $75. In most ordinary accidents, therefore,
the preponderance of the evidence rule minimizes errors.253 There
are no undue influences on the general or unique risk because in
the larger scheme liability matches culpability more accurately, and
by agreeing to litigate the parties assume the risk equally in the
legal process.
In increased risk cases, however, there is a conflict between the
twin policies of achieving correctness in the individual case and
efficiency on the whole. The traditional rule has been defended on
the basis of achieving the correct result in individual cases through
the requisite showing of injury and causation. But, as discussed,
such a goal is a chimera in increased risk cases.254 The very notion
that we can achieve individualized "correct" results in cases requir-
ing predictions into the future is dubious. In seeking correctness in
251 See Levmore, supra note 221, at 694 (noting that the preponderance rule applied to
ordinary accidents "may be the dominant rule in the legal system precisely because it mini-
mizes error-at least for a single case").
252 Id. at 693.
253 Id.; see also Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 593 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing
the error rates of a preponderance and proportionality schemes).
254 See supra note 26 and pages 140-44, 149-52.
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the individual case, the substantive law produces gross disparities
in the collective whole.255
Again simple math exercises demonstrate this point. Assume
there are four exposed plaintiffs and damage for the future injury is
$100. If there is a showing of a 50% likelihood of future injury, a
defendant will have no liability under the traditional rule, though
the expected value of damages on a probabilistic basis is $200. If
there is a showing of 51%, the defendant's liability is $400, though
the expected value is $204. When these cases are seen in context,
the correlation between liability and expected value of damages is
imperfect.256
We take the hypothetical a step further. Assume each of the
four persons is exposed to a 25% risk and they file lawsuits. The
timing of the lawsuit varies: three file suit immediately and one
when the injury manifests, if at all.257 Under the traditional rule,
the results are: in three out of four scenarios, the defendant's total
liability will be nil, and in one out of four the total liability will be
$100. The expected liability is $25, though the expected damage is
$100. Under a proportionality rule, the results are: in three out of
four scenarios, the defendant's total liability will be $75, and in one
out of four scenarios the defendant's total liability will be $175.
The expected liability is $100, which is the same as the expected
damage.
These simple examples show that the proportionality rule mini-
mizes errors across a larger class of cases.258 Because increased
risk cases rarely meet the preponderance threshold, plaintiffs are
consistently under-compensated and defendants consistently
escape liability-an effect Levmore calls a "recurring miss. '"259
This error rate built into the substantive law means that the tradi-
255 See Levmore, supra note 221, at 721 (describing certain situations where defendants
consistently escape liability).
256 Under the proportionality rule, the expected payout is perfectly correlated to the
expected damages. See id. at 697 ("The expected error of the probability rule is thus very
close to zero.").
257 We assume no statute of limitations problem. See supra text accompanying notes
150-151. As discussed later, this article argues that statute of limitations should be abol-
ished in these cases on the basis of mutual informational efficiency. See infra Section
VII.B.
258 "The important point is that it is hard to see why errors should be measured in a
case-by-case, rather than an aggregate, manner when a probabilistic rule accomplishes vir-
tually all that an omniscient factfinder would do." Levmore, supra note 221, at 698.
259 By using as an example the celebrated case of Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465
(Cal. 1970), Levmore considers the problem of "recurring misses" in the preponderance of
the evidence rule and shows how it may be met with a "probabilistic solution." Levmore,
supra note 221, at 705-10.
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tional rule arbitrarily increases a plaintiff's unique risk in any given
case. But critics of the proportionality rule may note that there is a
situation where the defendant pays liability in excess of expected
damages (the 25% chance that liability will be $175). This could be
viewed as producing a flawed result because some plaintiffs are
said to be overcompensated while the defendant is over-deterred.
There are two points to note here. First, the overcompensation
argument assumes that liability for physical injury is the baseline
from which appropriate compensation is determined. But freedom
from increased risk and freedom from physical injury are two inde-
pendent interests. 260  They share some common elements and
derive from the same fact pattern, but they are different interests
just the way a common set of facts can create liability for two dif-
ferent causes of action for different damages. Accordingly, the
baseline for comparison should be the damages for increased risk
and for personal injuries. In a right combination of events, a
defendant may be liable for injuries to both interests (but not to
the same plaintiff),26' in which case the $175 payout is not over-
compensation at all but the full theoretical liability.
Second, assuming arguendo that the $175 payout overcompen-
sates plaintiffs, the result is based on a hypothesized 100% filing
rate, which is an unrealistic assumption. For the purpose of calcu-
lation, we assume two things: (1) a 75% filing rate, meaning one
person will not sue for whatever reason, and (2) of the remaining
three plaintiffs, we apply the same timing assumption, i.e., two per-
sons will file suit immediately and one person will file suit upon a
physical manifestation. These assumptions provide a more realistic
sense of the diversity of choices involved in this problem. Under
these assumptions, there is a 91.7% chance that liability will be
apportioned at $50, and an 8.3% chance that liability will be
$150.262 On a weighted average basis, the resulting expected liabil-
260 See infra text accompanying notes 279-322.
261 As explained later in this article, a defendant can be held responsible for both the
physical injury and any increased risk injury. A defendant can be responsible for an
increased risk of injury, but the plaintiff is barred from later suing for a physical injury
upon manifestation. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
262 In deriving these figures, I assume the presence of four plaintiffs, A, B, C, and D, in
the following calculations: A has a 25% chance of death and there is a 25% chance that A
will be the non-filing plaintiff, or a 75% chance that the filing plaintiffs will be B, C, and D.
Of these three plaintiffs, based on the timing assumption, two will file suit immediately and
one will wait for a disease that will never manifest. Thus, in 75% of the cases, the liability
to these three plaintiffs as a group is $50. This leaves 25% of the cases where A is among
those who will choose to file suit. Among these 25% of the cases, there is a 33% chance
that A will be the plaintiff who waits until manifestation, in which case the liability is $150
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ity will be exactly $58 compared to the expected damages of $100.
This shows that the filing rate and timing of lawsuit (assuming
there is no statute of limitations problem) significantly affect the
ultimate liability payout matrix. While we may assume for discus-
sion purposes an efficiency between injury and filing rate, in truth
there is an inefficiency which benefits defendants. Reasons why
meritorious cases go unfiled are plentiful: lack of knowledge of the
wrong, inability to find an attorney, discounting of relatively minor
increase in risk, indifference or denial, lack of diligence and appre-
hension of prosecuting a lawsuit. Moreover, if the legal regime
increases litigation optionality by eliminating the statute of limita-
tions, timing plays a significant factor in increasing or decreasing
total expected liability. 63 Only in the clean world of theory is
there perfect deterrence; in truth defendants are always under-
deterred because of the choices made by victims, informational
inefficiencies in the process, or a combination thereof. Thus, the
overcompensation problem is not as significant even if increased
risk and physical injuries are jointly compensated.
The theoretical basis for the traditional rule and the concerns of
the corrective justice theorists are full of contradictions. Courts
have shunned a statistical approach in creating substantive rules of
law applicable to the collective whole while at the same time dog-
matically embracing it in the evidentiary process of determining
liability in each individual case. The traditional rule violates the
fundamental law of probabilities-the rule of large numbers-
which states that calculations of chance require sufficient sample
quantities so that individual variance is mitigated. It is of little
value to apply a probability rule to a sample of one and expect to
achieve the "correct" result in that case because the law of statistics
and legal experience say that each individual case can vary greatly
from the expected mean, i.e., the omniscient truth.164 Errors pro-
duced by the variance of general or unique risk, without more, is
not troubling. But when they are the product of extraordinary liti-
gation risk, there is a systemic problem with the process.
A proportionality rule greatly improves the overall accuracy of
matching the expected value of the total damages to liability. The
(an all-in probability of 8.3% of the total cases); and a 67% chance that A and another
plaintiff will file suit immediately and the remaining plaintiff will wait for a disease that will
never manifest, in which case the liability is $50 (an all-in probability of 16.7% of the
cases). In sum, 91.7% of the cases will yield $50 in liability and 8.3 percent will yield $150.
263 See infra Part VII.B (discussing statutes of limitations).
264 In statistics, variance measures the degree to which each data point deviates from a
regression.
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all-or-nothing rule contradicts this matching principle. The sub-
stantive rule of law is not neutral as in most ordinary accidents
where the preponderance of the evidence rule generally works
well. The law should seek to produce efficient results. Expected
damages should correlate to expected liability within the broader
context as in most ordinary accidents. In increased risk cases, how-
ever, the substantive law "loads the dice" in favor of the defendant,
thereby arbitrarily increasing the plaintiff's unique risk in each
individual case.265
D. Other Policy Considerations
There are two other policy considerations that require discus-
sion: the "slippery slope" and "floodgate" arguments. These argu-
ments are related. At any given time, a person is exposed to an
infinite variety of risks, natural and artificial, and the question
becomes whether even a de minimis increase in risk is actionable.
If not, where is the threshold? We can immediately dismiss the
notion that any fleeting risk creates a cause of action. Instantane-
ous risk is distinguished from latent risk. Most accidents result
from mishaps of instant transactions between parties: a man drives
drunk, a woman negligently handles a fork crane, a utility forgets
to turn off the gas line, etc. 266 These acts or omissions create
potentially grave but temporally minute risks. Their repercussions
immediately follow. If there is no adverse consequence, there is no
liability because no harm resulted. Strictly speaking, the defen-
dant's conduct did increase the risk of physical injury. Neverthe-
less, this harm is not actionable because cost internalization at this
level is the price for living in an imperfect world.
This does not mean that an instantaneous increase in risk is not
redressable at all. Where the risk created is palpable but fleeting,
the law transitions from a private recovery scheme to a public
deterrence system.267 Causing such risks is actionable via public
enforcement of administrative and criminal regulations. Drunk
driving is a good example. Although the act may result in no acci-
dents, it is punishable by law because it creates the risk of harm.
For each individual concerned, the- risk is fleeting at most, but the
265 Kaye, supra note 245, at 36 (suggesting that "the only real question is... whether the
[probability] technique would reduce the number of errors in factfinding.").
266 Schroeder uses the example of a speeding driver to illustrate how the administrative
costs would make most increased risk scenarios impossible for private enforcement.
Schroeder, supra note 26, at 473-74.
267 See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 908-10 (proposing a "public law" approach).
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risk in the aggregate is great on society as a whole. Private
enforcement is impractical for two reasons: (1) the transaction
costs of litigation far outweigh any harm;268 and (2) because the
harm is so fleeting, quantification of damages would truly be a
speculative affair. Thus the harm is redressed through public
enforcement. Many criminal and administrative regulations of pri-
vate conduct are aimed at reducing social costs of behavior that
increases risk to society.
Increased risk cases are different because they present pro-
longed risk exposure in circumstances where the transaction
between plaintiff and defendant can be specifically identified and is
not consummated for many years. Moreover, the harm is signifi-
cant and can be quantified. 69 Under these limited circumstances,
there is no reason why private enforcement of negligent acts is any
more or less efficient than public enforcement since the transaction
costs would not be extraordinarily high as compared to the injury.
An argument can also be made that a deviation from the tradi-
tional rule could result in a flood of litigation. 270 Any scheme that
seeks to award damages proportional to increased risk is said to
potentially "open the floodgates" of litigation.271 However, these
policy-oriented reasons are not sufficient bases to justify the tradi-
tional rule. The argument overstates the potential for a "flood" of
litigation by failing to consider the cost structure of these complex
tort cases. Not every situation where there is provable increased
risk would result in a lawsuit. These cases are always complex,
involving difficult issues of law, fact, medicine, science (and per-
haps even financial economics). The costs are prohibitive, and
there is significant self-selection involved.272 Like all rational
investors, litigants and attorneys will carefully weigh the costs and
268 See generally RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 95-156 (1988)
(reprinting Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (Oct. 1960)
(discussing the nature of transaction costs)). Cf Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 533-34 (1961) (the costs of tort liabil-
ity "should be borne by the activity which causes them," unless the administration of enter-
prise liability or damages arising out of it prove too costly.).
269 See infra Section VI (discussing the quantification of damages).
270 See generally Paul J. Komyatte, Medical Monitoring Damages: An Evolution of Envi-
ronmental Tort Law, 23 COLO. LAW. 1533, 1533 (1994) (noting that "eight out of ten Amer-
icans live near some type of hazardous waste site.").
271 See Metro-North Commuters R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997) ("[T]ens
of millions of individuals -may have suffered exposure to substances . . . [a]nd that fact,
along with uncertainty as to the amount of liability, could threaten . . . a 'flood' of less
important cases .... ").
272 See supra text accompanying notes 226-227 (discussing the litigation selection
process).
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benefits. For example, if a person has a 10% chance of suffering
illness with a present value of $1 million, the proportionality rule
would result in $100,000 award. Such an award might not even
cover the cost of the litigation.2 73 Attorneys are incentivized to file
a lawsuit only if the potential payout justifies the investment in
capital, labor and opportunity cost.274 Litigation cost is one reason
why many of these cases are grouped in class action or consoli-
dated litigation schemes. 75 Because they are expensive to litigate,
the liability burden is overstated.276
Moreover, the "floodgate" argument per se is not a sound basis
for creating rules of liability. It is an argument of convenience
based on a bias against lawsuits, which necessarily is a bias for
defendants. There is nothing inherent in the idea of a lawsuit that
should be viewed with disfavor. Whether liability is disproportion-
ately heavy is of course a relative concept. The allocation of liabil-
ity is always a zero-sum game.277 The question is whether the rule
of law is justified, and whether the bias against lawsuits is based on
the premise that most of these cases are frivolous. There is a dis-
tinction between meritorious claims, even if the aggregate liability
is great, and marginal claims for dubious injuries. Courts are not
adverse to imposing high liability in an absolute dollar sense, or
liability having severe consequences on defendants. 78 Where
there are 1,000 people who have been exposed to significant levels
of toxins, can we classify such suits as a flood of litigation? The
273 See Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1282 (1992) ("[I]t cost society
$1.92 to deliver $1 of compensation to a victim of negligent injury."); Gary Schwartz, The
A.L.I. Reporters' Study, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 529, 537 (1993) (estimating that plaintiffs
recover only 40-50 percent of total recovery net of litigation costs). Indeed, my own for-
mer practice confirms that even relatively simple tort cases, such as insurance bad faith
litigation, can well exceed $100,000 in fees and costs if the matter is vigorously defended
and proceeds to trial.
274 This is particularly so in tort law because of the American rule of attorneys' fees. See
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 246 (1975) (prevailing
party cannot recover attorneys' fees unless mandated by statute or contract).
275 See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Mass. 1986) (con-
solidated action of 33 plaintiffs).
276 See Schroeder, supra note 26, at 473-75.
277 See supra note 222.
278 See, e.g., Cheryl Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21
HARV. J. LEG. 307, 334 (1984) (liquidation is death of corporation); Francis E. McGovern,
The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2002) (estimating $54
billion in liabilities incurred for asbestos, and another $200 to $265 billion more in the
future (citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 53, 77 (2002))).
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answer is not self-evident, and it depends on whether these people
had a valid interest violated for which there is a cognizable injury.
V. FREEDOM FROM RISK AS A LEGAL INTEREST
A. Defining Interest and Harm
The question then is: Why should freedom from increased risk
be a legally protected interest? The Restatement provides the
basic framework for discussion. Under traditional negligence law,
a plaintiff must prove that a breach of a duty caused injury. 279 A
breach of duty is the violation of a legally protected interest.28 °
The Restatement defines an injury as "the invasion of any legally
protected interest of another. '28 1 This notion is separate from a
harm, which is defined as "the existence of loss or detriment in fact
of any kind to a person.'"282 Harm differs from injury in that it is
not necessarily the product of an invasion of a legally protected
interest, though most injuries are the infliction of some harm.283
Under traditional tort law, harm is generally considered to be
"bodily harm, physical harm, pecuniary harm, and the like.''284 The
traditional rule forces an increased risk analysis into the law's inad-
equate conceptualization of the injury troika. Increased risk defies
easy categorization.285 On the one hand, an accident precipitates
the cause of action and increased risk clearly involves the prospect
of physical harm and economic loss. The potential economic loss
component has a property-like interest if we perceive a person's
economic potential as a capital asset. On the other hand, the harm
created by increased risk is informational in nature. Risk is funda-
mentally the concept of information and the lack thereof, and spe-
cific information on the level of uncertainty determines in part
value in the market. The law too recognizes the value of informa-
tion in a number of areas,286 including invasion of privacy and defa-
279 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
280 Id. § 4. An interest is legally protected if society recognizes a desire to protect that
interest through the imposition of civil liability. Id. § 1, cmt. d.
281 Id. § 7(1).
282 Id. § 7(2).
283 Id. § 7(1), cmt. a.
284 Id. § 7, cmt. b.
285 Some scholars have suggested that increased risk is sufficient to create liability,
though the harm is less apparent than a physical injury. See supra note 33. Also, the law
has recognized liability where there is physical injury but not a showing of causation in fact.
See infra Section V.E (discussing the market share theory of liability).
286 For example, the law protects intellectual property rights, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-318
(2004) (Patent Act); regulates the disclosure of private information by financial institu-
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mation, both of which involve a disruption of the person's
informational integrity.287
This article started with the proposition that risk has inherent
value, and it cited among other things the example of a lottery
ticket. 28 8 We return to the lottery example here. Consider what
would happen if a lottery ticket is tortiously converted. Everyone
loves a winner, and not surprisingly there have been a number of
cases for conversion of a winning lottery ticket.289 But what if a
person steals a lottery ticket that eventually proves to be a loser?290
Even though ex post the plaintiff did not have anything of value,
the law would clearly provide a remedy for conversion with dam-
age calculated as the value of the ticket at the time of the theft.291
This is of course the correct result. The defendant took something
of value at the time of conversion and should not escape liability
just because luck subsequently diminishes the chattel's value to nil.
But beneath this clarity of result, we need to identify why the law
would provide a remedy. This inquiry touches on the notion of
property. Is the lottery ticket tangible property? We assume it is.
It is physical in form, it is sold on every street corner, and it has
trading value (at least ex ante). At first glance, the ticket squarely
falls within the law's framework of the injury troika. But what if it
tions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); and imposes evidentiary prohibi-
tions in rape cases, FED. R. EVID. 412.
287 Invasion of privacy is based on a fundamental right "to be let alone." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29
(2d ed. 1888)). See also William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (synthe-
sizing the right of privacy into four kinds: intrusion into seclusion or solitude, public disclo-
sure of private facts, publicity that places a person in false light, and appropriation of
image or likeness).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
289 See, e.g., Seward v. Dickerson, 844 So. 2d 1207 (Ala. 2002); Fitchie v. Yurko, 570
N.E.2d 892 (Il. App. Ct. 1991); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
290 Research has failed to find such a case, which is not surprising given the amount in
controversy. Of course, no one of sound constitution would sue for the theft of a $1 losing
ticket. Nevertheless, the hypothetical is not as academic as it first sounds. In many ways,
derivatives are like lottery tickets in that they are pure bets on the value movement of an
underlying asset. Like a lottery ticket, a derivative will either hit or miss. Therefore, there
is the possibility of a lawsuit brought for the conversion of a large stake in a derivatives
position, which eventually proves to be "out of the money" at maturity. Currently, I am
unaware of any such dispute, but it seems only a matter of time before the ownership of a
derivative position is disputed.
291 See DOBBS, supra note 91, § 5.13(2), at 547 ("The general rule requires the courts to
assess market value of a damages, destroyed or converted chattel at the time of the
harm."). There could be an issue of whether market value would be the expected value of
the lottery ticket or the market price of the lottery ticket. Id. at 546 ("If it is taken or
destroyed, the plaintiff may be allowed to recover the reasonable costs of replacing the
item.").
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does not take physical form but ownership is recorded in electronic
format or someone's memory? This fact does not change the legal
result because the physical ticket itself, as with a stock certificate or
a property deed, has no inherent value. The true asset is the thing
that ticket, certificate or deed represents. The notion of property is
abstract,292 leading to the question: What exactly has been con-
verted? We could say it is the original $1 investment in the ticket.
But the original investment was the consideration to purchase the
ticket and is different from what was actually given to the plaintiff
and converted. 93 The thing converted is not property at all, in the
sense of a tangible chattel or money. It is the opportunity for gain,
an abstraction but property nonetheless. The risk taken by the
ticket purchaser has inherent value that must be compensated
when that chance was tortiously converted. The ex ante chance
(the risk) is independent of the ex post win/loss result (the money
reward).
Keeping this framework in mind, suppose that each person's eco-
nomic value or health status is calculated and recorded in a certifi-
cate. These certificates are then traded in an open market, used as
collateral for debt, sold as garnishment of future wages, and
insured against diminution of value. Further, their value can be
speculated on through derivative instruments also traded on the
market.294 If a defendant steals this certificate, would he be liable
for conversion? What if he changes the essential nature or charac-
ter of this "property" so that the value of that certificate decreases
in the market? Would he be liable for this decrease in value
292 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 42-43 (2000). "Capital is born by
representing in writing-in a title, a security, a contract, and in other such records-the
most economically and socially useful qualities about the asset as opposed to the visually
more striking aspects of the asset." Id. at 49-50. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030
(9th Cir. 2003) (in a dispute over the ownership of an internet domain address, court set
forth a three part test to determine whether something can be classified as property: (1)
interest capable of precise definition, (2) capable of exclusive possession or control, (3)
viability of a legitimate claim to exclusivity).
293 If this was not the case, then the remedy for the conversion of a winning lottery
ticket should be the original $1 rather than the winnings. Of course, this result would
never stand as a matter of legal and equitable remedies.
294 These assumptions are not as far-fetched as they may seem. Life insurance certainly
underwrites the economic value of life. Scholars and the financial communities are contin-
uing to expand the uses of financial engineering in bold and imaginative ways. For
instance, Shiller recognizes that one's livelihood, income potential and susceptibility to
inequity should be protected through financial engineering. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW
FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4-5, 107-64 (Princeton Univ. 2003). More-
over, he proposes the commoditization of these financial instruments and the development
of trading markets, which would have a profound impact on our lives and our understand-
ing of risk management. Id. at 189-230.
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regardless of whether ex post the risk manifests? Is it possible to
view a person's prospective economic value as a capital asset akin
to property? In theory, at least, the decrease in a person's eco-
nomic value could be the basis to recognize a legal injury.
Until the nature of the harm caused by increased risk is clearly
identified, the argument for recognizing increased risk as a pro-
tected interest is diminished, notwithstanding the fairness and pol-
icy arguments.z95 The following sections explain how a plaintiff has
been harmed. Some aspects of harm fit nicely into the traditional
understanding of legal injury, but others are less tangible though
no less real. To explain the latter, this article analogizes a victim's
situation to financial securities. This analogy serves both to
demonstrate the nature of the harm and to quantify that harm.
Such an analogy might draw objections from some as there are nat-
ural limitations: a firm is an economic entity existing primarily to
generate profits for its investors, whereas profits are not the pri-
mary basis for the existence of a person; so equating a person to a
firm may be viewed as dehumanizing the inherent value of a
human being. The point is well taken. But it cannot be denied that
a significant part of any person's constitution is an economic com-
ponent. We see this in compensation for wrongful death, which
treats a decedent's value from a substantially economic perspec-
tive. There are also costs precipitated by increased risk to both
firms and persons, and one purpose of tort law is to remedy the
costs imposed on victims. The financial analogy is appropriate to
understand how involuntarily subjecting a person to increased risk
imposes costs to the victim, decreases her "asset" value, and cre-
ates an option scenario that has only negative value.
B. Increased Risk as a Cost
An injury can be in the nature of imposed costs. Personal injury,
property damage and pecuniary loss all concern costs imposed on a
victim. The most accessible concept of cost usually connotes out-
of-pocket economic losses.296 Cost, however, has a broader mean-
ing. In finance, cost measures the price paid as set by the risk, and
it makes no difference whether this price is paid in money or barter
(a tangible cost) or in lost valuation or opportunity (a more
abstract notion). Increased risk imposes both kinds of costs on the
victim.
295 See supra notes 24-29.
296 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1965).
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With respect to economic costs, increased risk cases involve the
cost of future medical monitoring, which courts have carved out as
an independent cause of action.297 There is also another pecuniary
cost: if exposed plaintiffs are honest in their dealings with insur-
ance companies, they can expect to pay higher insurance premiums
as a result of their increased susceptibility to future physical
298injury. Exposure to toxins is a relevant, unobjectionable factor
in the consideration of life or health insurance premiums, and we
would expect that an exposed plaintiff would incur additional eco-
nomic costs for insurance. Thus, recovery for increased risk can be
seen in part as the payment of the victim's insurance costs.
2 99
Increased risk also imposes nonpecuniary costs. It is unquestion-
able that a victim would suffer from mental disturbance and
decreased quality of life. Courts have recognized some of these
costs by allowing fear of disease and mental distress causes of
actions °.3  Thus some aspects of these nonpecuniary costs also fit
squarely into the traditional legal framework.
Increased risk also imposes opportunity costs. Every choice
(option) creates an opportunity cost, defined as the expected
return on a project foregone.30 1 In industry and finance, opportu-
nity cost analysis is performed regularly to determine whether a
firm is maximizing the efficiency of its capital allocations. If the
297 See supra note 163.
298 The insurance industry routinely calculates the cost and risk of poor health in calcu-
lating premiums for life and health insurance, and annuities. Michael I. Krauss & Robert
A. Levy, Calculating Tort Damages for Lost Future Earnings: The Puzzles of Tax, Inflation
and Risk, 31 GONZ. L. REv. 325, 353-54 (1995-96) (discussing pricing of insurance premi-
ums). Indeed, voluntary exposure to toxins (such as cigarette smoking and alcohol con-
sumption) and prior history of susceptibility to disease are relevant and legal
considerations in the determination of premiums. When an insurance company issues a
life insurance policy, that policy is an assessment of the underlying risk (i.e., the risk of
premature death). See generally FLOYD S. HARPER & LEWIS C. WORKMAN, FUNDAMEN-
TAL MATHEMATICS OF LIFE INSURANCE (1970).
299 See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 219 (1996) (damages should equal "the pre-
mium that would purchase an insurance policy providing tort-type and tort-level damages
in the event that the ultimate accrued harm occurs"); FRANK CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY
INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW: RISKS, REGULATION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 210
(1989) (damages should equal "the present cost of adequately insuring against probable
future costs associated with the particular risk."). Other commentators have reasoned that
damages are justified by increased insurance costs. See Ashton, supra note 29, at 1122;
Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: Proposal for
Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985); Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based
Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1520 (1998).
300 See supra note 162.
301 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 97-98.
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opportunity cost is greater than the yield on the current project, a
firm's capital allocation is said to be inefficient, creating a cost to
the firm even though the project may be profitable from the per-
spective of a pure accounting return. °2 If the opportunity cost is
less than the current yield, then a firm has efficiently used its capi-
tal. Similarly, individuals regularly conduct less formal opportunity
cost analyses when, for example, they relinquish a job to be closer
to family or choose not to pursue a lawsuit because the emotional
toll outweighs the potential economic reward. Opportunity cost is
a weighing of the value of the two options, and finance theory sug-
gests that it should be considered when deciding on a particular
course of action.30 3
For an exposed individual, the opportunity of an otherwise
healthy future is lost. It is a surprising anomaly in the law that
many jurisdictions recognize opportunity cost in the loss of chance
doctrine but not in increased risk cases. The two theories are mir-
ror images from a risk perspective. The common explanation for
this anomaly is that loss of chance involves medical malpractice
and the special policy of holding medical professionals to a higher
standard.30 4 While this may be true, another factor may be at work
here: the loss of chance doctrine is a judicial recognition of the
ordinary concept of opportunity CoSt. 30 5 There is an opportunity
cost for society as well. Even a 1% increased risk of death in a
class of 100 victims means that one more person will likely die.
The loss of each unique individual is not only an enormous loss to
those related to her, but also to society.
Lastly, there are the costs associated with extraordinary litiga-
tion process risk. Recall that increased risk presents significant
problems dealing with statutes of limitations, the single claim rule,
stale or lost evidence, and the potential disappearance of defend-
302 "If the ROIC [return on invested capital] is greater than zero but less than its
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) the company may be 'profitable' but it will not
provide an adequate return to the suppliers of capital. From this perspective, the company
is destroying value." COPELAND ET AL., supra note 57, at 27.
303 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 46, at 97-98.
304 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 182 (Kan. 1994) ("[T]he loss of chance doc-
trine serves to fairly compensate the plaintiff for the tortious deprivation of an opportunity
to live longer and recover from a physical injury or condition inflicted by the defendant's
wrongful act or omission." (emphasis removed) (quoting Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance:
A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 760
(1992))).
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ants.3 °6 These risks are present for most ordinary torts as well, but
they are greatly magnified by the latency period of increased risk
tort situations. Although plaintiffs are not at fault, they bear the
costs of these increased litigation process risks. Under the circum-
stances, it must be asked whether the innocent plaintiff or the cul-
pable defendant should bear the cost.
C. Increased Risk as a Diminution of Asset Value
Increased risk diminishes an individual's economic asset value.
Although each person has an inherent worth that is incalculable in
monetary terms, a part of this worth is a certain economic value
that can be readily calculable. This economic value is a part of the
human capital asset, which is evaluated and bartered for in typical
credit transactions such as loans and mortgages. In wrongful death
cases, the law values this component of a person and remedies the
loss. Viewed this way, the law implicitly analogizes a person to a
firm in that both are economic assets anticipated to throw off a
future stream of earnings. °7 As demonstrated by CAPM and the
DCF, the theoretical stock value of any firm depends on the pro-
jected cash flows and the risks associated with them. 30 8 This valua-
tion concept is incorporated in the pecuniary loss method of
valuing damages for loss of life.
Increased risk decreases the pure economic value of a person's
life. The CAPM shows that risk is a key component in calculating
a firm's value. Like firms, all persons have a certain risk premium,
as evinced by actuarial tables used by insurance companies. 30 9 An
306 Schroeder, supra note 26, at 475-76 (noting the unreliability of a causation-based
system for torts with long latency periods).
307 I do not equate the true value of human life to an economic asset. The intrinsic value
of human life is worth more than an economic stream of earnings. See Joseph A. Kuiper,
The Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Doubtful Future of Hedonic Damages
Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1197, 1202-03 & nn.
38-40 (1996) ("Much of this criticism focuses on the failure of pecuniary losses to account
for life's intrinsic value."). Remedying a lost life with money is an inadequate solution,
though it is the best worldly solution available.
308 See Krauss & Levy, supra note 298, at 348-53 (discussing the role of risk and the
CAPM on calculating damages under the pecuniary loss method.).
309 Insurance companies value the risks and price their products so that premiums
exceed the value of the risks assumed. They routinely measure this concept by a combined
ratio, which is the ratio of losses plus operating expenses to premiums earned. In the
simplest sense, an insurance company turns a profit so long as: (Losses Incurred) + (Oper-
ating Expenses) < (Premiums Earned) + (Investment Earnings from Premiums Paid). See
SMiTH, supra note 41, at 125 ("In order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a
trade at all, the common premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to
pay the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn
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example illustrates the concept. Assume for simplicity two individ-
uals with the same age, life expectancy of ten years and net earn-
ings of $100 per year, growing at a compounded rate of 7% per
year. Assume also that one person has a 20% chance of death
within the life expectancy due to exposure to toxins, and expert
testimony establishes that the overall risk distribution, or risk den-
sity as denoted Rd, in years 1 through 10 is as follows: 0.2%, 0.3%,
0.8%, 1.8%, 3.7%, 6.4%, 4.6%, 1.4%, 0.6%, and 0.2%. An econo-
mist is charged with calculating both persons' economic value, and
sets the baseline discount rate at 10%, which reflects the antici-
pated inflation rate and the inherent risks of these cash flows with-
out consideration of any special risk factors like exposure to
toxins.31 (These assumptions are referred to as the Standard
Assumptions, and they will be used as a standard set of data in
Section VI of this article to illustrate the different methodologies
available to calculate damages.)
Under these simple facts, the economic value of these individu-
als would differ significantly. For the unaffected individual, the
present value of the economic asset would be $805.311 For the
affected individual, the economist must factor the increased risk
into the discount rate.312 Each cash flow should be discounted by
the baseline rate plus the increased risk attributable to that year.
The calculation then yields an economic asset value of $731. 313
This shows that increased risk adversely affects a person's eco-
nomic asset value.
from an equal capital employed in any common trade."); Letter from Chairman Warren E.
Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 6 (Feb. 28, 2002) (insurance business
has value if the cost of float, earned premiums less underwriting losses and expenses, is less
than the cost to funds), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf
(last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
310 This discount rate would consider the baseline risk to these cash flows (e.g., risk of
future unemployment, decrease in earning power or other factors that pose risks to these
cash flows) and the anticipated inflation rates. See Richard Posner, Law and the Theory of
Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 161 (1986) (future earning
streams are not risk free, and therefore should not be discounted based on a risk free rate,
but should be discounted by a factor that considers the risks).
311 The calculation is:
9
X. $100x(1+7%)'xi=O (1+10%) ("1)
312 The concept is precisely the same as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method of
firm valuation. See supra pages 129-31 (discussing CAPM and equity valuation).
313 The calculation is:
9
1. $100x(l+7%)'x 1
i=0 (I+IO%+RdP)(i
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Some may criticize this analysis as mixing apples and oranges.
The pecuniary loss method is a theory of remedy that applies only
upon the occurrence of a loss event, whereas the concept here is
used to advance the argument that there is a loss and so liability.
When viewed through the traditional legal prism, this criticism is
fair. The pecuniary loss method is a theory of remedy that presup-
poses liability for the injury of death. Even this criticism, however,
breaks down under traditional tort doctrine dealing with property
loss claims. For instance, suppose a defendant's negligence
changes the nature and character of a cherished work of art that
has been with a family for many generations; and the adverse
change reduced the value of the artwork by $100, but the owner
does not plan to ever sell the painting (so the harm would never be
monetized). Of course, the property damage for decreased asset
value would still be cognizable. If so, why is there no cause of
action for a decrease in value when a defendant's negligence
changes the essential nature and character of the person by
decreasing her economic asset value? As previously noted, one
answer could be that the value of a human being should not be
compared to property. But on the flip side, the law has no trouble
in valuing human life in wrongful death lawsuits, and one might
well query whether not providing remedies for diminished asset
value marginalizes the uniqueness and importance of our value.
Another answer could be that property has a trading market and
therefore the interest in property is cognizable. True, there is no
formalized market for human beings as there is for works of art or
other property. Yet in reality each person is traded in the daily
transactions of life. Such trading value is not exclusively based on
economic value, but there is no question that economic and health
values are consequential factors in our lives. Still another answer
could be that calculating a decrease in value is considered inher-
ently speculative. Indeed, one suspects that this is the reason that
lies at the heart of the traditional rule.314 This criticism would be
valid, if true, but damages can be calculated under sound financial
principles and with a measure of quantitative rigor, while keeping
in mind that the law does not arbitrate the correct or incorrect with
mathematical precision but instead allocates right and wrong with a
sense of fundamental fairness.315
314 See supra note 10.
315 This is keeping in mind that the nature of these cases, like any other lawsuits, is
inherently uncertain. See King, Causation and Valuation, supra note 25, at 1375 (courts
have generally not required "mathematical precision" in providing damages). The law is a
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From a financial economics perspective, a decrease in economic
value is a tangible harm in and of itself. This decrease in economic
asset value is not an abstract notion. Just as stocks are traded in
the market, so too each person is assessed and "priced" in the daily
transactions of life.316 This is the case in most everyday economic
transactions such as the securing of credit and employment.317
Again, an insurance transaction illustrates the point in concrete
terms. Life and health insurance companies are in the business of
assessing each person's "asset" value, and they price the risk to
that asset. Any significant exposure to harmful elements will result
in an increase in life insurance premiums, which means that the
insurer perceives the expected value of that person to be decreased
by the increased risk. The fact that businesses and life partners
take out life insurance on those on whom they depend confirms
that each person has an economic asset value. Life and health
clearly are insurable interests and increased risk decreases the
value of that interest. Thus there is no reason why the decrease in
the economic asset value of a person should not be recoverable.
D. Increased Risk as a Negative Value Option
Increased risk also presents an option scenario. This option can
be likened to a financial derivative instrument because its value is
the uncertainty itself. A financial option and an increased risk
option are different in two fundamental ways: an increased risk
option is not purchased but is involuntarily imposed; and the con-
tingency in an increased risk option always has a negative value.318
These reasons support the conclusion that, from an option theory
perspective, increased risk is a harm and should be a legally cogni-
zable injury.
Option theory can be used to analyze the increased risk problem
and calculate damages. There are several considerations here.
First, an option always has value until expiration. In this case, the
social science, and it cannot be explained in neat, absolute equations. Nor is it appropriate
to overly rely on precise mathematics to explain what are essentially human interactions.
See Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. Rav. 1329 (1971) (explaining the limits of relying on mathematical precision to
decide cases).
316 Scholars have recognized that livelihood and educational value constitute significant
economic asset values that require protection by the law or financial markets. See gener-
ally SHILLER, supra note 294.
317 See supra Section II.B (discussing credit transactions).
318 If a financial option is far "out of the money," its value could be almost worthless.
Nevertheless, until expiration, an option theoretically always has positive value.
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value is always negative. Second, option value is calculated by con-
sidering, among other things, the dynamic nature of time and
risk. 19 Third, options can be exercised before expiration. In
increased risk cases, the victim has a choice between waiting for a
manifestation of injury, assuming no time bar due to statute of lim-
itations, and suing now for increased risk damages.3 2 0 Robinson
emphasized this multiple optionality:
I do not propose to require victims to pursue recovery for
risk if they prefer to await the outcome and seek compensa-
tion for actual injury. The question is whether there is rea-
son to deny an action to a risk victim who does not want to
wait, say, a decade to find out whether injury ensues. 321
Of course, the choices are mutually exclusive: if a plaintiff sues for
an increased risk injury, she cannot later sue for a physical injury
upon manifestation. An option represents a choice, and once the
choice is made, it cannot be undone.322
E. Causation Revisited
The problem of causation has been the Gordian knot in this
field, and so we return to the issue again. Because increased risk
cases lead to an aggregate under-compensation of plaintiffs and
under-deterrence of wrongful conduct, some courts have relaxed
the evidentiary burden of the causation element.323 Some scholars
have cautioned that such ad hoc "tinkering" could lead to signifi-
cant confusion,324 while others have proposed eliminating the cau-
sation element altogether to serve moral justice.325  The
elimination of causation would certainly brush aside the apparent
319 See supra Section II.D; infra Section VI.B.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 150-151 (discussing statutes of limitations); infra
Section VII.B (proposing that the statute of limitations be abolished in increased risk
cases).
321 Robinson, supra note 25, at 788.
322 A purchaser of a call option cannot prematurely exercise an option and then seek
additional compensation if the stock price subsequently rises. The common law incorpo-
rates this concept. In the situation above, courts would apply the principle of res judicata
to bar plaintiff from suing again. Courts may even extend the principle of assumption of
risk, which allocates risks based on voluntary undertaking to bar such suits. See PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 1, § 68, at 480-98.
323 See, e.g., Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 679 (Ore. 1973) (susceptibility
to meningitis, though not probable and no more than a possibility, was admissible evidence
(relying on Boyle v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 170 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1961), and subsequent inter-
pretation by Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967))).
324 King, supra note 24, at 1370.
325 Berger, supra note 9, at 2117.
[Vol. 23:111
2004] Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms 183
doctrinal hurdle standing in the way of some form of a proportion-
ality scheme.
While a radical solution, the elimination of causation is not
unprecedented, as seen in the development of the market share
liability announced in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.326 The plain-
tiff in Sindell was injured by exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES),
but could not prove which manufacturer of the drug caused the
injuries. 327 Describing the DES cases as "recurring circumstances"
where defendants will consistently escape liability on causation
grounds,32 8 the California Supreme Court allowed recovery based
on the proportion of economic benefit each manufacturer
received.32 9 The court relied heavily on a student written law
review article, which explained away the elimination of causation
this way: "cause-in-fact results from the fictional presumption that
each defendant is the cause because jointly, there is a high
probability ... that the product manufactured by some one of the
defendants, all of which behaved tortiously, caused the specific
plaintiff's injury. "330 In the final analysis, the court concluded "as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury."'3 31 Once again, the use of legal
fiction to bypass traditional tort doctrines is apparent.
This article does not depend on the theoretical considerations of
market share liability and so takes no position on its merits.332 Nor
326 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
327 Id. at 926. There were approximately 200 drug manufacturers, any one of which
could have made the drug that injured the plaintiff. Id. at 931.
328 Id. at 936; see also Levmore, supra note 221, at 721-26 (suggesting the use of a pro-
portional liability rule for "recurring wrongs").
329 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
330 Naomi Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 963, 996 (1978).
331 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)); see also
Sheiner, supra note 330, at 1000 (noting that the "basic policy" underlying the theory is
"that as between the innocent plaintiff and the tortfeasors, the tortfeasors should bear the
cost of the injury"); Gary Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 618 (1992) ("The Sindell rule achieves
the fairness goals of tort law by affording appropriate compensation to the victims of negli-
gence and by imposing liability on defendants in proportion to the harms their negligence
has caused."). Sindell has generated an enormous amount of commentary. See, e.g., Glen
0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REv. 713 (1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market-Share Allocations in Tort Law: Strengths
and Weaknesses, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 739 (1990); Andrew B. Celli, Note, Towards a Risk Con-
tribution Approach to Tortfeasor Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 635 (1990).
332 One might question whether such penalties imposed against an entire industry via
common law judicial remedy is more appropriately done as a legislative function. Cf. Elli-
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does it rely on a theory that would eliminate causation. This state-
ment is only contradictory if the assumed injury is a future physical
harm. But if the injury is the increased risk itself, then proof of
causation requires a showing that the defendant, and not any other
source, imposed (caused) the increased risk. A plaintiff should not
be able to recover by showing that a defendant could have caused
the injury without more, as was the case under Sindell. A plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
increased her risk. For liability to be assessed, the risk must be
traced back to the defendant under traditional tort principles, con-
stituting a specific transactional nexus between plaintiff and defen-
dant, and only then should the risk be measured for the purposes
of awarding damages.
VI. VALUING DAMAGES
A. Current Methods
Proof of damages is part of a plaintiff's prima facie negligence
case.333 Increased risk cases should be no different from ordinary
negligence actions in terms of proving a prima facie case of breach
of duty, causation and damages.334 If a plaintiff cannot prove dam-
ages by legally sound methods, she should not recover even though
liability may have been proven. In supporting the traditional rule,
courts have reasoned that an award of proportional damages is tan-
tamount to speculative damages. A frequently cited early case is
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court observed, "It is clear that the recognition of an 'enhanced
risk' cause of action, particularly when the risk is unquantifiable,
would generate substantial litigation that would be difficult to man-
age or resolve." 335 For obvious reasons, the prospect of speculative
damages is a significant issue and the Ayers court is correct in that
damages must be quantifiable.
ott, supra note 29 (proposing legislative remedial solutions for increased risk liability).
with respect to increased risk harms, they are properly within the judicial realm of com-
mon law negligence once it is accepted that the law should recognize freedom from
increased risk as a protected interest, the violation of which results in injury, and the plain-
tiff has properly identified the specific tortfeasor who injured her through the provision of
proof of causation.
333 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 165.
334 Under the proposal here, causation would be established by showing that the defen-
dant's conduct caused an increased risk of harm to the plaintiff. This must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence, but the degree of harm is not a relevant issue for causation
purposes. Of course, it is highly relevant for damages.
335 525 A.2d 287, 307 (N.J. 1987).
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In increased risk cases, there are two components of a damage
calculation. One is the present value of the anticipated physical
injury. The other is the increased risk itself. The former is gener-
ally not difficult to determine and is standard fare. Calculating the
increased risk is a different story. Increased risk must be shown by
scientific evidence.336 There are various methods of proving the
increased risk,337 and no method is without some uncertainty as to
its conclusions. Although scientific evidence may be uncertain and
have epistemic limitations,338 a plaintiff still has the burden of
proving damages in increased risk cases.
There are two methods of damage calculation currently in prac-
tice. Under the traditional rule, damages are assessed at the full
present value of the anticipated future injury. Under the propor-
tionality rule, damages are assessed by multiplying the propor-
tional increase in risk by the present value of the anticipated
injury339-an approach termed the "single outcome" method. 340
Both methods are two-variable functions, the variables being the
risk and present value of total damages. The changing nature of
risk as a function of time is not considered.
In addition to these two methods, Joseph King proposed a vari-
ant of the proportionality rule. Under his "expected value"
method, the increased risk is a fixed value, but the present value of
the anticipated injury changes as a function of time. 341 For exam-
ple, assume that a defendant's negligence increases a plaintiff's risk
of death by 25%. Death may occur at successive time periods T1, T2
and T3, and the probability of occurrence in each period is 5%,
336 By now, calculating damages for personal injuries is standard fare even where the
injury is death. Courts have routinely admitted into evidence expert testimony on
increased risk even when such risk failed to meet the burden of proof under the traditional
rule. See King, supra note 24, at 1386 & n.111 ("As a purely technical matter, valuing
chance appears to be well within the competency of science."); Petriello v. Kalman, 576
A.2d 474, 484 (Conn. 1990) (actuarial tables of average life expectancy and medical statis-
tics can be used to assist the factfinder in assessing damages).
337 There are generally four methods to prove increased risk and general causation:
structure-activity analysis, in vitro analysis, in vivo analysis and epidemiological analysis.
See Berger, supra note 9, at 2123-26 (explaining these methods).
338 See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 674-95 (1992) (noting that scientific evidence is
subject to numerous uncertainties); Berger, supra note 9, at 2129 (same).
339 See Petriello, 576 A.2d at 484; Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 372 (I11.
2002); see also Robinson, supra note 25, at 787 (stating that damages should equal the
"present value of future losses multiplied by the estimated probability of their
occurrence").
340 King coined this term. King, supra note 24, at 1383.
341 Id. at 1384.
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15% and 5%, respectively. Assuming that the longer a plaintiff is
deprived of life the greater the damages would be, the present
value of damages is $300 for period T1, $200 for period T2, and $100
for period T3. Under the expected value approach, the damage is
calculated as a weighted average, in this case $50.342 King advo-
cates the expected value method because it is more accurate than
the single outcome method.343
This article proposes that the traditional and proportionality
schemes are unsatisfactory and overly simplistic. Both schemes
may overcompensate the plaintiff, but for different reasons. The
traditional rule may overcompensate a plaintiff because she would
recover 100% of any future injury though the probability would
range from 51% to 99%. The single outcome and expected value
methods fail to consider the lapsing of risk over time, and so both
methods calculate the maximum potential payout, resulting in
overcompensation where the facts do not warrant such a payout.
Additionally, the expected value method is logically inconsistent in
that it purports to consider the time series of damages but assesses
damages from the fixed time perspective of the beginning term.344
While both the traditional and proportionality rules benefit from
simplicity of calculation, simplicity itself is the source of error
because calculating damages based on risk is a fluid rather than a
static endeavor.
This article proposes two alternative methods for calculating
increased risk damages. The methods focus on the two security
instruments involved: one is the negative value option, and the
other is the victim's economic asset value. These "securities" are
valued differently. Options are valued in the market under the
Black-Scholes formula. Under this method, the uncertainty itself is
valued. Equity securities are valued under the CAPM and the
DCF. Under this method, the victim herself is valued. Both meth-
ods are dynamic functions that consider the changing nature of
risk, time and value. However, the two methods yield different
damages.
342 The calculation is: (5% x $300) + (15% x $200) + (5% x $100) = $50.
343 See King, supra note 24, at 1384 ("The expected-value method therefore is more
consonant with a central purpose of valuing chance: achieving a more rational and accurate
loss allocation.").
344 In other words, the expected value method considers time as a factor, but only in
determining the present value of full damages. It does not consider the fact that risk and
time are related in addition to time and present value of damages.
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B. Option Pricing Model
We can calculate the option value of increased risk. Although
the precise mathematical expression of the Black-Scholes formula
is inapposite to a legal discussion, its underlying principles are rele-
vant because analogies can be drawn between the variables that
affect the value of a financial option and those that affect an
increased risk option. In particular, the notions of strike price, cur-
rent price, time to maturity and volatility can be imported to a legal
setting. Black and Scholes postulated that under certain condi-
tions,345 "the value of the option will depend only on the price of
the stock and time and on variables that are taken to be known
constants. ' 346 This is the key applicable concept.
The distance between the current stock price and the strike price
determines whether the option is in the money or out of the money
at any given time.347 For a call option, if S > X + P, then the option
is in the money. The more S exceeds (X + P), the greater is the
profit. The strike price represents the inflection point. We can
therefore construct an increased risk option where the strike price
is the individual's baseline risk for the particular harm (i.e., the risk
of a particular illness or death from natural causes or causes attrib-
utable to factors other than the defendant's negligence) and the
current stock price is the increased risk.348 The greater the spread
between the individual's baseline risk and the increased risk, the
greater is the damage.
Time to maturity is a significant variable. For a financial option,
the more time that remains in which it can be exercised, the greater
is the opportunity for the option to become in the money (and so
345 These assumptions are: (1) short-term interest rate is known and constant, (2) the
distribution of stock prices is lognormal, (3) stock pays no dividends, (4) the option is
"European" in that it can only be exercised at maturity, (5) there are no transaction costs
in buying or selling options, (6) it is possible to borrow fractions of shares, and (7) there
are no penalties for short selling. Black & Scholes, supra note 68, at 640. These assump-
tions are largely financial details that have little or no applicability to an increased risk
option.
346 Id. at 641.
347 See id. at 638 ("In general, it seems clear that the higher the price of the stock, the
greater the value of the [call] option. When the stock price is much greater than the exer-
cise price, the option is almost sure to be exercised.").
348 In epidemiology, this concept is expressed as relative risk. See Klein, supra note 9, at
1198 n.128. Relative risk is the ratio of risk incurred by the exposed persons (R) over the
risk associated with the general populace (R 2). Id. If R,/R 2 is 1.0, then the exposed per-
sons' risk is no greater than that of the non-exposed population. If the relative risk is 2.0,
this means that the exposure doubled the risk.
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the greater the value). 34 9 All else being equal, each passing day
theoretically decays the value of a financial option. A similar con-
cept works for damage calculation. Just because a plaintiff was
once subjected to a 20% risk of disease does not mean that twenty
years from now she will still have the same risk if she is symptom
free. A plaintiff's risk will decrease on a daily basis, albeit imper-
ceptibly. As a plaintiff survives over the course of time, the
nonevent of a physical injury is data relevant to the remaining risk
and should also be relevant for damage calculation.35 °
Lastly, a stock's volatility affects option value. 351 The greater the
price fluctuates (regardless of direction),352 the greater are the odds
that the current stock price will exceed the strike price. Volatility
can be represented by a stock price distribution graph, which typi-
cally takes the form of a lognormal distribution. 3  The shape of
the curve determines the "density" of the risk. If the curve is
tightly banded and the apex is steep, the stock has lower volatil-
ity.354 If the curve is broadly distributed with a lower apex, the
stock has higher volatility. Similarly, the pattern of disease mani-
festation can be graphed over a period of time.
An example better illustrates these points. Using data from the
standard assumptions of the earlier discussion,355 we can graph the
probabilities of disease manifestation and the risk density over
349 See Black & Scholes, supra note 68, at 638 ("On the other hand, if the expiration
date is very near, the value of the option will be approximately equal to the stock price
minus the exercise price, or zero, if the stock price is less than the exercise price. Nor-
mally, the value of an option declines as its maturity date approaches, if the value of the
stock does not change.").
350 Indeed, this is the situation in many cases where the exposure is discovered only after
a prolonged period. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192 (6th
Cir. 1988) (disposing ultra-hazardous liquid chemical waste over a ten year period).
351 See Black & Scholes, supra note 68, at 638-39 ("[T]he option will be more volatile
than the stock. . . . The relative volatility of the option is not constant, however. It
depends on both the stock price and maturity.").
352 That the direction of the volatility (i.e., the rise or fall of the stock price) is irrelevant
to option value was one of the key insights made by Black and Scholes. See id. at 642
(noting that "the direction of the change in the equity value is independent of the direction
of the change in the stock price"). The intuitive logic is that stocks tending to swing vio-
lently downwards also tend to swing similarly upwards, and vice versa. Therefore, volatil-
ity is important, irrespective of direction.
353 A lognormal distribution is the mathematical characterization of a bell curve-type
distribution. "A variable has a lognormal distribution if the natural logarithm of the varia-
ble is normally distributed." HULL, supra note 66, at 228.
354 Volatility is defined by variance and standard deviation. See BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 46, at 132-34 (providing mathematical formulas for determining variance and
standard deviation).
355 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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time. The top broken line represents the probability of disease
over time, and the bottom smooth line represents the distribution
of risk over time.
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Figure 3 identifies the problem facing courts. The risk spread is
the difference between the probability and the known information.
It represents the quantified uncertainty. In the beginning, the
unknown is the greatest. As time passes, so do portions of the risk.
Each day of nonoccurrence is relevant information, and more
information diminishes the uncertainty as the risk approaches time
to maturity. At the height of the latency period, around the sixth
year, if the plaintiff has not yet been injured, the likelihood of a
future injury becomes far lower.
The risk spread is the reason why courts have been hesitant to
grant damages-because the unknown is the greatest-and why
they have equated the unknown with speculation. But from a
finance theory perspective, a significant risk spread means that the
harm and so damages are at their greatest. In other words, what
the law considers "speculation" is what finance theory considers
value. Finance theory suggests that an increased risk cause of
action has the greatest value in the early stages of latency, and this
is precisely how plaintiffs are injured and why courts need to recog-
nize this injury.
Risk is a function of time. Damages for increased risk should be
calculated not as a static, linear number, but as a series of dynamic
data points. Its value will depend on the plaintiff's baseline risk,
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the increased risk, the latency period and the plaintiff's unique
actuarial factors. The baseline risk is a plaintiff's susceptibility to
the particular disease absent any negligent conduct. The increased
risk is the risk attributable to the defendant's conduct. The actua-
rial factor is the variable that could intervene to mitigate a defen-
dant's damages, e.g., the chance of accidental or natural death
before the disease manifests. Damage calculations must also factor
in the time lapsed, because if the odds of disease are distributed in
some pattern, then the lapsed time and its associated risk must be
discounted. For example, if the plaintiff waits until the fifth year to
file a lawsuit, then the lapsed risk must be considered in calculating
damages.356 Figure 4 illustrates this concept using data from the
Standard Assumptions.
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When all of these factors are combined, we can formulate a
dynamic option model for calculating damages. We denote Dpv as
356 The Black-Scholes formula assumes that stock prices are distributed in a lognormal,
bell curve distribution. Cox & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 68, at 201-02. The density of this
lognormal distribution describes the probabilities of an array of stock returns. The concept
of lapsed risk incorporates the probabilistic nature of risk and time.
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the present value of total damages. This number will depend on
the unique circumstances of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a 10
year old boy who may get cancer in the next ten years, the damages
will be different from a similarly exposed plaintiff who is 80 years
old.357 We denote R, as increased risk, which is the absolute risk of
the injury less the baseline risk; RL as the total lapsed risk in per-
centage terms; and A as the actuarial factor that should discount
the damages to consider the possibilities of an intervening cause.
358
The formula for damages then is: D = Dv x (RI - RL) - A. This
formula is a three variable function, the variables being time, risk
and total damages. This method is probably as sophisticated as the
damage calculation should be under option principles.359 The law
deals not in the precision of mathematics, but in justice as mea-
sured by rationality of process and method.
The application of option pricing principles to damages shows
that even the proportionality rule has the potential to overcompen-
sate the plaintiff. If freedom from increased risk is a legal interest,
then damages should reflect the negative value of that risk as it
changes over time and with other variables. An option model is
more accurate than the traditional and proportionality rules.
C. Economic Asset Model
If damages are perceived as the change in the economic asset
value of the victim, the damages are simply the difference between
the pre- and post-exposure asset values: D = EAVpre - EAVpo,.
These values can be calculated under the DCF valuation principles.
The two key components of a DCF analysis are the accuracy of the
projected cash flows and the discount rate. The adage "garbage in,
garbage out" is as apropos here as it is in calculating the value of
IBM. At trial, projections and discount rates are routinely and
hotly contested by opposing experts, and increased risk cases
would be no different. To calculate the pre-exposure value, the dis-
count rate and projected cash flows are established by an econo-
mist. To calculate the post-exposure value, the economist would
require data on the increased risk and the risk density.
357 King recognized these differences in the expected value damage calculation method.
See King, supra note 24, at 1383-84.
358 The actuarial factor would be redundant if the discount rate used to calculate the
present value of damages factors in actuarial risks. Krauss & Levy, supra note 298, at 348;
Posner, supra note 310, at 161-62.
359 Efficiency of information and plentitude of data distinguish the financial markets
from the legal marketplace. Accordingly, the value of financial options can be calculated
by using precise mathematical formulas such as the Black-Scholes formula.
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The post-exposure discount rate should be the baseline discount
rate plus the increased risk associated with each time period. It is
important to note that the aggregate increased risk is not added to
the baseline rate for each year. The overall increased risk is spread
across the entire latency period per the risk density, and each
year's increased risk is a fraction of the overall increased risk. To
use this damage calculation method, the scientific evidence must
provide a risk distribution across the latency period.
D. Comparison of Methods
We can compare the various methods of damage calculation by
using the Standard Assumptions. From this simple set of data, we
can calculate damages based on the economic asset, option pricing
and proportionality methods. These calculations are done for each
of the years 1 through 10 so that the differences in the methods are
highlighted on a year by year basis.
The first step common to each of these methods is calculating the
pre-exposure economic asset value, which can also be seen as the
full present value of damages.360 The asset value is the sum of the
present value of all cash flows. The earnings are discounted to pre-
sent value by the baseline discount rate. As each year expires, the
asset value naturally decreases. The calculations produce the fol-
lowing results.361
TABLE 1
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Earnings 100.0 107.0 114.5 122.5 131.1 140.3 150.1 160.6 171.8 183.8
Asset Value 805.3 785.8 757.4 718.6 668.0 603.7 523.8 426.1 308.1 167.1
Under the proportionality method, damages are calculated by
multiplying the above asset values by the aggregate increased risk.
3W Each of these methods incorporates King's concept of changing values of damages
over time. See King, supra note 24, at 1384. For simplicity, the damages are economic and
do not include pain and suffering.
361 The baseline discount rates for years 1 through 10 are: 0.9091, 0.8264, 0.7513, 0.6830,
0.6209, 0.5645, 0.5132, 0.4665, 0.4241, and 0.3855. For convenience, each year after Year 1
represents the future value for that year, and the future values have not been converted to
present value at Year 1. This makes sense because the damages depend on which year the
plaintiff files suit, and depending on that reference year the damages will differ and cannot
be standardized to Year 1 as if the lawsuit was always filed immediately after exposure.
Therefore, for each year, the set of discount rates used are the same as those used in years
1 through 10, except that Year 1 "slides over" to Year 2. In other words, in calculating the
damages for Year 2, the cash flow for Year 2 is discounted at Year l's rate of 0.9091 and so
forth.
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Under the option pricing model, the asset values are multiplied by
the net risk. Under the economic asset method, the above asset
values are subtracted by the post-exposure asset values.362 Table 2
summarizes the results of these calculations.
TABLE 2
Damages Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Economic Asset 74.1 68.7 61.1 51.1 38.7 24.8 11.8 4.1 1.4 0.3
Option Pricing 159.4 153.2 141.6 121.4 88.2 41.1 11.5 3.4 0.6 0.0
Proportionality 161.1 157.2 151.5 143.7 133.6 120.7 104.8 85.2 61.6 33.4
A graph of the data set shows the dynamic nature of risk and
time and the differences among the damage methodologies.
FIGURE 5
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As seen in Figure 5, the greatest damages are in the early years
for all three methods. This is consistent with the observations that
risk is the actionable harm and the risk spread is greatest in the
362 Unlike the calculation for pre-exposure asset value, the discount rates are not the
same and do not "slide over" on a year by year basis because the unique increased risk is
different each year. Each rate is separately calculated based on the particular risk for that
year and the number of years out from the reference year. For example, the discount rates
that factor in the risk distribution for years 1 through 10 are: 0.9074, 0.8220, 0.7352, 0.6401,
0.5263, 0.4021, 0.3852, 0.4216, 0.4038 and 0.3786 which assume corresponding discount
rates of 10.2%, 10.3%, 10.8%, 11.8%, 13.7%, 16.4%, 14.6%, 11.4%, 10.6% and 10.2%.
9 10
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early years. Under both the option pricing and asset valuation
models, the diminution in damages accelerates with time because
lapsed risk and time value are factored into the calculation. The
asset valuation model produces the lowest valuation because the
underlying risk is spread throughout the entire lapsed period,
which is then factored into the discount rate. This has the effect of
time-adjusting the risk, which results in reduced influence of risk
that is further out in time on the present value of damages.
It may surprise some to see that the proportionality rule pro-
duces the highest level of damages even though it has been sug-
gested as being fairer than the traditional rule. The higher values
are due to the static treatment of risk; damages only decrease with
time because the victim's asset value decreases. 363 The proportion-
ality method overcompensates the victims of increased risk
because risk is not viewed as a function of time and therefore a
fluid analysis. This accounts for the fact that in the early years the
option pricing and proportionality methods produce similar results,
but as time lapses, there is a widening disparity in valuation.
At this point, it must be asked whether the option pricing and
economic asset methods of damage valuation exceed the ability of
the plaintiff to produce the necessary data. If the data cannot be
produced, the methods are merely academic. Both methods do not
require significantly more information than the single outcome and
expected value proportionality models for damage calculation.
They require data that is one level more detailed than a single
probability increased risk: specifically the risk density, or the distri-
bution of risk over time. This additional data requirement, how-
ever, is not insurmountable.
Thus far, courts have simply worked with the concept of a single
number increased risk.364 At trial, epidemiological and other scien-
tific evidence may be simplified in terms of a single aggregate
probability,365 a sort of "bottom line" for the factfinder. But all
science involves collection and analysis of data. If scientific evi-
dence exists to determine the "bottom line" figure in the first
place, then in many cases the underlying data supporting that con-
363 See King, supra note 24, at 1384.
364 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) (25%
to 30%); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 482 (Conn. 1990) (8% to 16%); Davis v.
Gambardella & Son Cheese Corp., 161 A.2d 583,587 (Conn. 1960) (50%); Dillon v. Evans-
ton Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 366 (Ill. 2002) (5%).
365 Based on the available case law, plaintiffs have been able to introduce expert testi-
mony on increased risk. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205.
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clusion would show the underlying properties of that risk, including
how that risk is distributed.366 The damage calculation methods
suggested in this article would require evidence that is only one
level more detailed than the requirements of the current legal
scheme.367
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. General Considerations
The concept of a statute of limitations is entrenched in American
jurisprudence.368 With a few exceptions,369 scholars have not
extensively studied statutes of limitations, perhaps because they
are so pervasive and accepted.37° There are three primary justifica-
tions for a statute of limitations. First, it provides defendants peace
of mind by barring liability for conduct after a specified period.37'
Second, it promotes vigorous investigation and prosecution of
claims by plaintiffs, and such investigation advances the interests of
justice by securing fresh evidence and facts.372 Third, it curtails the
number of cases filed, and such limitations are said to benefit the
legal system.373
Statutes of limitations have long been criticized for the arbitrari-
ness of barring an otherwise valid claim on the basis of time
366 Like many things, certain diseases are not randomly distributed. For instance, it is
commonly known that testicular cancer is most prominent in younger men up to their late
30s, whereas prostate cancer is most prevalent in older and middle aged men. Other dis-
eases exhibit a certain signature.
367 In producing a single value increased risk, epidemiological data would show other
factors such as the distribution of risk across time, geography, race, sex, and other factors.
Dore, supra note 39, at 432.
368 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation ... are found
and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence."); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J.
Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454 (1996)
(statutes of limitations are "ubiquitous").
369 One commentator has argued that statutes of limitations as applied to toxic tort liti-
gation are fundamentally unfair, and therefore endorses its elimination on constitutional
grounds. See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic
Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683 (1983). The article argues that statutes of limitations for
claims that necessarily have a long latency period "effectively destroy the only means avail-
able for vindicating the victim's constitutionally protected right of personal security." Id.
at 1702.
370 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 368, at 454 ("With few exceptions, the policies on
which limitation of actions is based rarely have been the object of serious study.").
371 Id. at 460-71.
372 Id. at 471-83, 488-92.
373 Id. at 495-500.
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lapse.374 Such a procedural bar conflicts with the strong public pol-
icy of resolving claims on the merits.375 Despite these grumblings,
statutes of limitations are firmly planted in the jurisprudential land-
scape and will not be jettisoned any time soon.
That said, I note a few obvious observations. Statutes of limita-
tions never favor plaintiffs. As discussed, one way to view a law-
suit is as an option, and a statute of limitations puts a maturity date
on this option.376 Whatever tangential benefit plaintiffs may get
from being incentivized to prosecute their claims is more than off-
set by the preclusive effect.377 As a corollary, statutes of limita-
tions always favor defendants.378 Since their inception, defendants
have sought to apply them as an affirmative defense, and plaintiffs
have fought to escape their preclusive effect.379 These general
observations hold true in all fields of law and in all circumstances.
The simple explanation for this effect is that litigation is a two
party, zero-sum game. The options are typically simple, and pro-
duce polar payoffs where what is good for one is bad for the other.
Where, however, multiple options are available to parties, each
with its own benefits and costs, this simple calculus no longer holds.
B. Suboptimality
It is not within the scope of this article to present a broad-based
study of statutes of limitations. Rather, this article argues that the
statute of limitations should be abolished for increased risk cases
on efficiency grounds. If the substantive rules proposed in this arti-
cle are adopted, the singular situation is created where the applica-
tion of a statute of limitations presents a suboptimal solution for
both plaintiffs and defendants. Under the rules proposed here, a
374 Oliver Wendell Holmes once asked: "What is the justification for depriving a man of
his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?" Id. at 454
(quoting Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897)).
375 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 368, at 500 (citing Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 702
P.2d 563, 566 (Cal. 1985)).
376 See supra note 351 (discussing how time to maturity affects option value).
377 Under an option analysis, a claim represents an option for plaintiffs. The option is a
positive value option because outside of litigation costs (which represent the option pre-
mium) the option has only a potentially positive return. A statute of limitations imposes
an expiration date on the claim, and as such terminates what is otherwise a positive value
option.
378 As an option, a lawsuit always has positive theoretical value for a plaintiff until the
time of judgment for defendant. This does not consider the litigation costs, which can be
seen as the option premium.
379 Rules of civil procedure require that statute of limitations be pleaded as an affirma-
tive defense. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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statute of limitations would have the effect of terminating a plain-
tiff's option to sue later, which would incentivize more lawsuits and
increase costs on defendants and the judicial system. More impor-
tantly, a statute of limitations imposes a barrier to informational
efficiency for both parties. This informational inefficiency would
be unique in the law because it works against the interests of both
parties. It is easy to see how eliminating a statute of limitations
always benefits plaintiffs, and so this discussion will focus on how
defendants benefit from its elimination.
We begin by analyzing the effects of an independent tort for
increased risk under a statute of limitations regime. For simplicity,
the discovery rule is not at issue because we assume that a plaintiff
is immediately aware of the wrongful conduct, suffers some inci-
dental physical effects from the exposure that triggers the statute
of limitations, and the choice of filing suit or not is made contem-
poraneously. Under this scenario, a plaintiff has no practical
choice but to sue now for increased risk because failure to do so
would preclude both claims for increased risk and the physical
injury.380 The incentive to do so is clearly seen from Figure 5,
which shows that the risk spread is the greatest in the early years
and significantly decreases after the passage of time. Thus, plain-
tiffs are incentivized to file suit immediately.
This lawsuit may not be the most economically rewarding out-
come given the transaction costs of the litigation. Nor may it be
the plaintiff's preference given the noneconomic costs of the litiga-
tion, i.e., few litigants enjoy the litigation experience. The follow-
ing denotes the three potential outcomes where CE is the economic
transaction cost of litigation, CN is the noneconomic cost, and D is
the present value of increased risk damages.
D > CE + CN -- File Suit
D < CE + CN -- No Suit
D = CE + CN - Possibly File Suit
380 The discovery rule does not help the plaintiff who is aware of the defendant's wrong-
ful conduct, but whose full injury manifests after the expiration of the limitation period (or
symptoms of the full injury manifest within the limitation period though the full injury
manifests far later). Under the traditional rule, the plaintiff is caught in a Catch-22 where
she must prove the future injury by a preponderance of the evidence or waive the claim
because the latency period would in most cases exceed the limitation period. See supra
notes 150-151 and accompanying text. Therefore, under the proposal here (without the
elimination of the statute of limitations and without a mechanism to split the cause of
action), the plaintiff's action would essentially be an action for increased risk, and a lawsuit
for the future physical injuries would be practically precluded.
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We assume that both plaintiffs and their attorneys are rational.
We also assume an efficient state where plaintiffs and their attor-
neys have conducted due diligence and are well informed of the
risks of litigation and its potential rewards and costs. If the
expected reward outweighs the expected costs, plaintiffs would be
incentivized to file suit, and vice versa. When faced with a "use it
or lose it" option, the economically rational choice would be to file
suit unless the cost of the lawsuit outweighs the potential rewards.
Moreover, the noneconomic litigation cost is marginalized by the
prospects of losing the potential for all remedies. In a sense, the
litigation choice presents the certainty of having the opportunity to
pursue a potential remedy at no or little out-of-pocket economic
cost in a contingent fee arrangement, whereas foregoing the choice
subjects the plaintiff to the uncertainties of her incurred risk. The
clear choice is the preference towards certainty. Since the poten-
tial damage awards are significant even when the increased risk
may be relatively low, many plaintiffs will be incentivized to file
suit because something is better than nothing, and the claim preclu-
sive risk of not filing is too great. Under these circumstances,
defendants will face a greater probability of defending more law-
suits and the concomitant exposure to both liability and transaction
costs.
The increased risk option prevents distortions of the
noneconomic cost of litigation and litigation incentives. Consider a
legal regime where there is no statute of limitations. Under these
circumstances, a plaintiff would not be so quick to file suit. With-
out a statute of limitations, a plaintiff has two options: a vested
option to file suit for increased risk, and an unvested option to file
suit for a future physical injury. These options are mutually exclu-
sive, and the selection between them is the dilemma for the plain-
tiff.38' Importantly, the primary concern for an average plaintiff
would be to receive remedies in the event a physical injury
manifests. The costs of harm are greatest (even catastrophic) when
physical illness occurs, and since most people are risk adverse to
large losses, we understand that many people may prefer to keep
the unvested option open even at the cost of relinquishing another
option with less potential value. This is not to diminish the harm
caused by the increased risk itself; as discussed, the plaintiff has an
option to choose a cause of action for increased risk or physical
injuries. But clearly, given the choice between remedying
381 See supra text accompanying note 322.
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increased risk or physical harm, a plaintiff would rationally choose
the latter. Thus, there may be a benefit to a "wait and see"
approach, if the risk of preclusion is removed from the equation. If
the plaintiff waits, she will either develop a physical injury or not.
If she incurs the physical injury, she can sue and recover the full
damages (which is the optimal result from the perspective of rem-
edy). If she does not incur the disease after a prolonged period
(which is the truly optimal scenario), she has greater information
that she probably will not incur the physical injury at which point a
lawsuit for increased risk damages may make no sense.
Thrown into the mix are the option pricing and economic asset
methods for damage calculation. Both methods decay the damages
with time. The more the plaintiff waits, the greater her incentive
becomes to continue to wait and preserve the option to sue for
physical injuries. If it looks like she will not incur the physical
injury, then she may not mind the loss or diminution of a cause of
action for increased risk. The cost barriers to filing suit would
surely increase, but the plaintiff would still preserve the right to
recover remedies upon the occurrence of a physical injury. Thus,
the "wait and see" approach is self-enforcing.
From a defendant's perspective, the longer a plaintiff waits, the
better off the defendant will be. Being subject to fewer lawsuits is
always a good result for defendants. With the passage of time,
there is better information about the future injury and so damages
will be diminished. The passage of time also can make the adminis-
tration of justice more difficult for plaintiffs as extraordinary litiga-
tion risk increases. When a plaintiff opts to wait, the cost of this
risk is voluntarily assumed, and it increases with the lapse of time.
The net result is that there will be fewer lawsuits filed, as many
plaintiffs will forego one option for another, which may never vest.
The key factor in these cases is information. It is information, or
a lack thereof, that creates the problem in increased risk cases.
Greater information benefits both parties, but it can only be
achieved with the passage of time. 382 As time lapses, the risk
spread narrows as more information becomes known and the risks
decrease. The information collected with time is neutral in the
sense that it benefits both plaintiffs and defendants, though for dif-
ferent reasons. A legal regime under a statute of limitations does
382 This assumes that scientific knowledge will not advance so far that we can predict
whether and when a physical injury will manifest. Perhaps someday science can answer
these questions, which will moot the concepts of this article and the legal problems it seeks
to address.
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not allow the parties to capture this information, but rather forces
a plaintiff with a potential case to file a lawsuit to preserve her
rights, even if her preference is to wait and see rather than file
immediately. Eliminating the statute of limitations provides
greater information efficiency, which will translate into fewer law-
suits, reduced transaction costs, and superior allocation of reme-
dies to the more costly injuries. Because the substantive rules
proposed by this article create multiple options, the unique circum-
stance in law is seen where a statute of limitations would be subop-
timal for plaintiffs, defendants and the judicial system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As society progresses and knowledge develops, the law some-
times needs to reassess the interests it protects. This reassessment
can be triggered by changing social expectations (as was the case
for negligent infliction of emotional distress), greater technological
and cultural developments (as was the case for invasion of privacy),
or increased knowledge and information regarding particular
harms (as should be the case for increased risk torts). The sole
purpose for writing this article was to show that increased risk
inflicts real harm. This should not be a surprising conclusion
because there is a rational price at which victims will pay to be free
of increased risk of severe physical injury. This obvious fact alone
substantiates the point that risk has value. It also highlights the
question of why courts would deny this choice. The law's approach
has been to compartmentalize the harm into the distinct categories
of injury. Unfortunately, increased risk does not fit neatly into the
current tort paradigm. of legal interest and injury, and that is the
problem. The point of reference has been the injury troika. But
describing the harm from increased risk is more complex than the
simplistic categories of bodily harm, property damage or economic
loss.
This article proposes that there is harm outside of the current
injury troika. Increased risk inflicts harm by adversely affecting
the integrity of a person's inherent value, or capital asset. The
interest that should be protected is the right to her value and free-
dom from unwarranted imposition of costs (defined in a broader
manner than just economic out-of-pocket costs). Viewed through
the prism of financial economics, these costs are both tangible and
intangible, and some are readily acknowledged by the legal system
as independent injuries while others clearly are not. They are the
costs of future medical monitoring, the negative impact on the per-
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son's quality of life, the increased insurance costs, the extraordi-
nary litigation risks created by uncertainty, the imposition of a
negative value option, and the diminution of her economic asset
value. Collectively, these harms are too real and great to ignore,
and they justify the legal recognition of an interest in freedom from
increased risk. Thus the increased risk problem should be one of
valuation of damages and not liability.
Because the risk of a future injury is generally categorized in the
context of a physical injury, courts and scholars have become
bogged down in obtuse discussions of causation and speculative
damages that wander the wilderness of legal fiction and epistemol-
ogy. If, however, increased risk is recognized as a legally protected
interest, most of the thorny legal and logical issues are naturally
resolved. There is no need to rely on the fiction of a personal
injury because the injury is the increased risk itself. There is no
need to speculate about the future because the harm is a current
one. The Gordian knot of causation is also unraveled neatly and
without doing violence to cherished legal doctrines. A plaintiff
need only prove that she incurred increased risk, and the defendant
caused it. This approach is not only simpler, but is also more faith-
ful to the traditional doctrine requiring proof of breach of duty,
causation and injury, each of which is an independent element of a
prima facie case of negligence.
Finance theory also has application to damage valuation. In the-
ory, the traditional rule could over- or under-compensate victims.
In practice, few situations ever give rise to an increased risk meet-
ing the preponderance standard, and so the traditional rule signifi-
cantly under-compensates victims in the aggregate. This has led
many commentators to endorse the more equitable proportionality
rule. The proportionality rule is a step in the right direction, but
this rule tends to overcompensate victims. By failing to account for
risk as a function of time, a concept firmly rooted in financial eco-
nomics, the rule produces linear results that do not accurately
reflect the true damages.
This article suggests that increased risk damages should be calcu-
lated by using securities pricing techniques. Both option pricing
and economic asset valuation methods consider the dynamic
nature of risk. The option pricing model quantifies the underlying
uncertainty itself as applied to the plaintiff's situation. The eco-
nomic asset model calculates the damage to the plaintiff's eco-
nomic potential, a form of human capital asset, and which is
recognized in limited fashion under current legal doctrine. These
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methods produce nonlinear damage calculations that reflect the
available information, as is done in the financial markets.
Lastly, when increased risk is considered in this light, we see that
the imposition of a statute of limitations promotes a suboptimal
solution for all concerned. A statute of limitations reduces a plain-
tiff's options, which is never good for the plaintiff. It also is a bar-
rier to informational efficiency because it prevents plaintiffs and
defendants from obtaining more information regarding the
increased risk. Informational efficiency better matches liability
assessment and remedy allocation, and could reduce the number of
lawsuits and the transaction costs associated with them. For this
reason, under the proposal here, the statute of limitations should
be abolished.
